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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis seeks to fill a void in the banking performance literature by (1) proposing 
a cross-system bank productivity assessment methodology that can be applied to both 
conventional and Islamic banking and (2) implementing this methodology on a dual 
banking system to gauge the comparable productivity of Islamic and conventional 
banks relative to one another in a banking system that has experienced deregulation 
and consolidation. 
The growing significance of Islamic banking cannot be overlooked as its growth in 
recent years has significantly outpaced conventional banking. This new banking 
duality trend profoundly impacts the relative competitiveness of both banking systems 
and this in turn, may significantly affect the allocation of scarce financial resources 
between conventional and Islamic banking.  This necessitates comparable 
performance measurements of the two banking systems. Banks’ productivity 
measures are excellent indicators of their competitiveness levels. Nevertheless, 
Islamic banking has attracted minimal attention largely due to the great difficulties in 
obtaining measures that are methodologically comparable.  
Traditional bank productivity evaluation framework cannot be indiscriminately 
applied to Islamic banks because they operate on fundamentally distinct principles. 
Islamic banking conducts financial transactions in strict conformance to Islamic 
precepts that prohibit the receipt and payment of interest and speculative risk taking. 
Instead, Islamic banks mobilize surplus funds into financing productive investments 
and share in the profits and losses of a venture with the investors and the fund 
providers. Given the basic functions of financial intermediation of both systems which 
are fundamentally the same, it is argued that a cross-system comparable bank 
productivity measurement that adequately accounts for the unique characteristics of 
conventional and Islamic banking can be derived.  
This study theoretically demonstrates that under the intermediation approach to 
productivity measurement, both systems may be placed on an equal footing, hence 
enabling the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) within the Data Envelopement 
Analysis (DEA) Framework to be viably employed as a comparable productivity 
measure of conventional and Islamic banks.  Empirical evidence is then obtained by 
testing this model on data drawn from banks operating within the Malaysian dual 
banking system benchmarked against Singaporean banks between 1996 and 2002 to 
capture the effects of the 1997-1998 financial crisis and the subsequent bank 
consolidation episode.   
The empirical evidence obtained shows that Islamic banking operations (IBO) were 
more productive than conventional banking schemes (CBS) since 1997 due to the 
migration of funds that resulted from: (1) the Islamic banks’ ability and willingness to 
offer higher rates of return compared to the relatively lower deposit rates available in 
conventional banks and (2) the growing scale inefficiencies among conventional 
banks that followed the financial crisis. IBO tend to operate at more efficient scale 
sizes than do conventional banks. Nevertheless, the IBO experienced technical regress 
on average compared to CBS as the majority of the IBO were Islamic banking 
schemes operated by conventional banks that were able to leverage on the 
technological investments and other competencies of their parent banks. Consistent 
with these findings, the study shows that full-fledged Islamic banks were the least 
productive banks and they exhibited strong performance similarities with 
conventional banks. Nevertheless, the findings suggest a prevalence of asset-liability 
imbalance among the IBO due to a unique and heightened risk profile of the IBO. 
Subsequently, Islamic banking schemes operated by foreign banks were found to be 
more productive due to the greater contributions from their off-balance sheet activities 
that partially offset the problems of asset-liability mix problems.  
This study also concludes that foreign commercial banks had outperformed domestic 
commercial banks despite the restrictive regulation on branch and Automated Teller 
Machines (ATM) network expansion that was  imposed on the former. Overall, the 
foreign conventional banks (FCB) were more efficient than the domestic conventional 
banks (DCB) and this difference was largely due to the FCB being more scale 
efficient than domestic banks following the onset of the financial crisis and the bank 
merger exercise that involve all DCB. The empirical findings showed inconclusive 
evidence as to the presence of post-merger gains among merged bank entities and the 
transmission of these gains to the public.  
Both the theoretical  and empirical results provide a viable dimension to the call for 
comparable performance measurement between conventional and Islamic banks. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
           INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1: Changes within the Global Banking Industry in Transforming Banks’ 
Role of Financial Intermediation. 
The past two decades have witnessed revolutionary changes within the 
banking industry worldwide due to rapid financial deregulation, consolidation, 
technological advances and financial innovation. These forces profoundly 
impact upon the role of banks as financial intermediaries in pooling financial 
resources from surplus units and allocating them to deficit units for investment 
purposes that ultimately generate economic growth. Keen competition brought 
about by financial deregulation alongside rapid advances in information and 
communication technology ICT and development in finance theory have 
resulted in financial innovation with financial intermediaries, including banks, 
providing households and firms with new investment opportunities to earn 
higher returns and manage greater risks. Here, financial engineering takes 
place where financial intermediaries undertake a systematic approach in an 
attempt to develop better financial solutions to the specific problems of their 
customers taking into account the current state of technology, finance theory 
and regulation (Merton, 1995).  
 
Although financial innovation is typically associated with the production of a 
new financial product or instrument, it may also involve an entirely new 
financial intermediary system. This is because, from a functional perspective, 
financial intermediation pools and optimally allocates scarce financial 
resources in an uncertain economic environment (Merton, 1995). Here, it is 
important to note that while the most efficient institutional structure for fulfilling 
the financial intermediary function may differ, the basic role of financial 
intermediation would remain the same. In other words, the functional notion of 
financial intermediation holds that existing institutions will not necessarily be 
preserved as competition and technological advancements drive institution 
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structures to change towards one with greater efficiency in performing the 
roles of financial intermediation (Merton, 1995). 
 
Structural changes in financial intermediation institutions are apparent in the 
banking industry today. Cost reductions from technology advancements, 
progress in finance theory and enhanced competition induced by financial 
markets deregulation in the last decade have led to rapid financial engineering 
process and bank consolidation the world over. Financial engineering 
nevertheless has resulted in banks operating across geopolitical divisions to 
differ markedly from one another owing to differences in size, complexity, 
available technology, political, cultural and historical backgrounds, giving rise 
to a number of different “banking systems” that still perform the same financial 
intermediation function. 
 
In this dynamic new banking environment, the competitiveness of a particular 
banking system not only depends on the banks’ overall operating efficiency 
but also on banks’ ability to carry out financial innovation as they respond to 
new technological changes. Hence, banks’ productivity measures are good 
indicators as to how competitive banks are as the industry continues to 
evolve. Since it is expected that relatively unproductive banks will lose their 
market shares and be replaced by more productive ones, the same 
conclusion can be made about a particular banking system vis a vis another. 
This is consistent with the functional financial intermediation view that 
institution structures are always changing towards those that are more 
efficient in performing the financial intermediation roles.  
 
This process can now be readily observed in the global banking industry as 
Islamic banking is fast becoming a widely accepted alternative mode of 
banking to that provided by conventional banks. Against this backdrop, 
comparable banks’ productivity measures between Islamic and conventional 
banking can serve as ideal indicators determining the competitiveness as well 
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as the eventual dominance of either Islamic banking or conventional banking 
over the other with the passage of time.  
 
1.2: Advent of Islamic Banking as the New Financial Intermediary 
System: Challenging Conventional Banking as an Alternative Banking 
Mode 
 
1.2.1: Islamic Banking: Basic Theories and Principles 
Most financial market participants, be they borrowers, lenders, investors, bank 
shareholders or regulators, are familiar with and engage/transact in 
conventional banking, whereby banks perform the financial intermediation 
process by charging interest on advances extended to borrowers and paying 
interest to compensate depositors for providing the source of funding with the 
objective of making a profit on the spread or margin in between. In many 
countries however, particularly in countries that have a sizable Muslim 
population, the banking public are now fast turning to Islamic banking as an 
alternative banking mode to conventional banking. Islamic banking is a form 
of modern banking in which the financial intermediation process is based on a 
number of Islamic legal and economic principles developed in the first 
centuries of Islam that uses risk-sharing methods instead of interest-based 
financing (van Schaik, 2001).  
 
Islamic banking conforms strictly to the Sharia principles  that set Islamic 
financing apart from conventional financing. There are three broad Sharia 
rules that govern Islamic banking. (1) The first and the most fundamental of 
which is the strict prohibition on riba or the practice of usury that has been 
loosely translated by Islamic scholars as the practice of charging and paying 
interest (Al-Deehani et al, 1999). (2) The second is the ban on financial 
involvement on economic activities considered sinful in Islam such as 
gambling and the production of liquor and pork. Finally, the third Sharia rule is 
the injunction to avoid gharar or the accumulation of wealth through excessive 
risk-taking that involves uncertainty (Al-Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996).   
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 Unlike the conventional banking system, Islamic banking embraces the 
concept that profits can only be earned by the acceptance of risk (Schoon et 
al, 2003 ). Therefore, instead of taking interest, Islamic banks mainly operate 
profit and loss sharing (PLS) financing contracts by directly engaging in 
investment projects with finance users where depositors are regarded as 
shareholders of the bank or a particular deal and they are not guaranteed a 
nominal value or a pre-determined rate of return on their deposits (Al-Omar 
and Abdel-Haq, 1996). In other words, there exists a partnership between 
Islamic banks and surplus units (depositors) on the one hand and with the 
deficit units (investors) on the other in managing financial resources to finance 
productive uses, and hence, the process is akin to an equity financing 
arrangement rather than one of debt financing (Lewis and Algaourd, 2001).  
 
In all Islamic banking dealings, economic considerations are subordinated to 
moral considerations that serve the developmental interests of the community 
as a whole where profitability is not the sole criterion in evaluating the 
performance of a bank (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996). Because these 
concepts are fundamentally foreign to conventional banks, Islamic banking 
thus represents a unique financial engineering process that takes on a whole 
new efficient institution form that deviates from conventional banks, in that it 
has a different banker-customer relationship and hence provides an 
alternative mode of banking to conventional banking.  
 
1.2.2: The Growth of Islamic Banking in Recent Decades 
Profit sharing financial intermediation arrangements actually predate Islam. 
But it was not until the birth of Islam that interest-free financial intermediation 
based on profit-sharing principles were institutionalized across Muslim 
countries (Lewis and Algaourd, 2001). Nevertheless, Islamic banking 
centuries back was mostly organized around simple profit sharing 
arrangements and did not develop into a large scale financial intermediation 
system that was able to mobilize large sums of funds from the surplus units to 
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the deficit units. The prevalence of Islamic banking in Muslim countries began 
to fade as conventional banking took over following the colonial period. 
Nevertheless, Islamic banking was revived in the 60s and 70s following the 
resurgence of Islamic thoughts in the Muslim world at that time. Despite the 
experimental nature of its revival, Islamic banking has since expanded into 
more than 70 countries, most of which are Muslim countries in the Middle 
East and South Asia (Lewis and Algaourd, 2001). The size of funds mobilized 
by Islamic banking has not been extensively researched but is estimated 
among experts involved in the industry to be around US$200 billion in assets 
mobilized (Hassoune, 2002).  
 
At the present most Muslim countries have some type of Islamic banking 
although the degrees of practice conformance vary between countries. Lewis 
and Algaourd (2001) identified two basic forms of expansion of modern 
Islamic banking. The first involves the process of converting the entire 
financial intermediation of a country from a conventional system to a full-
fledged Islamic system. The only countries that had adopted such an 
approach are Pakistan, Iran and Sudan. The majority of other countries 
followed the second approach. In the second form, there are deliberate 
attempts by both the regulator and the market participants to establish Islamic 
banks to compete with conventional banks but essentially they maintain a 
mixed system where conventional banks and Islamic banks co-exist.  
 
Islamic banking is now truly a worldwide industry and is no longer confined to 
full fledged Islamic banks in Muslim countries only. Surprisingly, much of the 
innovation in Islamic banking has been driven by non-Muslim financiers (Ariff, 
2002). Banks such as Citibank, ANZ, ABN Amro, Goldman Sachs, HSBC and 
Deutsche Bank are actively involved in Islamic banking through their Islamic 
banking units or subsidiaries. Already, several large international banks have 
conveyed an interest in setting up separate Islamic-finance subsidiaries on 
large scale to target lucrative niches in Islamic mortgages and car finance and 
to compete with existing ones such as Citibank’s Citi Islamic Bank, HSCC’s 
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Amanah and USB’s Noriba (Kaleem). Others including JP Morgan, Deutsche 
Bank and American Express, have started to introduce interest-free products 
to their customers (Haron and Ahmad). Even the Dow Jones has established 
stock market indices of sharia-compliant companies as non-Muslim 
multinational corporations ranging from General Motors to IBM and Daewoo 
have began to use interest-free funds and services (The Economist, 2003). 
 
1.3: Competition and Challenges in Islamic Banking Operations 
Despite the evident growth rates, Islamic banking, like any other financial 
intermediation system has its own critical and pressing issues. One interesting 
development in Islamic banking for instance, has been the dominance of 
international conventional banks, rather than Islamic banks, as they overtake 
Islamic banks as the main providers of Islamic finance products given greater 
outreach to growing demand for such products via their extensive branch 
networks (Ariff, 2002).  
Because Islamic banking is still in its infancy, domestic Islamic banks continue 
to experience lack of risk analysis and management capability, lack of 
qualified professionals, lack of product diversification and service quality, cost 
ineffectiveness and non-maturity of secondary markets vis a vis their foreign 
conventional counterparts (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996). As Section 2 will 
explain, Islamic banking is particularly vulnerable to the heightened risk of 
equity funding, moral hazard and adverse selection, political pressures, 
reduced avenues for risk hedging and potential friction with the interests of 
central banks and regulators that oversee operations of authorized depository 
institutions. Arayssi (2003) for example found that inefficient decisions are 
often made when it comes to financing investments while Aggarwal and 
Yousef (2000) found a general lack of commitment from Muslim governments 
to fully develop Islamic financing options. The authors also found the high 
levels of information asymmetries in Islamic banking operations in developing 
countries. These factors would no doubt have significant impacts on the ability 
of Islamic banks to generate attractive returns. 
 
 6
At the same time, although Islamic banking is often argued as a form of 
ethical banking with priority assigned to moral considerations over that of 
profit, nevertheless, the growth of Islamic banking in international 
conventional banks has been mostly driven by the profit motive (Al Omar and 
Abdel-Haq, 1996). Despite the fact that many of the fully-fledged Islamic 
banks have been trying to fulfill the religious expectations of socio-economic 
growth, they usually end up losing market share to conventional banks that 
partake in Islamic banking with the sole objective of earning economic profits. 
In this regard, Islamic banks are often at a disadvantage compared to 
conventional banks because conventional banks are not prevented from 
adopting Islamic banking practice if it proves to be viably profitable (Al Omar 
and Abdel-Haq, 1996). By contrast, Islamic banks cannot issue all the 
financial instruments available to conventional banks.  
 
With globalization, the biggest threats to Islamic banking would come mainly 
from foreign competition and takeovers because Islamic bank units are 
generally small with 2/3 of them having less than the critical banking minimum 
of $500 million worth of assets (Ariff, 2002). Given the rapid financial 
deregulation the world over in preparation for the full implementation of the 
GATS signatory agreement, internationalization of financial markets is 
inevitable and as the once highly segmented Islamic financial markets with 
considerable national differences become more integrated and standardized, 
Islamic banks are getting less isolated, the gap is expected to widen further in 
a dualistic banking market (Brown, 2003). 
 
1.4: The Need for A Comparable Bank Productivity Evaluation 
Methodology 
The complete rejection of the use of interest rates obviously poses the 
question of whether Islamic banking will continue to strengthen based on its 
profit and loss sharing framework and ultimately challenge conventional 
banking in providing an alternative financial intermediation system that offers 
not only higher returns on a more ethical basis but also make desirable 
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contributions towards developing society. This is further compounded by the 
fact that the very nature of Islamic banking exposes participating banks to 
greater risks than are typical of the conventional system; this risk would have 
significant bearings on their ability to generate adequate returns.  
 
There is no doubt that Islamic banking has proven to be a viable modern 
banking mode based on its impressive track record but there is less certainty 
in Islamic banking’s ability to compete with conventional banking in mobilizing 
financial resources on a much greater scale, given the unique risks and 
circumstances that participating banks face in successfully carrying out profit 
and loss sharing operations. After all Islamic banking has only a mere 20-year 
history as a modern banking system.  
 
The continued process of financial deregulation, consolidation and integration 
worldwide would pose further questions about the sustainability of Islamic 
banking expansion. To be able to compete in this new competitive 
environment for instance, Islamic banks therefore must become competitive 
not only against other domestic Islamic and domestic conventional banks but 
also against foreign conventional banking that operates Islamic banking 
windows. A comparable bank performance evaluation framework in terms of 
productivity would enable one to effectively benchmark and rank both 
conventional and Islamic banks against one another. Ability to do so could 
reveal relative competitiveness of both banking systems within an increasingly 
“dualistic” banking industry. Empirical results from which would greatly assist 
decision makings by savers, borrowers, regulators, policy makers as well as 
the banks themselves.  
 
To date, most available knowledge of bank productivity comes from the 
scrutiny of conventional banks in US and Europe. Islamic banks have 
attracted minimal attention so far mainly due to the difficulties in rendering 
productivity measures that are comparable. The very few studies that exist on 
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Islamic bank performance meanwhile have obtained their data inputs from the 
highly  
regarded BankScope database. Due to the reporting of certain variables 
prohibited by the Sharia in these studies and the non-availability of 
BankScope’s data selection and inclusion policy, the empirical findings 
derived are questionable. The conventional banking productivity assessment 
approach cannot be automatically applied to Islamic banking since the 
underlying principles and mechanisms behind each banking system are 
fundamentally different. Without due consideration to this factor; relative 
productivity results may be biased towards one over the other. This flaw may 
render the performance results incomparable and theoretically incorrect 
These factors point to the need for a comparable bank productivity 
performance assessment between conventional and Islamic banks. A detailed 
analysis of the results would provide in-depth insights into roles that both 
Islamic banking and conventional banking will play in the coming years in 
mobilizing financial resources from deficit to surplus units on a global scale as 
the financial intermediation continues to become more dynamic. 
 
1.5: The Aims of this Study 
The main aims of this study are threefold.  
 
First, to explore the different characteristics of Islamic banking and propose a 
viable comparable productivity measurement methodology that is applicable 
to both conventional banks and Islamic banks. To do so, this study argues 
that because the basic financial intermediation function remains identical in 
both systems, comparable variables for both conventional and Islamic banks 
can be obtained and hence a viable and comparable assessment 
methodology can be constructed. This new methodology would not only able 
to adequately capture the different characteristics of conventional and Islamic 
banking but also yield meaningful performance comparisons in an accurate 
and unbiased manner.  
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 Second, to implement this methodology in order to assess the productivity 
changes (in terms of technical efficiency, scale efficiency and technical 
change) of conventional and Islamic banks in a selected dual banking system 
against a backdrop of rapid deregulation and globalization. In doing so, one 
can gauge how well  conventional banks and Islamic banks respond to forces 
of bank consolidation, foreign competition and technology advancements 
relative to one another.  
 
Third and finally, this study seeks to determine whether productivity gains, 
should there be any at all, that are the result from heightened competition 
from bank consolidation and changes in technology, are passed on to the 
public to enhance social welfare. Empirical findings in relation to this issue 
would help in answering whether the notion of “socially ethical banking” as 
proclaimed by both practitioners and Islamic scholars does indeed benefit the 
public or society relatively more than conventional banks when faced with the 
dynamics of deregulation. 
 
1.6: Summary 
Over the past 20 years, Islamic banking has risen to become an increasingly 
popular alternative system of financial intermediation that competes with 
conventional banking in both Muslim and non-Muslim economies alike. 
Islamic banking conducts financial transactions in strict conformance to 
Islamic precepts that prohibit the receipt and payment of interest and 
speculative risk taking. Instead, Islamic banks mobilize surplus funds into 
financing productive investments and share in the profits and losses of a 
venture with the investors and the fund providers.  The growing significance of 
Islamic banking cannot be overlooked as its growth in recent years has 
significantly outpaced conventional banking. This new banking duality trend 
profoundly impacts the relative competitiveness of both banking systems and 
this in turn, may significantly affect the allocation of scarce financial resources 
between conventional and Islamic banking. 
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 This necessitates comparable performance measurements of the two banking 
systems. Banks’ productivity measures are excellent indicators of their 
competitiveness levels. Nevertheless, Islamic banking has attracted minimal 
attention largely due to the great difficulties in obtaining measures that are 
methodologically comparable. Traditional bank productivity evaluation 
frameworks cannot be indiscriminately applied to Islamic banks because they 
operate on fundamentally distinct principles and feature unique capital 
structures, assets, liabilities, cost of deposits and costs of capital.  
 
This research proposes that a cross-system comparable productivity 
measurement methodology that adequately accounts for the unique 
characteristics of conventional and Islamic banking can be derived when 
based on the argument that the basic functions of financial intermediation of 
both systems remain essentially the same.  In doing so, this research also 
contributes to a void in the banking performance literature by (1) proposing a 
cross-system bank productivity assessment methodology that can be applied 
to both conventional and Islamic banking and (2) implementing this 
methodology on a dual banking system to gauge the comparable productivity 
of Islamic and conventional banks relative to one another in a banking system 
that has experienced deregulation and consolidation. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
2.1: Definition of Islamic Banking, its Practices and Salient Features 
Islamic banking is conceived to allow Muslims to transact in a system that is in 
line with their religious belief (BNM, 2003). It is practiced with strict 
compliance to the sharia or the set of divine rules or guidance derived from 
the Koran and sayings of the prophet that permeates all aspects of life in the 
Islamic faith (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996). In a nutshell, Islamic banking 
provides services to customers free from the giving and taking of interest and 
relies instead on profit and loss sharing principles. Perhaps, the most succinct 
definition of Islamic banking is provided by Schoon et al (2003) who terms 
Islamic banking as a form of financial intermediation governed by the concept 
that returns or profits can only earned by the equal acceptance of risk with the 
overriding goal of serving the interests of the community over that of personal 
wealth enrichment. Islamic banking was the primary facilitator of trade and 
economic transactions during the golden ages of Islam but was soon eclipsed 
by conventional banking guided by capitalism with the rise of the Western 
nations.  
 
In Islamic banking, one of the most important precepts in Islam is the 
establishment of economic justice through the prohibition of unjustified 
enrichment by receiving monetary advantage in any business dealing without 
giving a just counter value (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996). Here, riba or 
roughly translated; the premium that must be paid by the borrower to the 
lender along with the principal amount as a condition for the loan or an 
extension in its maturity, represents an unjustified advantage. It is commonly 
agreed by Islamic scholars that the concept of riba applies on interest-bearing 
funds for consumption and investment purposes (Islamic Fiqh Academy, 
1986)1. It is considered wrong and inequitable because whilst the earning of 
profit is uncertain, the payment of interest is predetermined and certain 
                                                 
1 As cited in Al Omar and Abdel-Haq (1996).  
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therefore encouraging a form of financial exploitation (Al Omar and Abdel 
Haq, 1996).  
 
The sharia also prohibited gharar or making profits by financing investment 
activities that entail uncertainty or speculative risks (The Economist, 2003; Al 
Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996; Chapra, 2003). Instead, earning profits in Islamic 
banking is legitimized by engaging in economic venture with a lender-
borrower relationship that is based on equitable risk-sharing between the 
finance or capital provider and the user (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996). 
Islamic banks earn profits from three principal activities: trading, leasing and 
direct financing in profit and loss sharing contracts (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 
1996). The banks are allowed to devise instruments to earn profits in any of 
these three financing methods provided the structure and conditions conform 
to the rules stipulated in the sharia (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996). 
 
2.2: Origins of Modern Islamic Banking 
The practice of modern Islamic banking formally began in 1963 with a 
pioneering experiment in Egypt, which lasted only for 4 years until 1967. 
During that period, a total of nine banks were in operation serving more than 
250, 000 depositors and they mobilized some 1.8 million Egyptian pounds (Al 
Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996). However due to a variety of political factors, the 
movement was short lived when the banks were unable to attract the required 
substantial numbers of small depositors. The movement towards 
implementing Islamic banking was revived in the 70s, this time more 
professionally, with the establishment of the Islamic Development Bank that is 
regarded by many as the turning point for the growing acceptance, 
understanding and popularity of Islamic banking (Lewis and Algaourd, 2001). 
It must be noted that Islamic banking must be distinguished from interest-free 
banking because Islamic banking is required not only to avoid interest-based 
transactions but also to participate actively in achieving the goals and 
objectives of an economy.  
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Since then, there has been a steady expansion of Islamic banks in the 80s 
and 90s. Currently, Islamic banking is operating in over 60 countries with an 
asset base of approximately $166 billion (Hassan and Bashir, 2003). In many 
Muslim countries especially in the Middle East, Islamic banks are rapidly 
gaining market shares in their domestic economies (Hassan and Bashir, 
2003). By some estimates, Islamic banking has been growing at 10% 
worldwide and about 15% in the Gulf which is much higher than the growth 
rate of conventional banking (Schoon et al, 2003). Already, Islamic banking 
has been able to mobilize some US$200 billion in assets (Hassoune, 2002)2. 
Zaher and Hassan (2001)3 even made the bold prediction that Islamic banks 
are poised to control some 40-50% of all Islamic savings by 2009/2010. For 
this reason, conventional banks like Citigroup and HSBC have started 
operating Islamic windows in the Gulf (Useem, 2002). 
 
2.3: The Dual Banking System 
With the exceptions of Iran, Pakistan and Sudan that only allow Islamic 
banking to constitute the entire financial intermediation function, Islamic 
banking elsewhere co-exists with conventional banking to varying degrees 
and proportions. They compete with and complement each other in 
performing the roles of financial intermediation. There are some three 
categories where this banking dualism exists (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996): 
Islamic banks operating in Muslim countries where they co-exist with interest-
based banks (for example, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and Malaysia) 
Islamic banks in non-Muslim countries whose monetary authorities do not 
recognize their Islamic character (for example, the Al-Baraka International 
Bank in London and the Islamic Bank in Durban). 
Islamic banks in non-Muslim countries whose monetary authorities recognize 
their Islamic character (for example, the Faisal International Bank in 
Copenhagen). 
 
                                                 
2 As cited in Brown (2003).  
3 As cited in Brown (2003). 
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The dual banking system represents a special case whereby a government-
regulated framework allows both conventional and Islamic banking systems to 
co-exist on an equal basis while competing and complementing each other at 
the same time. This is in contrast to most of the national banking systems 
cited above. In one of these forms of national banking system,  Islamic 
banking is the overwhelming preferred mode of banking with conventional 
banking being merely tolerated: while in the other system, the financial 
intermediary system is dominated by conventional banking with negligible 
Islamic banking operating on the fringe. So far, there is only one country, 
Malaysia, which has a rather developed and rapidly evolving dual banking 
system (Yackop, 2003). It is therefore no surprise that the country has taken 
the lead in developing and championing dual banking as the preferred 
medium through which to promote Islamic banking in a faster manner and to 
enhance the competitiveness of the financial intermediation system.  
 
2.4: The Fundamental Differences between Islamic Banking and 
Conventional Banking 
 
2.4.1: Distinctive Bank-Customer Relationship 
The nature of Islamic banking is similar to a partnership in which the 
depositors are regarded as shareholders of the banks and shareholders of a 
particular investment project undertaken. In this case, the relationship is one 
of direct participation and trading and not that of lender-borrower (Al Omar 
and Abdel-Haq, 1996). Islamic banks do not trade in debts as do conventional 
banks. Instead, as an alternative financial system, Islamic banks pool 
depositors’ funds in investment accounts to provide temporary equity funds to 
finance productive projects (Al-Deehani et al, 1999).  
 
In most cases, the bank acts as the agent or the mudarib and the depositor is 
the principal. Then, under a trustee management of investment accounts, 
depositors act as financiers by providing the funds while the bank acts as an 
entrepreneur by accepting the funds to undertake a venture or activity (Lewis 
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and Algaoud, 2001). However, neither the nominal value of invested capital 
nor a pre-determined rate of return on deposits is guaranteed.  If the bank 
makes profits from investing the depositors’ funds, then both the bank 
management and the depositors would be entitled to receive a certain share 
of these profits based on pre-agreed proportions. However if the investments 
incurred losses on the other hand, the depositors are expected to share in the 
losses as well. Thus, the investment account holders effectively become 
shareholders.  
 
In fact depositing funds into investment accounts is often compared to 
investing in a mutual fund or investment trust. However despite the striking 
similarities, Islamic banking operations cannot be directly compared with a 
conventional equity-based system. This is because Islamic banks only accept 
deposits from the public rather than issuing and selling shares. Although 
depositors are entitled to share in the bank’s net profit or loss, they have no 
voting rights and (unless it is musyaraka financing mode) cannot influence the 
bank’s investment policy (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). Furthermore, investment 
deposits can only be withdrawn on maturity and ideally on par value (Lewis 
and Algaoud, 2001). Because investment accounts cannot be traded, they 
have no market values. Thus, investment account holders are effectively non-
voting shareholders.  
 
2.4.2: Financial Reporting Priorities and Financial Structure 
In providing financial accounting information, conventional banks place an 
emphasis on interest rate spreads, provisions for loan portfolios and 
maturities of liabilities. Islamic banks on the other hand focus on asset 
allocation and returns on investments and trade (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 
1996).  
  
The divergence of Islamic banking from conventional banking can be better 
reflected in a comparative analysis of the financial statements of Islamic and 
conventional banks. To illustrate some of these differences and their 
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corresponding weights, a financial comparative analysis between an Islamic 
bank and a conventional bank was done by Al Omar and Abdel-Haq (1996) 
and the results are replicated in Figure 2.1. From Figure 2.1, it is apparent 
that while Islamic banks are allowed to invest in trade transactions and real 
estate operations, conventional banks are not. On the asset side of 
conventional banks, loans represent a substantial proportion while they rarely 
exists in Islamic banks and even if they do, they will be very marginal and 
interest-free. The largest portion of Islamic banks’ assets are made up of 
receivables in the form of murabahah and leasing transactions. In terms of the 
income statement of conventional banks, one would find that interest income 
and expenses constitute a major part of the statement. Again these are not 
applicable in the income statements of Islamic banks. Instead, they would be 
replaced by income from mudarabah, musyarakah, trade and leasing 
operations. Any profits gained from non-Sharia compliant activities will not be 
recognized. Furthermore, the profits of conventional banks are declared after 
deducting interest expenses payable to depositors, but in most Islamic banks 
the profits declared will be profits before deductions to pay the depositor’s 
share of those profits (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996).  
 
Deehani et al (1998) even argue that the concept of financial risks and 
modern capital structure theories are not directly applicable to Islamic banks. 
The paper demonstrated that both traditional school and Modogliani and Miller 
(MM) theories, which assume funds can only be raised through debt and 
equity, are inadequate in explaining the changes in the cost of capital and the 
determination of the market value of Islamic banks. Specifically, both the 
traditional and MM theories of capital structure assert that whilst the use of 
debt financing increases the market value of the bank, it also increases the 
variability of residual earnings available to shareholders since suppliers of 
debt are given first claim on the bank’s assets and earnings. Debt therefore 
increases the risk of bankruptcy assumed by shareholders. Consequently, 
shareholders demand a higher rate of return on capital while suppliers of 
debts accept a lower cost of debt. In the case of Islamic banks, the authors 
reasoned that since the investment account funds mobilized by them are 
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neither guaranteed nor predetermined nor do they create financial risks to 
shareholders, and they demonstrated that an increase in the Islamic bank’s 
market value do not alter its weighted average cost of capital which remains 
largely constant throughout. Islamic banks exhibit a great many differences 
due mainly to the Sharia requirements and their economic substance. One 
distinctive feature has been the under-capitalization of most Islamic banks (Al 
Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996). There is also often huge liquidity in Islamic 
banks compared to conventional banks that is often attributed to the lack of 
sufficient liquidity instruments, the absence of suitable investments and 
products with adequate redemption facilities. These problems are 
compounded by the non-existence of developed secondary markets for 
Islamic instruments and the possible inability of Islamic banks to use the 
central bank as the lender of last resort. This is due to possible incompatibility 
between the two institutions (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996).  
 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Assets   Assets   
Liquid Assets 25 Liquid assets (including Treasury notes) 21
Receivables (Murabahah and others) 35 Investment and Deposits 23
Investments 24 Loans 52
Fixed and other assets 16 Fixed & other assets 4 
        
Liabilities and Equity   Liabilities and Equity   
Current & Investment Accounts 78 Deposits 90
Deposits 14 Borrowing and other liabilities 0.5
Other Liabilities 2     
Depositors Share of Profits 2     
Shareholders' equity 4 Shareholders' equity 9 
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of the components of financial statements and their 
estimated weightings for Islamic and Conventional Banks (Al-Omar and Abdel-
Haq, page 107) 
2.5: The Need for a Comparable Bank Performance Measurement 
Methodology between Islamic Banking and Conventional Banking 
 
2.5.1: Definition of Comparable Bank Productivity Measurement 
The definition of “comparability” within a “comparable bank productivity 
assessment in a dual banking system”, refers to a quality whereby users of 
bank performance information are able to discern and evaluate the similarities 
and differences between conventional and Islamic banks. Nevertheless they 
are able to juxtapose them in terms of productivity measurement on a level 
playing field. This is done without omitting relevant and reliable information 
items that may adversely affect the accuracy of the results. This 
subsequently, might impair the decision making about scarce financial 
resource allocation by the users of such information.  
 
Furthermore, one must be able to compare the productivity aspects of 
conventional and Islamic banks at both the same time and across time as well 
as between banks of the same system at one time and across time. In this 
context as well, a comparable productivity analysis must embody the 
qualitative characteristics of relevance and reliability. Relevant and useful 
information should help users to predict and confirm performance outcomes 
and also be reliable in that the information should be sufficiently 
representative of the operation of the bank concerned without bias and undue 
gross errors. Hence, comparable bank productivity measures should assist 
users to accurately measure and meaningfully compare the performance of 
conventional and Islamic banks and this should ultimately lead to sound 
decisions on efficient scarce recourse allocation.  
 
Banks that operate Islamic banking have attempted to follow international 
accounting and financial statement reporting standards in presenting financial 
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statement information to guide rational investment decisions and to achieve 
an acceptable level of transparency (Abdel Karim, 2004). Subsequently, 
performance analysis amongst these banks is usually conducted by utilizing 
data obtained from these “conventional-style” financial statements. 
Nevertheless, due to the fundamental differences of Islamic banking, some of 
the variables and classifications of assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses 
inherent in the conventional system cannot be readily applied to Islamic 
banking operations. Thus, the current financial reporting practice adopted by 
Islamic banks is likely to mislead decision makers. Banks in Islamic banking 
systems therefore require different interpretations to those made of 
information provided by their conventional counterparts, particularly in the 
areas of revenue recognition and profit-and-loss sharing with depositors.  
Some of the critical needs for a comparable bank productivity measurement 
methodology are outlined below: 
 
2.5.2: Providing Accurate Financial Reporting to Stakeholders  
The need for a comparable performance measurement between conventional 
and Islamic banks is perhaps best conveyed by one of the objectives of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). Namely to convey, in 
the public interest, high quality, transparent and comparable bank 
performance measurement information to help participants in the world’s 
markets and other users of financial information to make economic decisions” 
(Abdel Karim, 2004). The many users of such information may include 
depositors, borrowers, national regulators, policy makers, international 
regulatory bodies performing review and oversight functions such as the 
Basel Committee where even conventional and Islamic banks consider 
themselves both foreign and domestic. This is because each of them has a 
stake in the consolidating world banking system that is increasingly exhibiting 
signs of dualism, during their course of their business or operations. For most 
of them, the importance of a comparable performance assessment stems 
from the relationship they have directly and indirectly with both conventional 
and Islamic banks and the relevance would be defined by these dimensions. 
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 Banks play a vital role as financial intermediaries because they control large 
proportions of surplus financial resources and influence the degree and 
manner these resources are invested to generate economic growth. The 
public interest is best served if these scarce financial resources are efficiently 
allocated to entities that will utilize them in the best possible manner. This will 
have desirable macroeconomic effects by enhancing economic productivity 
and the standard of living at the lowest cost. Members of the community or 
the stakeholders, who make resource allocation decisions need to have 
informed reasons for their choices among alternative intermediation channels. 
For instance, investors and savers decide whether to invest in a particular 
bank that suits their preferences and have to decide who should manage their 
resources on their behalf. Borrowers decide where to obtain the most cost-
effective financing from a bank and the regulatory bodies have to decide on 
how best to regulate the banks. The efficient allocation of resources therefore 
will be optimized if the stakeholders have appropriate bank performance 
measures to base their resource allocation decisions on. Bank performance 
measures capable of summarizing both financial and non-financial aspects of 
a bank in competitive relation to its peers within the industry would serve to 
assist stakeholders in their decisions. They need to predict and confirm the 
capacity of a bank or a banking system as being able to meet their objectives 
effectively and efficiently from its existing resource base and its likely future 
effectiveness in doing so with additional resources.  
 
2.5.3: The Rapid Global Growth of Islamic Banking vis a vis 
Conventional Banking 
The impressive growth of Islamic banking over the past two decades which 
overshadows the relatively lackluster performance of conventional banks 
warrants a thorough assessment of the comparable performances of both 
conventional and Islamic banks. It is of primary interest for stakeholders to do 
so as the rate of growth in Islamic banking continues to outpace the growth of 
conventional banks. This trend is likely to persist into the future given the 
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growing opposition against conventional interest-based banking systems in 
Muslim countries that is widely considered as a “bad moral” philosophy of 
capitalism that propagates a host of undesirables besides usury including 
speculation, volatility and inequality (Useem, 2002). After all, a majority of 
Muslims only accepted conventional banking practice under the principle of 
darura, or overriding necessity because, until recently, they have had little 
option of using an alternative banking system that conforms to their religious 
precepts (Useem, 2002). This development needs to be taken seriously by all 
parties since the popularity of Islamic banking may profoundly affect the 
efficient allocation of financial resources between conventional and Islamic 
banking systems. This view is shared by Zaher and Hassan (2001) that made 
bold predictions of Islamic banks poised to control some 40-50% of Muslim 
savings by 2009/2010 from an estimated global population of over 1 billion. It 
is well known, that a number of Muslim countries, such as Kuwait, Bahrain 
and Qatar are among the most resource-rich countries in the world. One only 
needs to contemplate the destabilizing effects induced by excess liquidity in 
the 1970’s, when the world financial system was flushed with petrodollars 
from the Middle East region, a consequence of the two oil crises of the 
decade, to see the potentially profound impact of the prediction made by 
Zaher and Hassan (2001)  about the perils to the world banking industries and 
financial system. Furthermore, with an increasing number of Muslim minorities 
residing in developed countries, conventional banks would have to radically 
change their traditional operations if they want to continue to do financial 
business with Muslim communities (van Schaik, 2001).  
 
Indeed, whilst Islamic banking was initially greeted with scepticism by 
developed economies in the recent past, it is now well received with great 
interest (Aziz, 2000). The current and potential size and scale of Islamic 
finance can no longer be ignored by conventional banks the world over. 
Hence, it is not surprising then that a number of international conventional 
banks in non-Muslim countries, that are readily equipped with extensive 
distribution networks at their disposal,  amongst whom could be included; 
HSBC, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, ANZ Amro, Grindlays, Keinwort Benson, 
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Union Bank of Switzerland and Girozentrale of Austria, have all taken steps to 
be actively involved in Islamic finance. They do this by operating Islamic 
financing windows, to strategically position themselves accordingly in order to 
capture meaningful shares of the Islamic banking market (Mohammed Ali, 
2002). In fact, it has been estimated that there are nearly 200 banks and 
financing institutions worldwide that operate Islamic banking/financing 
controlling some US$200 billion in assets (Mohammed Ali, 2002). With an 
average annual growth of about 10% worldwide and about 15% in the Gulf 
which is much higher than the growth rate of conventional banking (Schoon et 
al, 2003), Islamic banking appears to appeal to stakeholders much more in 
their efficient resource allocation decisions than conventional banks do. Even 
a number of major non-banking institutions such as General Motors, Daewoo 
and IBM have partly resorted to Islamic financing due to its attractive features.  
 
In this regard, the ability to benchmark conventional and Islamic banks 
relative to one another by undertaking comparative bank performance 
analysis would greatly assist stakeholders including industry players to 
identify the relative superiority and competitive edges of both conventional 
and Islamic banks (Aziz, 2000). For instance, depositors or fund providers 
would be able to know which banks are operating more economically, 
efficiently and profitably by using the resources provided that better match 
their preferences in terms of amount, timing, risk and desirability of returns. 
These issues form the very reasons for the provision of resources so that 
future decisions about scarce resource allocation can be adjusted 
accordingly. On the other hand, regulatory bodies performing oversight 
functions and policy makers would be able to know which banks have been 
able to achieve the public interest of higher economic and standard of living 
growth much more effectively and efficiently so that suitable policies and 
regulatory frameworks can be devised to maximize the potential. 
 
Benchmarking can also become a powerful managerial tool for identifying key 
features of the most efficient performers in the banking industry and relative 
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performance gaps. In doing so, both conventional and Islamic banks stand to 
benefit tremendously by discovering their own competitive positions within the 
banking industry relative to one another. They also become aware of possible 
avenues for improvement by setting standards and targets for measures of 
efficiency, effectiveness, innovation, research and development, productivity, 
product quality and diversification and customer service. These of course 
would be likely to enhance competition within the industry to the benefits of 
consumers and the public.  
 
2.5.4: The Unique Risks of Islamic Banking 
There is a pressing need to enhance the decision making of stakeholders in 
regards to the nature of unique risks and returns of Islamic banking. Islamic 
banking in nature is a mix of commercial banking and investment banking due 
to its reliance on investment operations that devote substantial resources 
towards the development of viable projects to ensure  that depositors’ 
interests are  protected and yet achieve adequate rates of return (Al Omar 
and Abdel-Haq, 1996; Abdel Karim, 2004). Investment banking is mainly 
carried out by mobilizing funds in investment accounts which are often 
commingled with shareholders’ funds. 
 
2.5.4.1: Heightened Risk of Equity-like Funding 
First, as Sundarajan and Errico (2002) point out, the profit and loss sharing 
financing mode raises several important considerations. Specifically, because 
PLS modes closely resemble equity financing, Islamic banks are vulnerable to 
the heightened risks usually borne by equity investors rather than debt 
holders. Meanwhile, projects to be funded by PLS financing tend to be 
principally selected based on their anticipated profitability rather than the 
credit-worthiness of the finance users (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996).  Credit 
risks are therefore shifted to investment depositors. 
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In principle, the administration of PLS financing is far more complex than that 
of conventional banking. This applies to a number of areas from the 
determination of profit-loss ratios for different projects on case-by-case basis 
to  the ongoing auditing of financed projects.  In addition there are virtually 
countless numbers of ways of providing funds through combinations of 
permissible PLS contracts which depend on a bank’s in-house sharia council. 
This results in the non-standardized nature of some Islamic financial products. 
These issues underscore the high degrees of operational risks in Islamic 
banking and highlight the importance of internal controls in the protection and 
maximization of values for both equity investors and investment account 
holders.  
 
Figure 2.2 summarizes the type and magnitude of risks typically faced by 
Islamic banks relative to those of conventional banks. Asset management and 
credit analysis are crucial in managing risk in Islamic banking since Sharia 
guidelines on the use of derivative instruments to hedge risks are uncertain. 
However, these are relatively under-developed in Islamic banks due to their 
present infancy (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996). Generally, Islamic banks 
also experience a shortage of qualified professionals with the necessary R&D 
experience, expertise and institutional capacity to produce greater diversity of 
products and risks. 
 
2.5.4.2: Incentive Problems: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 
Lewis and Algaoud (2001) highlight three fundamental incentive problems that 
are inherent in Islamic banking financing: (1) the absence of collateral 
requirements, (2) the inability of banks to monitor and force entrepreneurs to 
conform with certain covenants or undertake certain post-contractual actions 
and, (3) the obligation of banks to bear expenditures incurred by 
entrepreneurs. These principal-agent issues often lead to the following 
circumstances: 
Banks attract entrepreneurs with limited resources or wealth. In the case of an 
entrepreneur who is certain of the high profitability of an intended project the 
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option of   paying fixed interest to a conventional bank would be more 
attractive than giving up a larger profit share with an Islamic bank (Al Omar 
and Abdel-Haq, 1996). Thus, when an Islamic bank competes with 
conventional banks over profitable projects, it is expected that the Islamic 
banks will be left financing less profitable projects (Brown, 2000). 
 
There is a lack of incentives for entrepreneurs to put in the efforts necessary 
to maximize the successful outcome of a project and added incentives for the 
entrepreneurs to expend beyond the levels that are deemed necessary. As a 
result, the authors pointed out that Islamic banks often need to ration the 
supply of funds towards the mudaraba financing mode. 
 
 Conventional Banking Islamic Banking 
Credit risk A A (High) 
Maturity Mismatch A A (High) 
Currency Risk A A 
Interest Rate Risk A N/A 
Risk of Trade and 
Investments 
N/A A 
Liquidity Risk A A (High) 
 
A: Applicable     N/A:  Not Applicable 
Figure 2.2: Risks faced by Conventional and Islamic Banks (Al-Omar and 
Abdel-Haq,  1996;  pp 105) 
 
According to Lewis and Algaoud (2001), these moral hazards problems are 
serious enough to put investment accounts depositors at a disadvantage. This 
follows because depositors in Islamic banking are almost akin to investors of 
mutual funds, and yet they are not entitled to voting rights and the regular 
receipt of information pertaining to the project’s or company’s management 
and activities.  These would be available to a normal shareholder in proportion 
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to the company’s paid up capital. Furthermore, investment account holders 
cannot buy or sell their shares/interests in a company or project under Islamic 
banking. This lack of control compels the depositors to constantly monitor the 
banks’ performance (See Errico and Farahbaksh (1998)4.).  
 
On the other hand, according to some Islamic scholars, these incentive issues 
can be partially resolved by the “religious and moral appeal” of Islamic 
banking whereby truthfulness among Muslim business communities is 
paramount. In fact, the practice of Islamic ideologies embodied by Islamic 
banking will minimize such transaction costs because Muslim entrepreneurs 
will always behave in ethically sound ways. Nevertheless, such views are 
often less applicable in all circumstances for various reasons. First of all, the 
effectiveness of such religious values is only rigorous in financial systems that 
are fully Islamized. However, the case is quite different in mixed systems. Erol 
and El Bdor (1989)5, Haron, Ahmad and Planisek (1994)6, Gerrard and 
Cunningham (1997)7 studied the factors that led to the growing popularity of 
Islamic banking and found that (1) religion did not appear to be the overriding 
factor leading people to accept  Islamic banking, (2) people who used Islamic 
banking wanted their transactions to be processed as efficiently as possible, 
(3) Islamic banking customers were profit-oriented and expected Islamic 
banks to outperform conventional banks. 
 
Given these circumstances it is expected that both investment account 
holders and shareholders would have added incentives to be informed of 
comparative performance measures because they can lose all their invested 
capital if particular ventures fail. For the same reason, the bulk of Islamic 
finance goes to funding trade financing and mark up arrangements where 
banks are assured of lower but more or less fixed returns that do not involve 
risk-sharing. Aggregate data compiled by the International Association of 
Islamic Banks (IAIB) indicated that PLS modes only account for some 25% of 
                                                 
4 As cited in Lewis and Algaoud (2001). 
5 As cited in Lewis and Algaoud (2001). 
6 As cited in Lewis and Algaoud (2001). 
7 As cited in Lewis and Algaoud (2001). 
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banks’ total assets with the remaining majority comprising of non-PLS 
financing modes (Sundarajan and Errico, 2002). 
 
2.5.4.3: Political Influence over Islamic Banking Profitability 
One of the more obvious issues to consider, has been the fact that in most 
countries, government borrowing constitutes a major if not the largest share of 
demand for Islamic funds. Unlike lending by conventional banks however, 
these borrowings are not often used for productive investments. In fact Lewis 
and Algaoud (2001) stressed that even those funds that are used to finance 
productive projects, often  provide very low yields. Thus, the banks are often 
faced with difficulties in not only providing but also determining satisfactory 
returns on investment funds to be in a position to be able to compete with 
conventional banks. Without the certainty of satisfactory returns, IBO may not 
be able to attract longer-term funds to fund longer-term investment that 
provides higher and more satisfactory returns.  
 
Logically, one critical question arises: Why would IBOs want to undertake 
funding of such government demands in the first place? Lewis and Algaoud 
(2001) explain that the very development of the Islamic banking concept into 
an alternative banking mode that permeates financial systems in many Islamic 
countries was very much government-led. Thus, the ability of IBOs to attract 
funds and expand their assets owes much of their success to the Islamisation 
programs initiated by many Muslim country governments. In some countries 
for example, Islamic banks are usually immune from asset seizure and 
exempted from taxation. Such guarantees are presumably taken to encourage 
investors to undertake ventures in cooperation with an Islamic bank and for 
savers to deposit their savings with Islamic banks. Therefore, the growth in 
Islamic banking has been politicized to some degree. Furthermore, one needs 
to be reminded that unlike conventional banking, Islamic banking emphasizes 
social development and solidarity as opposed to economic profitability. It is no 
surprise therefore that Islamic banks are often compelled to extend non-
profitable investment funding to finance governments’ endeavors especially 
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when  such endeavors are regarded as necessary in enhancing the 
community and social developments. 
 
Thus, the profitability of IBOs may be confounded by such political influence. 
Nevertheless, a comparative bank productivity analysis would enable 
stakeholders, especially depositors, to gauge the degrees of political influence 
over banks’ profits and ultimately, the rates of return on investments. After all, 
Lewis and Algaoud (2001) maintain that while the religious factors have 
crucial roles, Islamic banking customers are nevertheless mostly profit-
oriented. To this end, the authors cited that the most critical factors to sustain 
growth in Islamic banking are; (1) the ability to provide modern banking 
facilities supported by the latest technological advancements, and (2) the 
ability to offer rates of return comparable to those received by depositors in 
conventional banks.  
 
2.5.4.4: Risks Arising from Non-PLS Financing 
Non-PLS modes of financing may appear less risky, but they do in fact carry 
special risks that need to be recognized. In extending purchase with deferred 
delivery for example, the bank essentially agrees to buy a commodity on a 
future date against current payment and hold the commodity until it can be 
converted to cash. In this case, Islamic banks are exposed to both credit risk 
and commodity price risk (Sundarajan and Errico, 2002). 
 
2.5.4.5: Limited Availability of Risk-Hedging Instruments 
In addition to the many specific risks inherent to Islamic banks, there are a 
number of more general factors that make Islamic banking riskier and/or less 
profitable than conventional banking. To begin with, Islamic banks have fewer 
risk-hedging instruments and techniques available, since the prohibition of 
riba bars Islamic banks from being able to use conventional risk-hedging tools 
such as options, futures and forwards (Sundarajan and Errico, 2002). This is 
further compounded by the relatively undeveloped Islamic interbank and 
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money markets as well as the un-availability of suitable government securities 
based on PLS concepts. A consequence is that there are also limited access 
of lender-of-last-resort facilities from central banks (Sundarajan and Errico, 
2002). In these circumstances, Islamic banks are deeply constrained in 
managing asset-liability mismatches and liquidity levels. As a result of these 
factors, Islamic banks have historically been forced to maintain comparatively 
larger proportions of reserve assets that either yield little or no returns, 
adversely affecting their competitiveness (Sundarajan and Errico, 2002). 
 
2.5.4.6: Summary of Unique Risks in Islamic Banking 
Islamic banking practices often translate into heightened risks for investment 
account holders, whose capital value and rates of return result from 
unrestricted investment account contracts where the banks returns are not 
guaranteed. This feature is coupled with an information asymmetry where 
banks manage depositors’ funds at their own discretion, significantly 
increases the potential for moral hazard and present incentives for risk taking 
and operation without adequate capital. Apart from these issues, investment 
depositors in Islamic banks do not enjoy the same rights as equity investors 
do in Islamic banks and investors in conventional banks but they share the 
same risks (Sundarajan and Errico, 2002; Al-Deehani et al, 1999). Under 
these circumstances, corporate governance is difficult to exercise and the 
potential for undue risk-taking and moral hazard is increased.  
 
Due to the lack of implied protection for investment depositors, who should 
therefore be entitled to receive disclosure of information about the banks’ 
investment performances that better reflect the banks’ true risks to enable 
comparisons not only between Islamic and conventional banks, but also 
among Islamic banks? This is consistent with the Islamic banking framework, 
where it is expected that depositors play more active roles in monitoring bank 
performance than would conventional depositors because neither capital 
value nor returns are fixed and guaranteed. Instead they hinge upon the 
performance of the investment funds. Such added monitoring would also help 
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ensure that the rates of return paid reflect a fair application of PLS principle to 
the bank’s profit. By partly reducing the information asymmetry inherent in 
some contracts, investment account holders would be able to better assess 
the potential risks and rewards of their investments.  Consequently, they 
should be able to make flexible decisions about the allocation of their 
economic resources, and decisions about whether to continue investing with 
the same Islamic bank, or to move their savings elsewhere to another Islamic 
bank or perhaps to conventional banks to protect their own interests based on 
their risk and return preferences. Furthermore, this would prevent, to some 
degree, unsound banks being able to attract depositors by promising 
unrealistic rates of return that may crowd out serious and well-managed 
banks (Sundarajan and Errico, 2002).  
 
Moreover, information about comparable bank performance measures can 
provide the public and supervisory authorities and bodies with a better 
understanding of banks’ strategies and the potential impact of their relevant 
risks.  This places the regulatory bodies in a better position to consider unique 
regulatory frameworks that could be adapted to the uniqueness of Islamic 
banks in-order to exercise informed market discipline and effective prudential 
supervision and thus, reduce the systemic risks in the Islamic banking system 
that exist as  part of a dual banking system.  
 
2.5.5: To Ensured Sustained Future Growth in an Interdependent 
Environment 
A general lack of understanding of the principles and operations of Islamic 
banking has made it very difficult for external parties such as the central bank, 
the investing public and other conventional banks that Islamic banks conduct 
dealings with, to adapt to the structures and interpretations of financial results 
presented by Islamic banks. This often weakens the credibility of Islamic 
banks since higher costs and premiums are incurred by Islamic banks when 
conducting business with their international conventional counterparts and 
they face high degrees of uncertainty (Abdel Karim, 2004).  
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 The unfamiliarity of Islamic banking financial reporting among the investing 
public also make them more likely to discount Islamic banks’ shares and profit 
sharing contracts, thereby depressing the values of these instruments and 
thus putting Islamic banks at a disadvantage (Abdel Karim, 2004). These are 
often compounded by the many different variants of Islamic banking whereby 
bankers and institutions may find themselves confused by the different rulings 
of the different sharia councils of each bank who follow different schools (Al 
Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996; Abdel Karim, 2004). This has resulted in the lack 
of standardization that in many cases may even render the financial 
performance of Islamic banks non-comparable to each other. Thus, the non-
transparent and non-comparability of financial reporting and performance 
assessment between conventional and Islamic banks make economic 
decisions by participants in the world’s capital markets too cumbersome and 
this often hampers the ability of Islamic banks to attract sufficient funding, 
lucrative investment opportunities, shareholders’ funds and the necessary 
qualified professional talents to maintain sustained growth relative to 
conventional banking.  
 
Perhaps, the most pressing need for a comparable performance evaluation 
methodology stems from the potential conflicts between Islamic banks and 
central banks. There is a consensus among Muslim economists that Islamic 
banks should be supervised and that this supervision should encompass a 
material appraisal of the quality of management decisions especially with 
respect to the more risky PLS finance to protect clients who have invested 
their money in investment accounts against avoidable loses (Al Omar and 
Abdel-Haq, 1996). This is regarded as being necessary because even though 
Islamic banks form part of the banking system in many countries in which they 
operate, the lack of understanding and misunderstanding between central 
banks and Islamic banks can be acute, especially with regards to the 
protection of depositors, which is a priority of central banks that stands in 
contradiction with the concepts of Islamic banking (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 
1996). The difficulty faced by central banks in adapting to the structures and 
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practices in Islamic banks could result in resentment and tension in their 
relationship making central banks less willing to support Islamic banking 
especially in non-Muslim countries. 
 
The pressing need is to make Islamic banking financial and performance 
reporting comparable to conventional banking so as to improve the credibility 
of Islamic banking to inspire confidence in their users, and to enhance the 
competitiveness of the Islamic financial services sector. This requirement has 
always been acknowledged and shared by Islamic banks and has led to the 
establishment of AAOIFI in 1989 (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996). A non-
governmental organization based in Bahrain, the AAOIFI was set up to 
harmonize Islamic and conventional banking financial statements so as to 
account for the differences between Islamic and conventional banking and to 
present information on these fairly in a way that can be understood by all 
interested parties. The AAOIFI accomplishes this by setting the financial 
reporting presentation and disclosure requirements using the same principles 
recommended by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
However, at the same time they cater to the specificities of Sharia contracts 
that may not have any parallels at all in conventional banking and try to be 
consistent with the nature of Islamic banking operations (Abdel Karim, 2004). 
It is the objective of this paper in the spirit of the AAOIFI to extend the 
application of comparable financial reporting to cover comparable 
performance evaluation of Islamic and conventional banks.  
 
2.5.6: A Persistent Lack of Credible Empirical Research On a Viable 
Cross-System Bank Productivity Measurement in the Banking Literature 
The need for viable cross-system measurements is further fuelled by the 
serious void of any credible empirical research on comparable performance 
between the two banking systems. Most of the previous studies of Islamic 
banks focused primarily on expounding the conceptual principles of interest-
free financing. In fact, it has been recognized that the general lack of relevant 
and reliable data is seriously impeding any comprehensive analysis of cross-
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system bank performance measurement. Much to our dismay however, most 
of the few empirical studies of Islamic banks’ performance fail to account for 
these apparent and wide fundamental differences.  
 
In what the author found as the only close contemporary study on cross-
system bank performance analysis between Islamic and conventional banks, 
Hassan and Bashir (2003) examined the determinants of Islamic banking 
profitability worldwide between 1994-2001 by employing ratio and a 
regression model analysis that considers a variety of internal and external 
banking characteristics. The study subsequently compared the performance 
of both Islamic and conventional commercial banks based on the selected key 
ratios which were used to explain some unique performance characteristics of 
Islamic banks relative to conventional banks. Much of the data in this study 
was extracted from the BankScope database compiled by IBCA. The authors 
however applied ratios such as net interest margin and loan loss provisions 
over net interest revenue that do not apply to Islamic banking due to their riba 
characteristics. The methodology and the eventual results therefore cannot be 
interpreted with any confidence that they accurately reflect Islamic banking 
operations.  
 
Similar suspicions can also be raised on a much related but more recent 
study by Kim Brown (2003) that seeks to implement a cross-country Islamic 
bank performance measurement for the period 1998-2001. The author 
adopted a combined approach of selected ratio analysis to provide annual 
analysis relating to bank size, structure, profitability and liquidity and Data 
Envelopment Analysis to analyze the cost efficiency of the banks. The main 
source of data was once again IBCA’s BankScope database. Similar to the 
earlier study, Brown (2003) also reports dubious financial ratios such as net 
interest margins that are inconsistent with the operation of Islamic finance. 
Thus, the credibility of the findings may be questionable and can possibly be 
challenged.  
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It appears that in the wake of a serious lack of relevant and reliable bank 
performance data for Islamic banks, researchers have resorted to obtaining 
their inputs from the BankScope database. The BankScope database is a 
unique collection of micro-level banking information on some 11,000 banks 
worldwide. The directory provides not only standardized consolidated and 
unconsolidated financial statements across years, but also financial ratings, 
ownership data and extensive financial analysis functions derived from public 
financial reports and private rating service reports from Moody’s, Standards 
and Poors, Fitchs and others. The BankScope database however does not 
cover the entire bank population in a country, but rather a supposedly 
representative sample (Bhattacharya, 2003). Nevertheless, its extensive data 
coverage has led to wide usage of data by leading financial institutions, 
regulatory authorities and central banks for cross-country studies and policy 
making purposes.  
 
However as the reported findings by Hassan and Bashir (2003) and Brown 
(2003) suggest, the appropriateness of the data compiled by BankScope is 
questionable, at least in the Islamic banking context. More specifically, there 
are no clear indications provided on the sampling design used, data selection 
and inclusion policy and the extent of country-specific coverage in respect to 
different size variables. Therefore, heavy dependence on inputs from 
BankScope may result in findings and conclusions being haphazardly made, 
where the reliability, credibility and comparability may be challenged. In fact 
there are a number of studies that warn against the hasty and indiscriminate 
use of BankScope data for country-specific and cross-country studies. 
Bhattacharya (2003) for example found strong selectivity bias towards large 
banks in BankScope that renders the database sample somewhat 
unrepresentative of the actual financial market. This flaw would be much more 
pronounced  by the potentially serious distorting of actual measurements in 
the context of a segmented banking industry. This conclusion is shared by De 
Brandt and Davis (1999)8, Corvoisier and Gropp (2001)9 and Ehrmann et al 
                                                 
8 As cited in Bhattacharya (2003) 
9 As cited in Bhattacharya (2003) 
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(2001). Ehrmann et al (2001) observed that since small banks are not 
adequately covered, BankScope proves to be a poor instrument to investigate 
micro effects across banks but is capable of giving a fair description of likely 
macro effects. However, the authors recommended the use of comparable 
databases such as the Eurosystem datasets and complete data that reside at 
central banks to produce more stable and robust results 
 
As explained above, Islamic banking and conventional differ fundamentally in 
both their principles and operations. In our view, the absence of adequate 
disclosure about BankScope’s data selection and inclusion policy renders 
problematic any cross-system study that uses BankScope’s data to attempt to 
perform a comparable performance analysis between conventional and 
Islamic banks. The results from such a comparison cannot be interpreted and 
applied with confidence. Given this, the authors opinioned that because no 
cross-system studies, to their knowledge, have ever relied on other more 
credible sources than BankScope; there is a definite void within the 
voluminous banking literature on cross-system comparable bank performance 
measurement in a dual banking industry. It is thus, the aim in this study to 
pioneer one.  
 
2.6: The Conceptual Comparability Between Conventional and Islamic 
Banking 
 
Given that both conventional and Islamic banks represent two different modes 
of banking each with its own distinctive bank-client relationship, a cursory 
glance at the apparent fundamental differences in banking principles and 
actual operations would suggest that it is not possible to compare directly the 
performance of conventional banks vis a vis Islamic banks and that any 
attempts to do so would result in skewed and inaccurate conclusions. This is 
not necessarily so.  
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Here, it is illustrated that an indirect comparable performance assessment 
between conventional and Islamic banks is viable. To this end, this study 
proposes a model that is based upon the functional perspective of financial 
intermediation that holds the notion that the financial intermediation roles of 
conventional banks and Islamic banks are essentially identical despite taking 
different efficient institutional forms and structures. To do so, this study follows 
the functional perspective to derive four comparable bank performance 
variables that are applicable to both conventional banks and Islamic banks 
alike. This bank performance evaluation technique can be effectively applied 
in other dual banking cases that involve the co-existence of conventional 
banks and Islamic banks.  
 
To the knowledge of this study’s author, the proposed model constitutes a 
novel contribution to both contemporary literature and empirical research on 
conventional and Islamic banking. It deviates away from standard approaches 
employed by previous studies that failed to give due consideration and 
recognition of the non-parallels in both banking systems. This inference alone 
renders the validity and intuitive interpretation of past findings questionable. 
 
Instead of merely imposing the conventional banking performance evaluation 
model on Islamic banks, this study in contrast, builds a robust performance 
measurement model based on the underlying functional financial 
intermediation concept that recognizes the fact that for a variety of reasons 
perhaps due to the dynamics of institutional change driven by technological 
advancement, competition from banking and non-banking institutions as well 
as financial market regulation, the most efficient institutional structure for 
fulfilling financial intermediation may differ across institutions, time and 
geopolitical divisions but maintains that the basic functions of financial 
intermediation remain the same anywhere, past and present. 
 
2.6.1: The Functions of Financial Intermediaries 
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The primary function of any financial intermediary is to facilitate the allocation 
and deployment of financial resources effectively and efficiently, spatially and 
temporarily in an uncertain economy (Merton, 1995). This formal definition is 
best illustrated graphically as shown in Figure 2.3. From Figure 2.3, it is easy 
to infer that a financial intermediary essentially acts as a conduit through 
which pooled small and scattered financial resources are channeled from 
saving surplus units to deficit units who plan to undertake sizable productive 
investments. In return, the deficit units compensate the financial intermediary 
for its intermediation role while the intermediary in turn compensates the 
surplus units for the surplus funds that are made available for the intermediary 
instead of being invested on some alternative assets or investment vehicles. 
Surplus units generally receive some minimum returns to compensate for any 
loss of purchasing power to inflation. 
 
 Surplus funds Finance 
 
 
Deficit units Financial 
Intermediary 
Surplus units 
 
Compensatory returns Compensatory returns 
 
Figure 2.3: The Financial Intermediation Process 
 
The role of financial intermediation however is neither passive nor simple. 
This is because both savers and investors desire or face different yields, risks, 
liquidity characteristics and time-pattern of returns (Viney, 2000). Given these 
conflicting preferences, it is most likely that the surplus and deficit units would 
be frustrated in meeting their goals. A financial intermediary however could 
align these different preferences simultaneously and profit from its efforts 
invested to do so.  
 
 Savings/Deposit Loans
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Figure 2.4: The Financial Intermediation Process in Conventional Banking 
 
2.6.2: Conventional Banking Parameters 
Applied to conventional banking as of the case of Figure 2.4, banks pool the 
depositors’ savings and lend them to borrowers for either consumption or 
investment purposes. For its intermediary efforts, the bank charges higher 
interest on loans to earn interest revenue but compensates depositors with 
lower interest expense and earns the profits in between. Here, interest 
charged and paid by the bank are predetermined or at least made known at 
the time of contract and factors in the time value effects of money. The 
determination of interest is usually guided by market forces in the money 
markets but the interests charges imposed on the borrowers are heavily 
determined by the creditworthiness of the borrower and not the potential 
profitability of the investment projects. Payment of interest to the bank (except 
in the case of a loan default) and depositors is guaranteed regardless of the 
eventual return outcomes of the investment funded. Thus, the fixed returns of 
debt financing in conventional banking do not reflect the risks inherited by an 
investment because the depositors and the bank do not share in the profits as 
well as the losses of a particular investment. In the eyes of Islamic banking, 
this represents a form of economic injustice as the bank and depositors are at 
an advantage by making profits in advance that are divorced from the 
circumstances and crucial management of the investment and thus, putting 
the risk burdens on the borrower.  
 
2.6.3: Islamic Banking Parameters 
With some slight adjustments, the same financial intermediation framework 
more or less applies to Islamic banking as demonstrated by Figure 2.3. 
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Because Islamic banks invest funds instead of extending advances, it 
represents a form of commercial and investment banking. Due to this reason, 
Islamic banks pool together investment account savings from finance 
providers and deploy them as investment financing to fund investments taken 
by finance users. It is worth noting that owing to their nature, Islamic banks 
tend to finance profitable investments instead of consumption. In return the 
bank receives its share of profits if the venture is successful and shares them 
with the finance providers in fixed and predetermined proportions. The same 
process applies to loss sharing in the event that the investment generates 
negative returns. It should be noted that only the PLS sharing ratio is 
predetermined in advance. Whether the finance providers and the bank 
receive positive returns, depends entirely on the eventual success and 
profitability of the investment, it is not certain and predetermined (Chapra, 
2003). The funding mode of Islamic banking therefore closely resembles that 
of equity financing as opposed to debt financing. The finance providers, the 
bank and the finance users all share the risks of a particular project (Chapra, 
2003). Islamic scholars praise this economic justice because all parties earn 
their returns that correspond to equal risks assumed. Although many Islamic 
banks in general do pay surplus units simple interests to prevent the loss of 
purchasing power to inflation, compounding and time value of money effects 
are strictly prohibited (Al Omar and Abdel-Haq, 1996).  
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Figure 2.5: The Financial Intermediation Process in Islamic Banking 
 
2.6.4: Derivation of Comparable Variables 
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It may apparent by now, which comparable variables can be used to compare 
the performance of conventional banks against that of Islamic banks without 
sacrificing the crucial consideration of unique elements within each banking 
system. This study proposes the derivation of comparable variables that are 
consistent with the use of accounting figures and bank financial statement 
analysis that are used by banks’ stakeholders to guide their economic 
decision making on scarce economic resource allocation in regards to the 
banks. Careful scrutiny of Figures 2.3 to 2.5 would reveal that the elements of 
the upper financial flow belong to the balance sheet while those of the lower 
flow are disclosed in the income statement of a bank. Thus, conventional 
banks’ savings and loans can be compared with investment account savings 
and investment financing in Islamic banks, while Islamic equivalents to 
conventional banks’ interest revenue and interest expense are financing 
income and income attributable to depositors. These variables are both 
relevant and reliable. Hence, with the functional perspective of financial 
intermediation, it is viable to construct a bank performance assessment model 
that is applicable to conventional and Islamic banks by taking into account the 
specificities in both banking modes. 
 
2.7: The Effects of Bank Mergers on Bank Productivity and Efficiency 
 
2.7.1 Trends and Reasons for Bank Mergers and Acquisitions 
No single analysis of a banking sector can ignore the effects of rapid bank 
consolidation as the banking sectors worldwide are becoming more 
integrated. The last fifteen years have seen an unprecedented number of 
bank mergers the world over (Focarelli and Paneta, 2002). The trend started 
off with merger deals in the US in the 1980s but more recently, mergers of 
European banks and banks from developing countries are slowly dominating 
the scene (Cybo-Ottine and Murgia, 2000). Bank mergers and acquisition may 
be seen as a collective response by banks to benefit from new business 
opportunities and fend off threats that have been created by changes in the 
regulatory environment and technological progress (Mendes and Rebelo, 
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1999). On the one hand, the active deregulation of financial markets 
worldwide have increasingly blurred the boundaries of industries, enterprises, 
regulations, language and geopolitical divisions. On the other hand, progress 
in communication technology lowers costs of communication allowing greater 
dissemination of information across geographical, political and social 
divisions. Thus, these two forces of technology and deregulation have 
enabled even physically distant bank and non-banking institutions to become 
active competitors in any market fueling the needs for existing banks to adopt 
proactive and defensive strategies to maintain market shares and create 
shareholder value. Bank mergers, be they market oriented or pre-arranged by 
regulators, are seen as the most effective means to create value in the new 
competitive environment. 
 
2.7.2: Productivity Gains Arising of Bank Mergers: The Theoretical 
Perspective  
Bank mergers can increase value by cost reduction and/or revenue 
enhancement (Houston et al., 2001). Cost reduction can be achieved by 
exploiting economies of scale, economies of scope, eliminating redundant and 
overlapping resources, consolidating common functions, selective 
redeployment of assets, transfer of asset control to better quality management 
and enhancing capacity to invest in new and sophisticated technology and 
distribution channels. Cost cutting potential has been found to be greater 
when banks have considerable geographic overlap with cost savings 
estimated to be up to 30% of the target’s non-interest expense. Meanwhile, 
post-merger revenue enhancement can be derived from a number of possible 
sources. The most frequently cited motivations include the cross selling of 
bank services, the ability to raise interest on loans and fees and lower interest 
rates on deposits. Both cost reduction and revenue efficiencies represent the 
motivations behind most bank mergers, whether market guided or otherwise. 
 
2.7.3: The Empirical Evidence and Debate Over Productivity Gains of 
Mergers 
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The existing literature seeking to determine whether bank consolidations 
produce efficiency gains as often claimed by bank managers and executives 
can be conveniently divided into three broad categories as expounded by 
Calomiris (1999). The first category involves cross-regime comparisons that 
contrast the performance of banks under regulatory regimes that permit and 
prohibit bank mergers. The second approach attempts to analyze the causes 
and likely advantages and benefits of bank consolidations. The third approach 
examines the consequences for individual bank performances following 
consolidations that often include event studies on stock price performance of 
the bidder and the target around the date of a merger. A merger is assumed 
to create value (either through cost reduction or/and revenue enhancement 
efficiencies) if the combined value of the bidder and the target increases on 
the announcement of the merger. The conclusions arrived by these studies 
groups differ significantly. 
 
The first two categories often view mergers as the sources of enhanced 
efficiency and competition within the banking industry. Much academic 
literature on the subject suggests that there are vast potentials for bank cost 
efficiency improvements to be realized from bank mergers. Several studies 
indicate that many scale economies remain unexploited even for the largest 
banks in US (Berger and Mester, 1997; Berger and Humphrey, 1997) and in 
Europe (Allen and Rai, 1996; Molyneux et al, 1996; Vander Vennet, 2001). 
Berger et al. (1999) find that this was more particularly so in the 90s than in 
the 80s due to technological progress, regulatory changes and favorable low 
interest rate environment, conditions that are still present today. Meanwhile, 
there is conclusive evidence that banks exhibit substantial X-inefficiencies that 
range somewhere between 20-25% of total costs (Berger and Humphrey), 
suggesting that mergers may substantially improve cost efficiency in the event 
of a relatively efficient bank acquiring relatively less efficient ones.  
 
Yet a majority of the studies within the third category conclude that these 
potential cost efficiency gains are seldom realized. Studies on US banks find 
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on average, little or no cost X-efficiency improvements (DeYoung 1997; 
Peristani 1997; Berger 1998). It is also noted that evidence from a number of 
studies support the premise that pre-consolidation efficiency may not 
necessarily be maintained (Berg 1992; Berger 1992; Pilloff 1996; Akhavein et 
al., 1997; Berger, 1998; Huizinga, 2001). These findings lend credence to 
Avkiran (1999a) who suggested bank mergers appear to be based on 
perceived economic and political gains rather than conclusive mathematical 
findings that can be substantiated. The academic literature on the value gains 
from bank mergers also creates a troubling paradox: empirical evidence from 
event studies find little wealth creation but reported instead little or no 
improvement on post-merger operating performance relative to their peers 
(Piloff, 1994; Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; Berger et al, 1999; Kwan and 
Eisenbeis, 1995) although Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) found abnormal 
returns on average associated with large bank mergers in Europe that are 
consistent with a cost efficiency explanation of bank mergers. Cybo-Ottone 
and Murgia (2000) however ascribed the difference to different structures and 
regulation regimes between US and EU markets. This paradox in general has 
even led some researchers to conclude that the current wave of mergers 
reflect non-value maximizing motivations of bank managers such as 
channeling expenditures according to private preferences that destroy value 
for the acquiring shareholders (Ryan 1999; Gordon and Rosen, 1995). 
 
2.7.4: Bank Mergers and Benefits to the Public 
On the other hand, Akhavein et al (1997) and Berger (1988) found that US 
bank mergers from both the 80s and the 90s actually improved profit 
efficiency. Given the evidence that mergers often fail to upgrade cost 
efficiency, improved profit may be attributed to widespread use of increased 
market power. This is not surprising given that mass consolidations lead to 
higher market power and concentration and these heightened the possibility 
of anti-competitive pricing. Further as quoted from Akhavein et al. (1997), 
there are real concerns about the trade-off between possible gains in 
operating efficiency if there are any, with the possible efficiency losses from 
the exercise of greater market power in light of the frequent occurrence of 
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mega-mergers in the banking industry. Previous studies have generally 
concluded that consolidation leads to less competitive pricing and thus harms 
consumers. In a banking study by Prager and Hannan (1998)10, the authors 
highlighted that bank mergers reduced deposit rates. Sapienza (2002)11 
meanwhile reports that loan rates increase when the target has a large local 
market share. Kahn et al. (2000) concluded that large in-market mergers lead 
to increased market power that manifested itself in rises in personal loan 
rates. 
 
Thus, while merged entities may become more productive, there is no 
certainty that the gains will be passed on to consumers via lower prices, wider 
product range of improved quality and better services. This is because 
consolidation yields increased market power to the merged entities thus 
resulting in higher prices and less desirable product mix, quality and services 
(Focarelli and Panetta, 2002). For instance, while an in-market merger is 
expected to result in cost savings when redundant bank braches are closed 
down, such savings cannot be sustained over the long run unless the savings 
result from improved institutional efficiencies in the operations of the acquiring 
and target banks (Avkiran ,1999). If not, the public could end up paying for 
products and services at rates above competitive prices.  Furthermore, many 
bank products are price inelastic particularly when in the case of the retail 
banking sector and localized markets. Customers may agree to pay more if 
there is little option or incentive in shifting to a new bank or if there is a 
general maneuver made by all banking groups in unison. The eventual 
outcome therefore rests on the magnitude of efficiency effects relative to the 
magnitude of market power effects. Avkiran (1999) best summarizes the 
scenario by stating the possibility of increased market penetration create 
monopoly power and as such, merged entities are less inclined to improve 
service at better prices. Therefore, there is a major debate about whether 
some form of unfavorable prices may be passed on to the consumers through 
increase in loan rates and/or decrease in deposit rates. 
                                                 
10 As cited in Focarelli and Panetta (2002). 
11 As cited in Focarelli and Panetta (2002). 
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 It is therefore an aim of the study to probe these issues in depth as this study 
seeks to implement a proposed comparable bank productivity measurement 
methodology on a suitable dual banking system case study. 
 
 
 
2.8: Choice of Population under Study & Motivations of Study  
 
2.8.1: The Malaysian Banking Sector: A Unique Case 
In spite of the rapid rise of Islamic banking, it is noted that almost all 
economies that have Islamic banking operations belong to either one of the 
two extremes: (1) those with banks which operate in a banking system that 
has entirely converted to operate only pure Islamic banking and are 
supervised by religious bodies with conventional banking entirely prohibited 
(the only examples thus far are Sudan, Pakistan and Iran) and (2) those with 
Islamic banks occupying the fringe of an essentially conventional banking 
system with minimal presence (for examples Saudi Arabia and South Africa). 
In either case, a comparable productivity assessment and comparison 
between conventional and Islamic banking cannot be effectively and 
meaningfully implemented as one of the two banking systems is significantly 
underrepresented. Such situations are likely to yield results biased towards 
the dominant system and against the lesser system. The banking “dualism” in 
both cases is rather undeveloped or even often negligible. 
 
The Malaysian banking sector however, presents a rare case where a not 
only developed but sophisticated dual banking system to be studied. Islamic 
banking in Malaysia is not only tolerated but also promoted by the government 
to compete as well as complement its existing conventional banking system. 
These two banking sectors provide an ideal framework for this study due to 
several reasons: 
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 First, unlike any other financial system found elsewhere, the Malaysian 
banking sector is essentially a dual banking system where an Islamic banking 
system is operating parallel with a conventional banking system and 
buttressed by a comprehensive Islamic financial system that includes well-
defined and accepted Islamic banking laws. It also boasts well developed 
Islamic money and capital markets as well as Islamic insurance. 
 
Second, the inclusion of banks operating in the regional financial hub of 
Singapore provides ideal bank performance benchmarks for assessing 
relative competitiveness and productivity levels largely because both the 
Malaysian and Singaporean banking sectors exhibit high degrees of similarity 
and homogeneity. This is attributed to (1) the fact that both Malaysia and 
Singapore were once a single sovereign economy and share the same 
historical development before both parted in 1969, (2) the close geographic 
proximity and strong economic linkages between the two countries and (3) the 
heavy involvement of Singaporean banks’ operation in the Malaysian banking 
sector.  
 
Third, the Malaysian domestic banking sector is fragmented into banking 
operations under the conventional and Islamic banking systems. This enables 
the comparison of different banking systems within the same banking 
industry, taking into consideration the regional market structures. 
 
Fourth, technological innovations and the effects of the 1998 Asian Financial 
Crisis have prompted a sudden wave of mergers imposed and supervised by 
the central bank. The merger exercise drastically reduced the number of 
banks in Malaysia from 54 to 23 banking institutions that comprise 10 
domestic banking groups and 13 foreign banks in a time span of just 2 years. 
This, alongside with the continuing gradual deregulation of the financial 
system provides an ideal background to explore and gather evidence on the 
controversial issues pertaining to pre and post-merger efficiency and 
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productivity gains and the degree of transfer of these gains, if any at all, to the 
public and thus enhancing consumer welfare as applied to a developing 
country case with a partially deregulated banking sector. This scenario also 
presents an opportunity to gauge the ability and willingness of Islamic banking 
operations to enhance social welfare. 
 
 
 
2.8.2: The Malaysian Dual Banking System 
The Malaysian banking sector presents us a very unique case to be studied 
unlike any other found in the world. In spite its Middle Eastern origins, it is 
surprisingly in Malaysia, a multiracial and multireligious Muslim country, that 
Islamic banking development is most exciting. Its rapid growth fueled by 
active participation of many conventional and Islamic financial institutions from 
both developing and developed countries alike has been unparalleled and 
rarely rivaled elsewhere.  
 
Malaysia stands in contrast to other markets with Islamic finance operations. 
Rather than having too few uncompetitive Islamic banks within an 
overwhelmingly conventional banking system or a completely Islamised 
banking system that lacks healthy competition, in Malaysia, there is the 
breadth and the scope of innovations necessary to become competitive. 
Malaysia has moreover chosen to implement the dual banking system to 
simultaneously develop both its conventional and Islamic banking systems. 
Within the Malaysian dual banking framework, conventional and Islamic banks 
are recognized and treated equally by the monetary authority, allowing them 
to co-exist while competing with and complementing each other (Al-Omar and 
Abdel-Haq, 1996). Unlike most other markets, opportunity and 
encouragement are given to all banking institutions, domestic and foreign, to 
practise Islamic banking if certain conditions are met (Al-Omar and Abdel-
Haq, 1996). Currently almost all domestic Malaysian and foreign banks that 
operate within the Malaysian market carry out Islamic banking operations. It is 
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within this unique dual banking environment that both conventional and 
Islamic banks are equally competitive relative to one another in many aspects, 
presenting a rare opportunity whereby both can be effectively juxtaposed on a 
level playing field.  
 
The 1993 launching of the Interest-free Banking Scheme made Malaysia the 
first country to implement the dual banking system. Under this framework, 
conventional banking institutions were able to provide Islamic banking 
services within their existing banking establishment in an arrangement known 
as the Islamic Banking Scheme (IBS) (Aziz, 2001a). The rationale being that 
the dual banking system is considered the most effective and efficient mode 
of increasing the number of institutions offering Islamic banking services at 
the lowest cost and within the shortest time frame. Malaysia’s keenness to 
promote itself as a centre for Islamic banking and finance is seen by its 
comprehensive system with a new Islamic Financial Services Board to set 
standards and harmonize practices, and a centralized syariah council in Bank 
Negara. The Islamic Banking sector presently accounts for 8.9% of the 
banking sector’s total assets as shown by Figure 2.6. With the launch of the 
Financial Sector Master Plan (FMSP) in March 2001, the BNM has set a 
target for Islamic banking to hold 20% of banking assets by 2010. 
 
By the end of 2002, a total of 2 Islamic banks, 10 domestic commercial banks, 
4 foreign commercial banks and 3 merchant banks participated in Islamic 
finance operations. This has been a tremendous improvement from the 
passive participation of only 3 banks back in 1993. The other core 
components of the Islamic financial system comprised the Islamic money 
market, the Islamic capital market and the takaful or insurance market (Aziz, 
2003). The development of the Islamic money and capital markets is 
supposed to provide the banks avenues for liquidity and risk management as 
well as an alternative source of financing, and to create broader and diverse 
Islamic financial instruments for investors (Aziz, 2003). Complementing these 
three components is Islamic insurance or takaful, that provides the necessary 
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risk protection to its policy holders and to serve as an efficient mobilizer of 
long-term funds. Today, the Islamic money market has become an integral 
part of the Malaysian Islamic financial system, with transactions of more than 
RM2 billion a day and a broad spectrum of instruments, among which include 
the Government Investment Issues, Bank Negara Negotiable Notes, Islamic 
accepted bills and Islamic private debt securities (Aziz, 2003). New players 
such as money brokers have facilitated the development of this market. The 
Islamic capital market essentially comprises the equity market and the debt 
market. Phenomenal growth has been recorded in both these markets. In the 
debt market, the outstanding Islamic debt securities as at-end June 2003 
were 45.5% (or RM68.2 billion) of the total outstanding private debt securities 
(Aziz, 2003). Meanwhile In the equity market, more than 80% of the counters 
in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange are Shariah-compliant (Aziz, 2003). The 
takaful market has also shown impressive growth and the four takaful 
companies now offer a broad range of products in both family and general 
business which is comparable to the conventional counterparts.   
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Figure 2.6:  Market Share (total assets) within the Malaysian Dual Banking 
System in 1998 and 2002 
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Malaysia’s initial plan to expand Islamic banking was an effort to turn Malaysia 
into the regional hub and leading center of Islamic banking with a large 
number of dynamic and proactive players providing a wide range of products 
and vibrant Islamic money and capital markets to help develop the SME 
sector, thus answering the governments’ call to promote home ownership and 
other asset ownership (BNM, 1999). The need for an Islamic banking system 
become more relevant with the onset of the 1997-1998 financial crisis that 
saw excessive credit expansion in speculative financing that made the 
financial system vulnerable to a sudden short-term capital flight. In Islamic 
banking, the depositors bear the risk of an investment with no guarantee of a 
fixed return. As such, depositors have increased incentive to monitor their 
banks’ operations and this instils market discipline on the banks to curb 
excessive short-term lending into financing speculative investments (Chapra, 
2003). 
 
2.8.2.1: The Trends and Performance of Participating Banks in Islamic 
Banking within the Malaysian Dual Banking System 
Islamic banking has been on a progressive upward trend with annual growth 
of almost 49% between 1995 and 1999. From a virtually non-existent market 
share 10 years ago, Islamic banking has now captured more than 8% of 
banking assets and with continued expansion, that figure would reach 20% by 
2010 (Aziz, 2003). It mobilized some RM 59 billion of assets, RM 48 billion in 
deposits and RM 30 billion of financing funds in 2002. There are now more 
than 2,200 branches of Islamic banks and IBS offering Islamic banking 
products and services. Surprisingly, Islamic banking in Malaysia turns out to 
be a popular alternative banking mode even among its non-Muslim 
populations and conventional banks operating under the IBS actually control 
about 70% of total Islamic banking assets in Malaysia. Overall, commercial 
bank IBS controls the largest marker segment of Islamic banking with a 
market share of 42.7% followed by Islamic banks at 29.8% (Aziz, 2003).  
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Foreign banks such as Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group (ANZ), Amro and HSBC have also started offering 
Islamic financial products and even leading Malaysian banks. HSBC Amanah 
Finance that was set up in 1998 for instance, is now even marketing its 
products in North America and Europe and about 1/5 of its customers are 
non-Muslims (Ariff, 2002). Although there has been strong growth, the 
qualitative performance of Islamic banking services provided by domestic 
banks is less encouraging compared to those of foreign banks. Take for 
example the investment deposit return profile in domestic banks where 65.3% 
were concentrated on short-term investments with maturities ranging from 1 to 
3 months (BNM, 1999). The lack of interest in long-term investments is due to 
the less-than-compensatory return rate against the perceived uncertain risk 
burden in domestic banks (BNM, 1999; BNM 2000). In addition, the exposure 
of domestic banks to the broad property sector was significant at 42.6% in 
1999 of financing followed by the manufacturing sector at 9% in 1999 (BNM, 
1999). This was mainly driven by rapid growth in house financing and the 
fixed-rate nature of Islamic banking which provided borrowers opportunity to 
lock in their cost over the long term. 
 
Clearly Islamic banking of domestic banks is utilized mainly for financing low-
value activities that are of short term in nature; domestic Islamic banking is 
also exposed to the risky property sector. Against this backdrop, it is evident 
that foreign banks have become more advanced in this new sector. With 
globalization looming ahead, the threats to Islamic banking are expected to 
come mainly from foreign competition and takeovers because Islamic bank 
units are generally small with 2/3 of them with less than the critical banking 
minimum of $500 million worth of assets (Ariff, 2002). 
 
2.8.3: The Malaysian Bank Consolidation Exercise 
Among the countries of South East Asia, Malaysia has made the most 
progress in restructuring its banking system following the 1997-1998 Asian 
financial crisis that profoundly impacted on the competitive structure of the 
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industry. The financial crisis left many Malaysian banking institutions reeling 
from substantial losses due to high levels of non-performing loans, NPL, 
which rapidly eroded their capital bases to the point where systemic bank 
failures were imminent. The crisis highlighted rampant weak internal and risk 
management controls over many years. Excessive speculative lending 
activities caused severe mismatching between risk profiles of bank portfolios 
vis a vis the minimum capital requirements. There was simply an 
overstatement of banks’ capacity to absorb shocks (BNM, 1999). These were 
finally revealed during the crisis when banks with high lending exposures to 
unproductive activities found high NPL levels and capital deficiency in their 
books making the Malaysian banking sector back then particularly vulnerable 
to contagion effects.  
 
BNM realized that a longer-term solution lay in the purchase of assets and 
assumption of liabilities of weaker banks as the only way the operations of 
these banks would not be interrupted. BNM also recognized that consolidation 
of the banks would enable them to reach critical size not only to build 
resilience against shocks but to build capacity as well to meet future 
challenges of deregulation and globalization. The sooner the industry 
consolidates, the more well-placed banks are to meet future challenges. 
 
Subsequently in 1999, the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) Malaysia’s central 
bank implemented a bank consolidation program to expand the capital base in 
building the resilience of domestic institutions after they recorded hefty losses 
and high NPL levels that were rapidly eroding the capital levels of weakened 
banks before the situations posed a systemic risk to the financial system. 
Banking institutions meanwhile were given the liberty to form their own merger 
groups and elect their own leader to lead the merger process. Approval was 
subsequently granted for the formation of 10 banking groups, each with a 
minimum shareholders’ equity of RM 2 billion and an asset base of RM 25 
billion (BNM, 1999). Over a period of only two years, BNM had forced the 
merger of 58 financial institutions comprising commercial banks, merchant 
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banks and finance companies into 10 domestic anchor bank groups with 13 
foreign banks (see Figure 2.7). Despite resistance from 2 large commercial 
banks and a number of small but yet profitable institutions, the bank merger 
exercise was successful (Browers et al, 2003). 
 
As a result, there were consolidation, rationalization of common functions and 
operations across member institutions in the group, outsourcing of non-core 
activities and leveraging on cross-selling of products and services within the 
groups (Aziz, 2002b). The consolidation enabled the banking groups to reap 
economies of scale and scope, asset synergies, increase operating efficiency, 
enhanced profitability and to address problems of capital deficiencies (BNM, 
1999). To BNM, these are the developments that would build a strong, 
efficient and stable banking system that is able to mobilize and allocate funds 
effectively and efficiently that it had envisioned. This would not only act as a 
impetus for sustainable economy recovery but also as a proactive response to 
prepare the Malaysian banking industry towards an imminent heightened 
deregulation period. Domestic banks can no longer remain under protection 
as the financial sector is expected to gradually remove barriers of entry for 
foreign players under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services and the 
GAT on Trade and Services, which Malaysia has committed itself to (BNM, 
1999). 
 
2.8.3.1: Performance of Banking Groups following Mergers 
Following the comprehensive merger exercise, the banking sector rebounded 
strongly evidenced by sharp turnaround of asset growth, pre-tax profits, 
increased loan activities and enhanced capital and reserves levels. Even 
during the period of slower economic growth in 2001 following a slowdown in 
the technology sector worldwide, the banking sector persevered and 
continued to record improved performance. In fact by 2002, profits in the 
banking continued to improve for the 3rd consecutive year since the financial 
crisis ended in 1999 when the mergers began (Aziz, 2002b).  
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This development further lent credence to BNM’s initial decision to merge the 
banks. Because domestic banks have largely built their resilience, the focus 
now turns to gearing up of capacity building to enhance the domestic banking 
sector’s ability to compete with foreign banks on a level playing field. There 
have been signs that a second wave of mergers might take place in the near 
future although the new consolidation process would be more market-based 
rather than one arranged by BNM. BNM welcomes such a development 
claiming that although size alone would be insufficient, being a large bank 
enables a bank to have enough critical mass and scale to invest in cutting 
edge technology, improve management systems and to attract the necessary 
talents required to compete against the best players (Aziz, 2002b). With these 
enhancements, it is expected that domestic banks would be able to better 
compete with foreign banks in a new range of products and services that have 
improved quality and convenience to suit increasingly sophisticated banking 
consumers. 
 
The new focus seems to rest on technological progress in domestic banks 
because technology advancements especially in ICT have brought great 
changes in terms of creation of new products, educating consumers that are 
increasingly more sophisticated and aware, changing cost structures and 
transformation of the industry structure. Banks that are able to harness 
technology to aid decision making, facilitate risk management and enhance 
customer relationship will stand to gain and those that do not would lose their 
customers to better quality, greater variety and lower-cost products 
elsewhere. To this end, increased banking size would provide a better 
platform for banks to make new investments on new technology since such 
investments often entails high costs coupled with uncertain payoff that cannot 
be afforded by some domestic banks (Aziz, 2002b). 
 
2.8.3.2: Reservations on Post-Merger Productivity Gains 
Prima facie, the consolidation program seems to have succeeded in 
strengthening the banking industry and enhanced their productivity and 
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competitiveness by great measure. However, it must be noted that several 
other factors have played some crucial roles as well. Of importance is the 
consideration that while credit extension and approval rose   strongly, it was 
largely due to demand side factors where there was strong demand for credit 
in response to the low interest rate environment that was also aided by a 
series of fiscal stimuli to revive the domestic economy (BNM 1999; BNM 
2000). Next, the smooth success of the mergers and the subsequent 
turnaround in profits was only successful because significant amounts of 
distressed assets were removed from their balance sheets to Danaharta for 
recovery prior to any merger and during a subsequent period ranging from 12 
to 18 months after any merger. Plus, there were Tier 1 capital injections by 
Danamodal specifically designed to ensure the initial success of the mergers. 
Next, the smooth success of the mergers and the subsequent turnaround in 
profits were only successful because significant amounts of distressed assets 
were removed from their balance sheets to Danaharta for recovery prior to 
any merger and during a subsequent period ranging from 12 to 18 months 
after any merger. Plus, there were Tier 1 capital injections by Danamodal 
specifically designed to ensure the initial success of the mergers. 
 
The consolidated banks are now certainly larger than they were during the 
pre-crisis days, but the merged banks have yet to fully integrate and are not 
as profitable as they were before they merged. Employee-friendly regulations 
and unions have prevented banks from capturing efficiency gains resulting 
from the consolidation and most Malaysian banks are overstaffed (Browers et 
al, 2003).  
 
These exogenous factors placed the banking sector in a better position to 
undertake financial intermediation more effectively and competitively. Thus, 
by large measures, the success of the mergers were attributed to these. It is 
not immediately clear however  whether the weaknesses in bank 
management and operation have been solved and that they have become 
more competent instead.  The consolidated banks are now certainly larger 
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than they were during the pre-crisis days, but the merged banks have yet to 
fully integrate and are not as profitable as they were before they merged. 
Employee-friendly regulations and unions have prevented banks from 
capturing efficiency gains resulting from the consolidation and most Malaysian 
banks are overstaffed (Browers et al, 2003). This scenario is further 
compounded by strongly, it was largely due to demand side factors where 
there was strong demand for credit in response to the low interest rate 
environment that was also aided by a series of fiscal stimulus spending to 
revive the domestic economy (BNM 1999; BNM 2000). 
 
Furthermore, while gaps between domestic and foreign banks in terms of 
operational efficiency and productivity have narrowed, there are still many 
areas where domestic banks are evidently behind. As a striking example, the 
governor of BNM in 2002 revealed that bank productivity as measured by 
number of transactions per employee for domestic banks average around 
5,000 compared to almost 11,000 for foreign banks (Aziz, 2002b). In terms of 
convenience to customers, some domestic banks still experience disruption in 
retail deposit and loan initiation systems and take longer to approve credit 
card applications. In the Malaysian banking sector, there are currently 13 
foreign commercial banks that despite regulatory restriction on branching and 
the type of products and services that they are allowed to offer, they still 
manage to control 30% of total assets of commercial banks (BNM, 1999).  
 
Malaysia has had a significant foreign banks presence since the 1880s and 
even though domestic banks have been able to catch up by expanding their 
capacities, foreign banks have so far been able to respond to changes in 
opportunities and threats faster. They proved to be more innovative by 
leveraging on the established and time tested R&D expertise and delivery 
mechanism of their parent banks (Aziz, 2002b). With much better capacity, 
they are also able to employ the best cutting edge and cost-cutting technology 
to continuously improve their productivity. As such, foreign banks pose great 
challenges to domestic banks. They even began to dominate certain banking 
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niches such as Islamic banking where domestic banks used to have a 
competitive advantage. Given that existing regulatory restrictions will be 
eventually phased out as banking deregulation picks up, the threat and 
challenges faced by domestic banks to even maintain their market share are 
expected to become more intense. 
 
In general, there has been lack of evidence on increased benefits to the public 
following first round of bank mergers in Malaysia. For instance, as greater 
market share is associated as another benefit of bank mergers, figures from 
BNM13 have indicated that the market share of commercial bank deposits with 
the top 5 foreign banks have increased from 18.58% during the 1998 pre-
consolidation period, to 20.18% in 2002 at the expense of the consolidating 
domestic banks (RAM 2003). In another more subtle but more pervasive 
example, BNM has envisaged that with increased capacity and resilience from 
the mergers, domestic banks would have the competencies to serve and 
expand the rather riskier but crucial SME sector. Unfortunately, the domestic 
banking system, despite having build sufficient capacity from the mergers, is 
still ill-equipped to serve this potentially lucrative segment. There are still 
chronic problems such as lack of accessibility, responsiveness and 
willingness to extend financing into this sector coupled with high collateral 
demands (BNM, 1999). These cast some doubts  whether productivity and 
efficiency gains were realized from the mergers and if they were realized, 
whether these gains have been passed on to benefit the public.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Source BNM annual report 1998 and 2002 
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Figure 2.7:  Major Mergers and Acquisitions in the Malaysian Banking System 
between 1996 and 2002 
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2.8.4: Singaporean Banks as Ideal Benchmarks 
Finally the choice of inclusion of Singaporean banks in the study deserves 
special mention.  Singapore has been one of Asia’s most liberal banking 
markets amongst other international financial centres like Tokyo and Hong 
Kong. It is the regional financial hub for South East Asia. In contrast to 
Malaysia, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) implemented a 5-year 
plan in 1999 to liberalize the banking sector and remove regulatory barriers 
against foreign banks (Browers et al, 2003). The Singaporean market has 
thus changed from one of a cozy oligopoly into a cut-throat competitive and 
unpredictable market. The banking liberalization move has even prompted 
some of the most aggressive price wars seen in Asia. By 2001 for example, 
all banks were selling their mortgages with first year rates below cost 
(Browers et al, 2003).  
 
There is no doubt that Singapore has been long regarded as the best in the 
region (well capitalized with relatively low NPL levels, it is no surprise that 
Singaporean banks successfully weathered the 1997 crisis). Driven by 
competitive forces and constant pressure from the MAS, Singapore banks 
initiated a consolidation wave that reduced 7 major domestic players into just 
3 by 2001. The efficiency of Singapore’s banks is expected to improve by 
great degrees given that MAS has already geared up efforts to promote 
Singapore as not only the regional but an international hub for wealth 
management, global processing and risk management competing against 
other competitors such as London, Zurich, Luxemburg, Bermuda and Hong 
Kong. In fact, Singapore has further succeeded in diverting considerable 
European funds traditionally destined for Hong Kong (Browers et al, 2003). 
 
Therefore, Singaporean banks provide ideal benchmarks for conventional and 
Islamic banks in neighboring Malaysia against which to measure relative 
banking efficiency and productivity. This is enhanced by the fact that banking 
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operations in Singapore and Malaysia closely resemble one another (other 
than operating efficiency and productivity) considering that the two countries 
share the same history and culture. In fact, Singapore was part of Malaysia 
before opting for separate sovereignty some 4 decades ago. Furthermore, 2 
of the 3 Singaporean banks have a significant presence in the Malaysian 
banking industry and even operate Islamic banking at higher efficiency levels 
than most Malaysian banks. Both banks have successful operations in 
Malaysia that run independently with little back-office or technology 
processing in common with Singapore (Bowers et al, 2003). They proved to 
be able create significant value by leveraging on scale and skills they have at 
home or elsewhere. Malaysia would continue to become a major expansion 
destination for Singaporean banks apart from the cultural similarity where 
consumers and corporations are relatively underserved by domestic 
Malaysian banks as they poised to enter the Chinese market.  
 
2.9: Research Motivation 
2.9.1 Comparable Productivity within the dual banking system 
The principal interest of this study is to explore: what is the relative 
productivity of Malaysian banks (both conventional and Islamic) operating 
under the only known credible dual banking system compared to foreign 
banks and their Singaporean counterparts that also participate in Islamic 
banking in Malaysia? 
By answering this question, pertinent information would be offered relating to 
issues such as: 
Does conventional banking have productivity advantages over Islamic 
banking or vice versa? What are the relative productivity scores in terms of 
technical efficiency, scale efficiency and technological progress of 
conventional banks and Islamic banking units against one another? 
Which banks are the most efficient banks of all and how can they be 
emulated? 
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How do domestic conventional and Islamic banks fare against foreign banks 
that provide the same set of services but somehow restricted by BNM 
regulations, in terms of bank productivity? Do Malaysian banks have a 
productivity advantage in Islamic banking compared to their foreign 
counterparts, in which they have been pioneers and have long been regarded 
as having superior competitive advantages. 
 
There is a pressing need for such issues to be answered as a thorough 
comparative performance analysis would help in crucial decision making 
relating to the ability of domestic banks to meet the challenge of at the least, 
regional competition that comes with imminent financial liberalization. 
However, despite the urgent need for related findings that policy-makers can 
use with confidence at this crucial point, there is a general void in comparative 
bank productivity studies in banking industries such as Malaysia and 
Singapore, which can be characterized as an oligopoly7.   
 
2.9.2: Consolidation and productivity change 
 Has the consolidation in the Malaysian dual banking industry, in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis, improved productivity? 
This represents an interesting issue to probe because the BNM believes that 
the mergers would help domestic banks to achieve critical mass to invest in 
technology to facilitate innovations, reap scale and scope economies, reduce 
costs and excess capacity as well as upgrade their risk management 
systems. These however, can only be achieved if the mergers result in better 
and more competent bank management. The positive outcomes observed so 
far can be attributed to exogenous factors that do not explain improved 
productivity in banks. Although the merged banking entities were able to catch 
up with foreign banks in common areas such as operating efficiency and 
                                                 
7 The large banks in these countries lead in initiating changes, which are closely followed by other 
banks within the industry Operationally, the banks in an oligopoly market offer similar interest 
rates.The Stackelberg Model describes the type of competition in this market as intense because this 
market form does not only depend on the larger banks, but the recognition of their interdependence, the 
action of one bank will affect the actions of others and each oligopoly bank watches their rivals closely. 
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technological progress, foreign banks have been able to innovate more 
effectively and efficiently and even dominate niches once strategically 
controlled by domestic banks. 
 
The productivity analysis proposed in this study provides additional insight 
into the changes in productivity of banks within the sample and can guide 
decisions relating to the second merger wave, by identifying the productivity 
track record of various banks.  Hence it should help to determine if any 
benefits from synergies have been achieved as a result of the first wave of 
Malaysian bank mergers.   
 
These issues also motivate the final research question: Are there any 
unequivocal indications that post-merger productivity gains, if there are any at 
all, benefit the public? This question about the degree of wealth transfer would 
be vital to probe how far Islamic banking in a dual banking system is 
committed to promote the greater interest and welfare of the community as 
opposed to private profitability since both practitioners and Islamic scholars 
have often claimed that Islamic banking is a form of “socially ethical banking” 
unlike conventional banking.  
 
If the improvement in productivity results in improved quality of service and 
pricing to customers, it is reasonable to expect an increase in banks’ post-
merger market share (Avkiran 1999).  The extent to which productivity gains 
are passed on to the public following bank merger is proxied by the change in 
the merged entity’s market share (Rhoades, 1986) of deposits.   
 
2.10: Research Questions 
 
There is a general deficiency in the banking literature on bank performances 
under the dual banking system in the wake of the rising “banking dualism” 
worldwide combined with interesting deregulation and consolidation 
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developments in the post-crisis Malaysian banking sector. This has so far 
been the only developed dual banking system in the world.  Banking efficiency 
and productivity studies present many avenues to address pertinent issues 
relating to (1) comparable productivity measurement in a dual banking 
system, (2) the effects of bank mergers and (3) the transfer of post-merger 
productivity gains to consumers. Following these, there are three key three 
principal research questions that form the motivation behind this study.  
 
2.10.1: Research Question 1: What Are the Relative Productivity Scores 
between Conventional Banks and Islamic Banks operating within a Dual 
Banking System? 
First and foremost, the principal motivation of this study is to fill the void in the 
existing banking literature in regards to measuring relative productivity and 
operational efficiency between conventional and Islamic banking based on a 
credible comparable bank performance measurement methodology. To this 
end, this study also seeks to pioneer bank performance assessment within a 
dual banking system.  
 
The choice of the Malaysian dual banking system permits this study to raise 
several subsequent critical questions that closely related to Research 
Question 1: 
 
How productive and efficient are both conventional and Islamic banks relative 
to one another within a dual banking system environment? This allows one to 
gauge which banking system fares better given an equally competitive back-
ground.  
 
What are the core competencies, key strengths as well as weaknesses that 
are inherent within each banking system? Are they attributed to (1) better 
innovations and technological adoption, (2) managerial efficiency or (3) scale 
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and scope economies or some combination of these factors?  Answers to 
these questions would yield great insights on the following issues: 
Are banks innovative in general? Which banks are the most innovative and 
most effective in adopting the right production technology? To what extent 
does technical change prevail over time among different banking systems and 
groups? 
How good are banks in general in their ability to control costs and generate 
revenues? Which banks have the most effective and efficient management in 
maximizing revenues and minimizing costs to maximize shareholders’ wealth? 
To what extent do these x-efficiencies prevail over time among different 
banking systems and groups? 
Are banks operating at the most productive scale size? Which banks are 
undersized or oversized? Which banks can enhance efficiency and 
productivity by scaling up or scaling down their operations? 
What are the ways to improve or enhance operating productivity and 
efficiency levels for each banking unit/group? 
 
2.10.2: Research Question 2: What are the Relative Productivity Scores 
between Domestic Commercial Banks and Foreign Commercial Banks? 
The presence of active but regulated participation of foreign banks in Malaysia 
also enables this study to enrich a few existing studies including those that 
question the competitiveness of foreign banks and their ability to challenge 
domestic establishments despite often  having to endure numerous regulatory 
restrictions. Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), Sathye (1998) and Isik (2002) found 
that foreign banks appear to experience the fastest efficiency growth vis a vis 
domestic institutions in India. In addition, Isik (2002) reported that foreign 
banks are much more innovative in terms of technological upgrades in the 
Turkish banking system whilst domestic banks are more adapt in imitating 
foreign banks. Thus, within the same framework developed in probing 
Research Question 1 above, this study also seeks to investigate how 
productive and efficient are foreign banks against domestic banks in a dual 
banking system and what are their key strengths and weaknesses? Insights 
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gained would be of great assistance to policy makers and domestic banks’ 
management alike in the wake of rapid financial deregulation. 
 
2.10.3: Research Question 3: What is the Evidence relating to whether 
Mergers Lead to Productivity Gains? 
Thirdly, there is no consensus in the banking literature about the benefits of 
mergers to productivity of the merging entities, to the public or to the 
shareholders (Berger, and Humphrey, 1992; Pilloff 1996; Akhavein et al 
(1997)1, Huizinga, 2001.). This scenario is even less clear in Malaysia and 
Singapore due to the difficulty of conducting empirical research on small 
sample sizes and the lack of data due to the strict regulatory restrictions on 
transparency.  It is noted that with the steps recently undertaken by the 
authorities of both countries to embrace liberalization as a means to promote 
competition and efficiency, data unavailability has been a major limitation on 
gathering credible empirical evidence to substantiate or even to evaluate the 
success of the policies undertaken. On another hand, bank mergers appear to 
be based on perceived economic and political gains rather than conclusive 
mathematical findings (Avkiran 1999a). 
 
While these may be due to the soft economic environment, the uncertain 
political climate and the fact that banks are still at the early stages of 
operating as merged entities, it is crucial to recognize and address the areas 
that may be improved on.  The following research questions are developed to 
capture these concerns: Do bank mergers lead to productivity gains? This 
study attempts to make a novel contribution to the voluminous existing 
literature on the subject by answering the question from a distinctive point of 
view: Has the consolidation in the Malaysian dual banking industry, in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, improved bank productivity of domestic banks, 
thus enhancing their competitiveness vis a vis foreign banks? 
 
                                                 
1 As cited in Huizinga et al (2001) 
 66
  
2.10.4: Research Question 4: What is the Evidence of Public Benefits of 
Bank Mergers? 
Finally, the public may not benefit from mergers, unless the cost savings that 
led to efficiency gains arising from improvement in institutional efficiency 
outweigh the exercise of market power in uncompetitive pricing.  While in-
market mergers are anticipated to result in cost savings when surrounding 
branches are closed down, this is not necessarily an indication of improved 
efficiency in the long-run as the public may not be gaining the benefit (Avkiran 
1999). In fact, the public could be paying for services at prices in excess of 
competitive norms (Rhoades 1986) when the closure of a bank for example, 
requires forced additional travel to seek banking services.  Since bank 
customers are known to ‘vote with their feet’,12 the comparison of productivity 
changes and market share of deposits following mergers can yield valuable 
insights towards a discussion on the benefits of mergers being passed on to 
the public. 
 
These issues motivate the fourth research question: Are there any concrete 
indications that post-merger productivity gains, if there are any at all, benefit 
the public in the form of more favourable rates (to both depositors and 
borrowers) and better product/service quality? This question about the degree 
of wealth transfer would also be vital to probing how far Islamic banking in a 
dual banking system is committed to promoting the greater interest and 
welfare of the community as opposed to private profitability in the face of 
enhanced market power since both practitioners and Islamic scholars have 
often claimed that Islamic banking is a form of “socially ethical banking” and 
more desirable than conventional banking.  
 
 
                                                 
12 CEO of Citibank Malaysia’s statement at the Malaysian Banking Summit 2003 
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2.11: Significance of Study 
 
In reaching its stated objectives, this study attempts to make two important 
contributions to the existing literature on bank performance measurement. 
 
First, this study aims to propose a credible basis to construct a viable 
comparable bank performance measurement framework that is applicable to 
both conventional and Islamic banks that accommodates unique 
characteristics of each system. It does this by acknowledging that despite the 
differences in principles and institution forms, Islamic and conventional 
banking operations are comparable on the basis of shared similarities in 
providing financial intermediation. The framework would enable researchers 
to evaluate banks’ productivity performance between conventional and Islamic 
banks that operate on different principles on a level playing field. Empirical 
results would help fill the void in bank performance literature in regards to 
Islamic banks that has long been hampered by the absence of viable 
comparable methodologies and data unavailability. From this pioneering work 
also, one is able to discern the competitive advantages that conventional and 
Islamic banks have over one another and probe whether the rapid rise of 
Islamic banking is only a mere reflection of consumer interests to religious 
ideals that lacks productivity substance. If this perspective is true, then it may 
cast doubts over the potential ability of Islamic banks to effectively compete 
with conventional banks as an alternative financial intermediation mode on a 
sustainable basis.  
 
Second, this study provides valuable insights about the effects of mergers on 
both productive (in terms of technical efficiency, scale efficiency and technical 
change) and social efficiencies in the dual banking system, an issue about 
which most studies have largely been silent. In particular, it is expected to 
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further contribute to the ongoing debate on whether bank mergers do in fact 
yield improved cost efficiencies as well as revenue efficiencies. Cost and 
revenue efficiencies are often used by bank management and regulators to 
justify any bank merger exercise citing that gains in both would enhance 
shareholders’ value creation. However, as far as available empirical evidence 
is concerned, bank mergers appear to destroy shareholders’ value and 
generate very little cost efficiency gains although there is strong evidence of 
revenue efficiencies. Not surprisingly, this trend has spawned some concerns 
about the possibility of prevalent anti-competitive practices resulting from 
increased market power and concentration for merged banks.  
 
The principal objective of the Malaysian bank consolidation exercise and 
financial deregulation program is to enhance the resource base and 
competitiveness of domestic banks to compete head on with foreign 
commercial banks on equal playing fields once the local financial markets are 
fully liberalized. Just as in other nations, both the developed and the 
developing, financial liberalization is inevitable given the rapid pace of 
globalization and the eventual lifting of trade and economic barriers among 
industrialized and newly industrialized countries as required by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines. From another perspective, financial 
deregulation and consolidation efforts are seen as necessary to boost 
competitiveness of banks to expand and grow. By benchmarking the 
consolidated Malaysian banking entities against multinational banks, empirical 
findings would contribute much to literature on how competitive have 
indigenous banks become relative to their counterparts as a result of well-
intentioned deregulation and consolidation program, in the case of not only a 
transitional/developing economy but also in the context of a dual banking 
system.  
 
Another novel contribution stemming from this study is the opportunity to 
gauge the extend to which Islamic banking lives up to its widely proclaimed 
reputation of being a “socially ethical form of banking” that champions the 
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noble virtues of protecting and developing social welfare and economic equity 
where private economic gains are not regarded as the most important priority. 
Many scholars maintain that this unique element is the crucial factor that sets 
Islamic banking apart from conventional banking that is widely regarded as 
sinful by Islamic religious councils. 
 
This study also adds new dimensions, in that it approaches these issues by 
studying a case that not only involves a dual banking system but also a case 
of a developing economy with an oligopolistic banking sector. This stands in 
contrast to the bulk of bank performance studies that come from the scrutiny 
of deregulated and competitive US and European banking industries. It is also 
the authors’ belief that this would be the first comparative bank productivity 
and efficiency study between Malaysia and Singapore that share close 
geographic proximity, strong cultural and economic links as well as a common 
banking sector history for many years. Such comparisons have been noted to 
be a key area requiring more research (Molyneux 1996)2. From the feedback 
obtained during the presentation of results from a pilot study, it is noted that 
there has been no previous significant attempt to investigate the productivity 
of Singaporean banks due to the small number of banks in the sector and the 
relative lack of transparency under the regulated environment.  Furthermore, 
since there is a lack of research on the comparative bank productivity within 
the South East Asian region, this study is expected to not only provide an 
important reference point for policy-makers but also open avenues for future 
research.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 As cited in Huizinga et al (2001). 
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CHAPTER 3: 
BANK PRODUCTIVITY 
 
3.1: Introduction 
 
This study attempts to fill the vacuum within the existing banking performance 
literature body by providing empirical evidence in relation to the comparable 
productivity measures of conventional banks against those of Islamic banks in 
a rapidly deregulating environment which is much characterized by active 
bank mergers and acquisitions. To achieve this end, this study first proposes 
the MPI as a comparable productivity measurement methodology that is 
capable of comparing the productivity of Islamic and conventional banks on a 
level playing field without ignoring the unique characteristics of both banking 
systems. This study then harnesses this cross-system approach to examine 
the relative productivity of Malaysian conventional and Islamic banks that 
operate under the only existing dual banking system by benchmarking them 
against Malaysian foreign banks and Singaporean conventional banks. The 
empirical evidence on relative productivity measures gathered would help 
shed light on the relative competitiveness of conventional banks and Islamic 
banks. This would also yield insights as to how well both banking systems 
respond to the effects of sweeping bank mergers as the banking industry 
continues to be deregulated. 
 
Conceived by Sten Malmquist in 1953, the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) 
is a reliable measure of bank productivity and has made a large contribution 
to the relevant bank performance literature. This is because the MPI allows 
one to quantify the distinctive measurable sources from a single general 
productivity measure over time. In this context, the MPI first identifies 
productivity changes of a DMU between two periods and then distinguishes 
the sub components of a change in total productivity that are attributed to 
technical change (shifts in the production frontier as the production technology 
changes), relative technical efficiency (changes in management practices of 
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banks relative to one another) and the scale efficiency (changes in production 
scales relative to a bank’s optimal scale size). Given balanced panel data, 
where input data is available across all periods under study, chained MPI 
scores can be generated that allow productivity analysis to be conducted over 
several time periods. The computation of MPI is done based on a number of 
assumptions about the production technology. Because these rarely represent 
the actual production technology, researchers employ either the parametric or 
the non-parametric approaches to estimate the production technology.  
 
This study implements this non-parametric DEA MPI approach in the 
Malaysian dual banking case in such a way that the distinctive characteristics 
of conventional and Islamic banks and the conceptual similarity between both 
systems preserved and accounted for to achieve a viable and robust cross-
system means of measuring comparable bank productivity.  
 
What follows is a conceptual framework that defines bank productivity. To 
illustrate in a simple manner, Figure 3.1 is a graphical representation of this 
conceptual framework that comprehensively captures the vital aspects of 
bank productivity. Following this, the discussion of the framework is centred 
on the following categories/themes: 
 
1. The definition of productivity in the context of service productivity that 
applies to banks as opposed production productivity.  
2. The subtle yet distinctive features of productivity and efficiency. Although 
both are commonly used interchangeably, both terms are different from 
one another. It is also shown why productivity gives a more accurate 
measure of bank productivity. 
3. The definition and derivation of three mutually exclusive components of 
productivity changes namely technical change, relative technical efficiency 
change and scale efficiency change. 
4. A brief and concise survey on the common methods and approaches of 
measuring bank productivity changes and the sub components. A 
discussion also covers the pros and cons of each method. This provides 
insights as to this study’s choice of a non-parametric DEA methodology.   
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Figure 3.1: The Conceptual Framework Measuring Bank Productivity 
 
 
 
 
3.2: The Definition of Productivity 
 
In conventional theoretical terms, productivity is defined as the rate of 
transformation of inputs to outputs, or simply the ratio of outputs over inputs 
(Coelli et al., 1998). This represents the output-orientated view of productivity. 
Productivity however, can be similarly defined with the alternative input 
orientated approach as the ratio of inputs over outputs. Thus, to increase 
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productivity, a DMU can either seek to maximize outputs for a given level of 
inputs or minimize inputs for a given level of outputs. 
 
3.2.1: Productivity in the Context of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
Because in real practice a particular Decision Making Unit (DMU) often uses 
multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs, a method that is able to aggregate 
multiple inputs and outputs into a single index must be used to compute a 
single measure of aggregate productivity. Accordingly, the ratio of outputs 
over inputs becomes the ratio of an output vector over an input vector and the 
ratio of input over output becomes the ratio of an input vector over an output 
vector. Coelli et al (1998) terms these as the measures of Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) that gauge the productivity of all production factors as 
opposed to partial productivity measures such as land and labor productivity 
that only considers the productivity of land and labor in isolation. The interest 
of this study is to assess the overall productivity of banking units given their 
technology, inputs, outputs and industry environment. Therefore, by 
assessing bank productivity changes, this study means assessing the 
changes in bank TFP. 
 
3.2.2: Productivity as Applied in the Services Industries 
Here, an analysis of the productivity concept in the context of services 
production is imperative to generate accurate measures and intuitive 
interpretation of bank productivity. In the words of (Jarvinen et al, 1996), 
service productivity can be defined as the ability of a service providing DMU to 
utilize its inputs to provide services with a quality matching the expectations of 
customers. This definition is crucial as banks being part of the service 
industry, use multiple physical inputs (such as labor and technology) and 
funds sources to provide multiple banking services and financial products of a 
certain complexity and quality as required by customers and demanded by 
regulators, that are not easily defined in clear cut physical measures. Thus, 
the measurement of bank productivity differs from standard productivity 
measures in manufacturing DMUs where outputs are rarely more than the 
physical products produced.  
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 A number of approaches have been devised by researchers over the years to 
model the production process of banks. The two most notable ones are (1) 
the traditional production approach, in which banks employ the input vector of 
labor, capital and banking funds as input factors to produce a vector of three 
bank outputs namely short-term loans, long-term loans and other earning 
assets and (2) the non-traditional intermediation approach, in which the bank 
is seen as a financial intermediary that gathers surplus financial resources 
and channels them to deficit units for productive investments and 
consumption (Isik et al, 2002). Accordingly, banks in the second approach use 
4 inputs (staff numbers, deposits, interest expenses, and non-interest 
expenses) and produce 3 outputs (net loans, net interest income and non-
interest income) (Avkiran, 1999b). There has been no consensus among 
scholars as to the most superior model. Bank production models will be 
explained in detail in the following sections. At this point however, it is worth 
noting that because this study conceptualizes banks as financial 
intermediaries, it opts to adopt the latter approach. 
 
However, it is an objective of the study to demonstrate that the productivity 
measurements used in production-based DMUs may be inadequate to 
measure the productivity of service-based DMUs such as banks, where 
multiple tangible, intangible and specialized factors of production are in use. 
Although several researchers have, including Gianrini (1991) and Gronroos 
(199 ), argued that quality and productivity cannot be dealt with separately as 
in the case of services, most studies do recognize them as separate concepts 
(Brignall and Ballantine, 1996; Heskett et al, 1994).  
 
3.3: The Distinction Between Productivity and Efficiency 
 
The concept of productivity has been rooted in the production function 
approach that describes the relationship between input factors and output 
products (Vehmanen, 1994). But so is the concept of production efficiency. 
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Both productivity and efficiency terms have so frequently been used 
interchangeably that many infer both are synonymous. Coelli et al (1998) 
regards this development as unfortunate as using efficiency in isolation to 
measure productivity can be misleading. This is because both technological 
progress and production efficiency are two different sources of productivity 
enhancement. In terms of the production frontier that reflects the maximum 
output attainable from each input level or simply as the current  production 
technology, technology progress is seen as shifts (not necessarily parallel 
shifts) in the production frontier over time due to technological innovation 
(Coelli et al, 1998). This must be distinguished from technical efficiency gains 
that refer to the distance of an observed production away from the production 
frontier. Fully efficient DMUs are located on the production frontier. Hence, 
improving efficiency is indicated by movements closer to the production 
frontier (Avkiran, 1999a). However, one aspect may become obvious from this 
observation, as identified by Noulas (1997)3, is that increased efficiency from 
one period to another does not necessarily indicate higher productivity since 
the production technology may have changed. Similarly, improved productivity 
does not signify a corresponding improvement in efficiency if the production 
frontier has shifted but the relative distance from the new frontier remains 
unchanged as the previous distance from the previous production frontier. 
 
Performance measures between two time periods are therefore confounded 
by effects of technological progress and cannot be solely attributed to 
efficiency measures. By measuring TFP productivity, effective comparisons 
can be made across DMUs and time, whereas in the case of efficiency 
measurement, effective comparison can only be made against a pre-
determined standard or ideal that is reflected by the production function 
(Vuorinen et al, 1998). Thus, productivity indicators give a more holistic view 
and assessment of banks’ performance across units and time. This fine 
distinction will be made obvious in the Methodology section, where a detailed 
discussion in terms of production economics is devoted to explain the subtle 
difference.  
                                                 
3 As quoted in Avkiran (2000). 
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3.4: Measuring Total Factor Productivity 
 
Measuring TFP changes for a DMU involves measuring the changes in the 
levels of output produced and the levels of inputs employed in the production 
process over at least two time periods. In practice, the simple ratio of output 
over input cannot adequately and accurately measure and compute the 
changes in multiple inputs and outputs over time periods owing to the difficulty 
in determining a common set of weights to be applied to input and output 
vectors across all DMUs that may differ considerably from one another. 
Furthermore, a simple productivity ratio is unable to attribute changes in 
productivity levels to either efficiency changes or technological changes.  
 
An index number approach can address these challenges. An index number 
is a real number that captures the changes in the value of variables across 
time and space (Coelli et al, 1998). It requires only 2 data observations from 2 
distinct periods to measure the changes in productivity between these two 
periods. By using a hypothetical example, Coelli et al (1998) shows that in 
theory, an index number is able to decompose a single productivity change 
measure into technical change, efficiency change and scale efficiency 
change. In practice, researchers employ one of two different performance 
indices, the stochastic Tornqvist (1936)4 index or the non-stochastic 
Malmquist (1953) index, to compute the productivity changes for a particular 
DMU.  
 
The Tornqvist index is by far the most popular index number approach 
implemented by studies on productivity (Coelli et al, 1998). This is due to the 
fact that the Tornqvist index features a number of economic-theoretic 
                                                 
4 As quoted in Isik et al (2002) 
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properties as expounded by Diewert (1976, 1981)5 and Caves et al (1982)6 
that enable the index to generate very reasonably close approximations to the 
actual output and index numbers and does not smooth the pattern of technical 
progress. The Tornqvist index is essentially a weighted geometric average of 
relative prices with the weights being the simple average of the share values 
in period 0 and 1 (Coelli et al, 1998). However, although the Tornqvist index 
can be easily computed by using only a single observation in each time 
period, it requires both price and quantity information that may not be easily 
obtained and the assumptions that all DMUs are cost minimisers and revenue 
maximisers (Coelli et al, 1998). Furthermore, in its original form, the Tornqvist 
index does not allow for the decomposition of productivity change into 
changes in technical efficiency or management performance and changes in 
technology since it also assumes that production is always efficient (Fare et 
al, 1994). 
 
The Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) on the other hand is less restrictive. It 
allows one to identify productivity changes between two periods from a given 
panel data without the need of price data and to decompose productivity 
changes into two components, one due to technical change (shifts in the 
frontier) and the other due to technical efficiency change (the catching up 
effect). Fare et al (1994) extended the original MPI decomposition to derive 
the third component to include effects due to change in scale efficiency 
(changes in production scale relative to the optimal scale size). Thus, given 
the availability of suitable panel data, the MPI gives a richer account of 
productivity change.  
 
3.5: The Malmquist Productivity (MPI) Approach of Measuring 
Productivity  
and the Decomposition of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Productivity 
Measure  
                                                 
5 As quoted in Coelli et al (1998) 
6 As quoted in Coelli et al (1998) 
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 The MPI was initially founded by Malmquist (1953) and expounded in a 
consumer theory context. The idea behind Malmquist (1953) was to measure 
the quantity of consumption that an individual needed to consume in a certain 
year in order to achieve the same utility level as in the previous year. The 
quantity index proposed by the study represents a proportional scaling factor 
that is expressed as the ratio of two distance functions from different time 
periods. This method of utilizing distance functions in productivity 
measurement was formally developed by Caves et al (1982) into a general 
production framework that showcases great similarities to the formulation of 
distance functions of Shepard (1970). However, Fare et al (1992), who 
identified the direct link between the distance function concepts of Caves et al 
(1982) and the measures of relative technical efficiency of Farrell (1957), 
whereby the distance functions are the reciprocals to Farrell measures of 
technical efficiency. Contrary to Caves et al (1982) that required assumptions 
on the economic behavior of DMUs, Fare et al (1994) utilized the non-
parametric linear programming, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
showed that a DEA MPI can be decomposed into changes in production 
technology, technical efficiency and scale efficiency. This study adopts the 
DEA based MPI because of these virtues. 
 
Fare et al (1994) employ the DEA MPI to decompose productivity growth into 
two mutually exclusive components: changes in technology (technical 
change) and improvements in production efficiency relative to the production 
frontier (technical efficiency). Across time, technical change involves 
advances in technology due to technological innovations and is represented 
by an upward shift in the production frontier.  The second component- 
technical efficiency- describes the degree to which an activity generates a 
given quantity of outputs with a minimum consumption of inputs, or generates 
the largest possible outputs from a given quantity of inputs (Anthony, 1965; 
Avkiran, 1999). Firms in a particular industry are technically efficient if they 
operate on the production frontier, and technically inefficient if they operate 
below the frontier. Fare et al (1994) showed that it is also possible to 
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decompose technical efficiency change into two distinct components: changes 
in management practices or pure technical efficiency change and changes in 
production scale relative to the most productive scale size or the optimal 
scale. In relating to scale efficiency, the third component of productivity, Coelli 
(1998) noted that a firm may be technically efficient but may still be able to 
improve its productivity by exploiting scale economies. In addition, the author 
observed that the increase in a firm’s productivity from one year to the next 
need not have been from efficiency improvements alone, but may have been 
due to technical change or the exploitation of scale economies, or from some 
combination of these three components. 
 
There are a number of important studies of banking productivity that harness 
the MPI to derive and decompose TFP changes. Notable ones include Alam 
(2001), Avkiran (2000), Fernandez et al (2002), Mukherjee et al (2001), 
Wheelock and Wilson (1999), Berg et al. (1992) and Grifell-Tatje and Lovell 
(1996). 
 
3.6: Common Methods of Measuring Productivity 
 
Although Coelli et al. (1998) illustrated that changes in the TFP index can be 
easily shown to be attributed to changes in technical efficiency, scale 
efficiency, scale of technology and technical change, the study concluded that 
even for the simplest one-input, one-output cases, it is not possible to 
interpret the sources of TFP changes without some knowledge of the 
production technology. Production functions can be estimated from sample 
data and generally requires information on inputs and outputs. 
 
The vast number of previous studies in bank productive efficiency generally 
differ in the methods used in production function or frontier estimation. 
Research methods in measuring bank productivity have developed in two 
main directions, the parametric method that employs econometric and 
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statistical methods and the non-parametric method, which uses linear 
programming applications (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Both approaches 
differ from one another in terms of the structure of the benchmark production 
function, whether random error is accounted for and the distribution of 
inefficiencies to isolate inefficiency from random error.   
 
3.6.1: The Parametric Methods 
The parametric methodology is empirically more popular than the non-
parametric approach in frontier analysis in economic studies because it allows 
for random error and offers room for mathematical manipulation but is more 
restrictive. A fundamental requirement in constructing a parametric function is 
to select and impose an appropriate functional form that attempts to resemble 
the actual production process as closely as possible (Coelli et al, 1998). 
These functional forms can be simple (such as the Cobb Douglas production 
function) or complex (like the translog functions) with many other variants of 
varying degrees of complexity in between these two. These however impose 
restrictive constraints that represent a critical limitation on the parametric 
approach as a specific functional form may be applicable to some DMUs while 
inappropriate to describe the production process of others because all DMUs 
are essentially unique and not homogenous in reality (Avkiran 1999a). 
Furthermore, it is also difficult for parametric functions to accommodate 
multiple outputs.  
 
The three main parametric models are: 
1. The Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). SFA is the principal parametric 
model applied by previous studies. It involves the use of econometric 
modeling methods to specify the functional form for cost, profit and 
production functions in relation to inputs and outputs and allows for 
random errors. It measures technical efficiency, scale efficiency, allocative 
efficiency and MPI. This method has few problems as the selection of a 
distribution form may be arbitrary and thus, flexible. SFA also allows the 
testing of hypotheses in regards to inefficiency and structure of production 
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technology. However the SFA is only appropriate when applied to estimate 
single-output production technologies and is therefore, difficult to adapt to 
multiple outputs. Some of the studies on banking performance that 
harnessed this approach include Ferrier and Lovell (1990) and Altunnbas 
et al (1995). 
2. The Distribution Free Approach (DFA). Similar to SFA, the DFA specifies a 
functional form for production technology but assumes that efficiency is 
stable and that random error averages out to near zero over time. Thus, 
the DFA seeks to describe average deviations in terms of inefficiency of 
each DMU relative to the benchmark’s inefficiency at any point in time. 
DFA has been employed by Bauer et al (1993) and Berger and Humphrey 
(1998). 
3. The Thick Frontier Approach (TFA). Unlike SFA and DFA, TFA does not 
impose any pre-conceived functional form on technology. Instead random 
errors and inefficiencies are accounted for by (1) deviations from predicted 
performance within the highest quartiles and (2) deviations from predicted 
performance between the lowest and the highest quartiles. Studies that 
have applied the TFA technique include Lazano (1998), Bauer et al. 
(1993) and Mahajan et al. (1996). 
 
 
3.6.2: The Non-Parametric Methods 
Non-parametric approaches are less restrictive in nature because they do not 
require the imposition of a possibly unwarranted functional form on the 
structure of the production technology as required by the econometric 
approach that may not be applicable to a particular DMU (Rebelo and 
Mendes, 2000) and Avkiran (1999). They also more readily accommodate 
multiple outputs. Non-parametric approaches however attribute all deviations 
from the frontier to inefficiency.  
 
The non-parametric technique that has been most frequently used is the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA is a non-parametric methodology that 
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constructs a piece-wise frontier formed by linear combinations of the best 
practice observations in the sample and hence, it does not impose any form 
specification on the production function. The frontier is formed in such a way 
that no observation point lies beyond the frontier. Therefore, the frontier 
creates an envelopment of all data points. DEA is often used in literature on 
banking efficiency to generate relative technical efficiency scores by 
comparing a particular DMU to a virtual technically efficient DMU (or its target) 
that has the same input-output configuration. The efficiency scores generated 
follow the technical efficiency ratio as defined by Farrell (1957). DEA is a 
close substitute for SFA and reports the same measures that SFA does. DEA 
has gained popular acceptance and application among studies on banking 
efficiency and productivity. Some of the most influential papers in this 
literature field include Berg et al (1992), Elysiani and Mehdian (1995), 
Wheelock and Wilson (1995), Zaim (1995), Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1996), 
Miller and Noulas (1996), Bhattacharya et al (1997), Shyu (1998) and Avkiran 
(2000a, 200b). 
 
Another non-parametric but relatively less known technique is the Free 
Disposal Hull (FDH). The FDH is somehow a lesser variant of the DEA 
because it constructs the same stepwise production frontier that is either 
lower or similar to the DEA. Berger and Humphrey (1997) report that in the 
banking performance literature, efficiency studies employing the non-
parametric approaches (overwhelmingly DEA approaches) outnumber 
efficiency studies using parametric approaches.  
 
3.7: Common Approaches of Modelling Bank Production/ Behavior 
 
In order to compute productivity measures for banking units, both inputs and 
outputs must be specified. There however appears to be no consensus 
among researchers with regard to the selection of inputs and outputs for bank 
efficiency studies. In general the banking literature has considered 4 
approaches for modelling bank production or behaviour. The first two 
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approaches are the most frequently encountered and both apply the 
traditional microeconomic theory of the firm to banking and differ only in the 
specification of banking activities (Denizer et al., 2000). 
 
Firstly, the intermediation approach models banks as financial intermediaries 
where financial assets are transferred from surplus to deficit units. This is also 
dubbed as the non-traditional banking approach that views the bank as the 
financial intermediary between surplus units and deficit units. Following the 
second approach, 4 inputs (staff number, deposits, interest expense, and non-
interest expense) and 3 outputs (net loans, net interest income and non-
interest income) have been identified (Avkiran, 1999). This approach is found 
to be more relevant to banks as it includes interest expense, which is a 
significant contribution of costs to banks (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1990; 
Berger and Humphrey, 1991). These studies have found that interest expense 
often accounts for between one half to two thirds of total banking costs.  Its 
relevance is even more so given inclusion of off balance sheet activities OBS 
in non-interest income. OBS involve trading financial instruments and 
generating income from fees and loan sales. These activities affect banks’ 
profits but do not necessarily appear in conventional bank balance sheets. 
These non-traditional banking activities however, are increasingly seen as a 
potential dependable income source to at least compensate the competitive 
erosion and volatility of interest income in the relatively deregulated banking 
industries.  
 
The production approach is where banks are regarded as production centers 
of services to both depositors and borrowers (Denizer et al., 2000). As such, 
banks utilize traditional production factors of labor and capital to generate 
deposits and loans (Avkiran, 1999). This approach is also known as the 
traditional banking approach and was introduced by Benston (1965). Under 
this approach, outputs are usually measured in units rather than in dollar 
terms. Although this approach recognizes the multi-product nature of banking 
activities, earlier studies ignored this aspect of banking products, partly 
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because the techniques to deal with scale and scope issues were not well 
developed (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). 
 
A third approach is the value-added approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1992), 
where high value creating activities are regarded as outputs, measured in 
dollar terms, and labour, physical capital, and purchased funds are regarded 
as inputs (Wheelock and Wilson, 1995).  Berg (1992) applied the value-added 
approach to study the efficiency of Norwegian banks.  
 
The fourth approach known as user-cost, is usually attributed to Hancock 
(1986)7 and this assigns an asset as an output if the financial returns are 
greater than the opportunity cost; and a liability item is regarded as an output 
if the financial costs are less than the opportunity costs. When neither 
condition is satisfied, the asset or liability is classified as an input (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1992). 
 
3.8: Summary 
 
In summary, the conceptual framework of bank productivity assessment as 
summarized in Figure 3.1 of this chapter,     comprehensively captures the 
vital aspects of bank productivity. This chapter defines productivity in the 
context of service productivity that applies to banks;  explores the distinctive 
features between  productivity and efficiency; and explains the derivation of  
three components of productivity changes namely technical change, relative 
technical efficiency change and scale efficiency change.   A concise survey 
and discussion on the common methods and approaches of measuring bank 
productivity changes provides insights as the choice of proposing the usage of 
a non-parametric DEA methodology.   
 
                                                 
7 As cited in Murkhejee et al (2001). 
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CHAPTER 4: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
4.1: Evidence of Productivity Efficiency Gains From Financial  
Deregulation 
 
Much of the available literature on bank productivity investigates bank 
productivity changes following a deregulation of the respective financial 
market relative to the pre-deregulation period. The weight of empirical 
evidence so far suggests that regulation of the banking industry is the chief 
source of bank inefficiency although the existence of considerable degrees of 
mixed results may confound this statement. This lends support to the notion 
that with strong regulatory protection coupled with the absence or lack of 
market competition, bank management tends to misuse or misallocate 
resources available to them. With this in mind, substantial reduction of 
regulation and heightened competition would be expected to induce positive 
effects on bank productivity and efficiency. It must be noted that deregulation 
of the banking sector means the determined effort of the banking authorities 
to remove a number of banking regulations that have been stifling market 
forces from operating fully and properly. The degrees and speed of 
deregulation differ greatly across countries resulting in varying conclusions. 
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 The overwhelming majority of empirical evidence on bank productivity 
available comes largely from the scrutiny of the banking industry in the US,  
European and Australian markets, with a few studies focusing on developing 
countries. Studies on bank efficiency on the other hand are more balanced 
with notable attention given to examining banks in emerging markets. 
However, the weight of literature reviewed still draws on studies conducted on 
the US and European banking industries where the majority of bank 
productivity studies tend to be focused. 
 
4.1.1: Efficiency and Productivity Concepts 
Previous studies conducted on banking efficiency and productivity 
assessment use various and different concepts of efficiency and productivity. 
It is therefore essential to fully understand what these concepts mean before 
attempting to draw conclusions from previous literature.  
 
Total Factor Productivity: This is defined as the ratio of all outputs of a firm 
over all factors of production or inputs. The value indicates how much output 
vectors can be produced by a unit of input vectors (Coelli et al, 1998). 
 
Allocative Efficiency: It deals with the minimization of cost of production with 
proper choice of inputs for a given level of output and set of input prices, 
assuming that the organization being examined is already fully technically 
efficient (Avkiran, 1999a). 
 
Technical Efficiency: This concept looks at how the ability of a firm to obtain 
maximum outputs from a given set of inputs while assuming full allocative 
efficiency. Technical efficiency itself may be confounded by scale effects. 
Thus, it can be decomposed into pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency. Pure technical efficiency gauges the management performance in 
maximizing output. Scale efficiency meanwhile reflects whether a DMU is 
operating at the optimal scale size. There would be scale inefficiencies if the 
firm is operating at any other scale size (Avkiran, 1999a). 
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 4.1.2: Empirical Evidence from Developed Economies 
In the earliest published work on bank productivity, Berg et al. (1992) 
analyzed the productivity of Norwegian banks before and after deregulation 
between 1980 and 1989 by using the MPI. Results showed TFP regress 
during the pre-deregulation periods arising mainly from input accumulation 
and building of idle production capacity by banks in anticipation of increased 
competitive pressures from the imminent financial deregulation by the 
financial authorities in 1984. From 1987 onwards however, there was rapid 
post-deregulation productivity growth with large banks exhibiting the most 
rapid growth. The authors however highlighted that these gains were sourced 
largely from technical efficiency rather than technical change. This means that 
in an increasingly competitive industry following deregulation, inefficient banks 
converged to the frontier to maintain their market shares. Subsequently, the 
scores for the best practice banks stabilized while those of the least efficient 
banks continued to catch up. Towards the end of the study period, similar high 
productivity levels were observed for all banks indicating a highly successful 
deregulation exercise in boosting catch up effects and knowledge diffusion 
leading to increased competition. 
 
Humphrey (1991) analyzed the effects of deregulation on US banks between 
1977 and 1987 by using the growth accounting approach rather than the 
conventional parametric and non-parametric frontier analysis. The study found 
that during the study period, bank deregulation in the 1980s appeared to have 
led to very low and even negative productivity growth for banks.  
 
Elyasiani and Mehdian (1995) conducted a similar study on US commercial 
banks that were divided into small and large banks according to asset size for 
the periods 1979 and 1986. Both years represented the pre and post 
deregulation years in the US. By applying DEA on an intermediation model, 
the study found that small banks exhibited relatively higher efficiency during 
the pre-deregulation period but this advantage was reduced in the post-
deregulation period. Meanwhile, small banks experienced technical progress 
compared to large banks that underwent technical regress instead. The 
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authors attributed the differences to the possibility that market conditions 
affect small and large banks differently and therefore, small and large banks 
had different efficient frontiers. The analysis was however confined to two 
widely spaced years and as such, a large productivity progress in one year 
could be offset by a large productivity regress in another year, giving the 
impression of little productivity changes over the period of study (Alam, 2001).  
 
By decomposing the MPI into pure technical efficiency change, scale 
efficiency change, technical change and change in scale of technology using 
the intermediation approach that classified inputs and outputs on user cost 
basis, Wheelock and Wilson (1999) found on average, during the deregulated 
period 1984-1993, US banks experienced diminished productivity. In general 
the smallest banks experienced the largest declines in productivity and 
efficiency while large banks experienced smaller declines. They however 
reported advances in technology. The declines are due to the failure of 
technological progress to offset the decreases in technical and scale 
efficiencies. Only a minority of banks in each size were pushing the frontier at 
a decreasing rate while the majority failed to catch up and even experienced 
declining productivity. This development may suggest that deregulation 
affects banks of different sizes in different ways. 
 
In an another study on US banks that also used the MPI methodology, Alam 
(2001) found on average banks did not move closer to the frontier. Instead, 
changes in measured productivity are mostly attributed to shifts of the frontier 
or technology. Significant productivity progress was initially registered 
followed by a regress following a wave of shocks before the banks settled 
down and adjusted to a slower but steady productivity growth. Alam (2001) 
used the intermediation approach of modeling banks.  
 
Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1996) probed the productivity of Spanish savings 
banks during the post deregulation period between 1986 and 1991 using the 
MPI. The study adopts the value-added approach to model banks’ behavior. 
Findings indicate rapid productivity decline due to technical regress for the 
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best practice banks. Meanwhile less efficient banks catch up with the efficient 
ones at a declining pace. The paper also found that productivity decline was 
the slowest among fast branching banks and that mergers and acquisitions 
had no effect on productivity. In general, this study casts some doubts on the 
productivity and efficiency gains in the wake of a banking deregulation.  
 
Noulas (1997) investigated the deregulated Hellenic banking between 1991 
and 1992 by employing the MPI based on the intermediation model. Results 
show that state banks experienced technological progress as they upgrade 
their technological capabilities in response to competition from private banks 
and technical efficiencies increased for private banks and decreased for 
public banks.  
 
Avkiran (2000) performed MPI analysis in investigating the productivity of 
major trading and regional banks in Australia in the deregulated period 1986-
1995. The study employed the intermediation approach. The principal findings 
include an overall productivity increase attributed to technological progress 
rather than technical efficiency and that the performance for both groups of 
banks was almost identical. The study highlighted technological innovation as 
the dominant effect resulting from deregulation. The author also concluded 
that management has little control in reducing non-interest expenses and 
therefore technical efficiency. On the other hand, the study suggests that 
management has more control over technological progress. Based on this 
evidence; the author calls for more policies that support capital investment 
mainly in the form of preferential tax treatment.  
 
Therefore, the results of deregulation on the productivity and efficiency of 
banks in the post-deregulation period are mixed. Notable studies that indicate 
negative experiences are Spain (Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1995) and the US 
(Humphrey and Pulley, 1997) and (Wheelock and Wilson, 1999). To explain 
the US experience, Burger and Humphrey (1997) noted that interest rate 
deregulation in the US sparked a competitive scramble to pay higher rates on 
deposits without a corresponding reduction in banking services or increase in 
deposit fees. Thus, the productivity gains made cannot be adequately 
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captured by scrutinizing the banks’ balance sheets as many of the benefits 
may have been passed on to consumers. On the other hand, the productivity 
decline of Spanish banks may have been caused by the willingness of the 
banks to trade efficiency and productivity gains to rapidly expand market 
share. In (Wheelock and Wilson, 1999), the authors concluded that in an 
industry that is undergoing rapid changes, only a few pioneering banks are 
able to adapt quickly in response to new market opportunities because a 
regulation change has different effects on different banks.  Therefore, 
depending on the unique market conditions and bank behaviour that prevails 
prior and during deregulation, the results of liberalization are likely to differ 
across countries. 
  
 
4.1.3: Empirical Evidence from Developing Countries 
Because Malaysia is a developing country, it may be worthwhile and of 
interest to this study to investigate some productivity and efficiency outcomes 
of a number of banking deregulations carried out elsewhere in other 
developing countries.   
 
Perhaps the most relevant literature on bank productivity and efficiency 
performance assessment pertaining to the comparative performance between 
domestic and foreign banks in a liberating developing economy comes from 
the studies of the Indian banking system. Four closely related papers provide 
a good comprehensive coverage on the subject: Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), 
Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), Sathye (1998) and Isik (2002).  
 
Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) investigated the impact of the Indian banking 
industry during the early years of deregulation by using a combination of DEA 
and stochastic frontier analysis. The data examined were modelled on the 
value-added approach. The results indicated that public banks were the most 
efficient banks but foreign banks appeared to catch up with them at increasing 
rate owing to their better adaptation to a more competitive environment and 
better specialization on banking niches in metropolitan areas as opposed to 
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domestic banks that were required to serve both rural and urban markets. The 
authors noted that towards the end of the study period, foreign banks were 
nearly as efficient as public banks despite facing more regulatory constraints 
in terms of branching restrictions, higher capital adequacy requirements and 
inhibitions on lending to priority sectors. The study did not use MPI and 
therefore did not investigate productivity changes.  
 
The authors attributed the rise in efficiency of foreign banks to the fact that (1) 
foreign banking institutions were constrained by numerous regulations 
especially on capital adequacy, (2) foreign banks were only subjected to 
inhibited priority sector lending as compared to local banks (3) Indian banks 
were required to branch into rural and suburban areas and make significant 
commitments towards funding priority sectors. Thus foreign banks were able 
to efficiently extend their networks within urban areas only and thus they are 
regarded as more efficient in adapting to an increasingly competitive 
environment. 
 
The results of the study were echoed by that of Sathye (1998). Sathye (1998) 
measured the productive efficiency of publicly owned, privately owned and 
foreign owned banks operating in India for the 1997-1998 period using two 
DEA models- model A and model B. Model A had interest expense and non-
interest expense as inputs and net interest income and non-interest income 
as outputs (similar to Avkiran (2000)). In Model B, a less direct approach to 
measure banks’ efficiency was taken with deposits and staff numbers as 
inputs and net loans and non-interest income as outputs. The study found that 
public banks had higher efficiency scores compared to private and foreign 
banks for Model A but foreign banks dominated both public and private banks 
in Model B. These results led the author to conclude that (1) foreign banks 
appeared to be more efficient users of input quantities (deposits and staff 
numbers) to produce output but needed to focus on pricing aspects (interest 
and non interest income and expenses), (2) the disappointing results of 
private banks obtaining the lowest scores in both models could have been 
attributed to the fact that banks were expanding and thus, employed higher 
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fixed assets that had yet to generate any returns. The paper recommended 
policies to reduce non-performing assets and establishment expenditure 
(through voluntary retirement of bank staff and rationalization of rural 
branches) to increase the overall efficiency of Indian domestic banks enabling 
them to better compete with foreign banks. 
 
Sathye’s (1998) study was complemented by Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) 
where the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth of Indian public sector banks 
was studied. The authors decomposed the TFP growth index into (1) 
technological change, (2) scale economies and (3) the effects of imperfect 
adjustment to quasi-fixed factors. It is noted that this study is the first to 
investigate changes in Indian banks’ productivity over a long- enough time 
period to capture the effects of regulatory changes on banks’ productivity. 
Emphasis was given to the banks’ performance following the nationalization of 
commercial banks that took place from the late 1950s to the early 1980s and 
the deregulating period since the mid 1980s. The study reported productivity 
decline during the first few years after the initiation of bank nationalization 
before banks started to recover in 1975. Productivity regress during the early 
years was attributed to technological regress suggesting that banks had too 
few years to absorb the shock of nationalization. Nevertheless, the authors 
found moderate scale economies progressed throughout these early years. 
High scale growth was reported for the late 1970s to early 1980s due to 
branch network expansion but fell subsequently due to (1) structural 
adjustments due to the deregulation process and (2) reduced scope for cost 
reduction following better utilization of existing capacity. 
 
After the initial period of shock, banks’ productivity grew at 2% on average per 
year. Growth rates later accelerated substantially during the deregulating 
years with the final few years of the study reporting growth rates as high as 
7%. The authors linked the TFP performance decline during the early years of 
nationalization to major changes to the operations of banks as banks were 
required to (1) expand their branch network into rural areas, (2) achieve 
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lending targets to priority areas and (3) adopt differential structure of interest 
rates that were tied to borrowers’ income and lending type. These regulations 
were later either abolished or modified during the subsequent deregulation of 
the banking system that led to increased productivity and technical progress. 
 
In a study of liberalization effects on the bank efficiency of Turkish banks that 
practice Islamic banking, Zaim (1995) found, by using the intermediation 
approach to model banks’ behavior, that technical efficiency increased by 
10% on average and that technical efficiency differences among banks 
narrowed over time. Most inefficiency was sourced from technical inefficiency. 
Banks however were able to operate at their most productive scale or be fully 
scale efficient following the deregulation. 
 
In a related study of Turkish banks, Isik (2002) found that public banks 
experienced the slowest productivity growth while foreign banks saw the 
fastest. However, although all bank groups experienced substantial progress 
in TFP change, efficiency change, pure efficiency change and scale efficiency 
change, all (except for foreign banks) recorded notable technical regress. Isik 
(2002) also reported that both domestic and foreign private banks were more 
apt at improving technical efficiency through better management practices 
rather than improvement in scale efficiency. Nevertheless, most productivity 
growth for public banks came from scale changes 
 
Foreign banks strongly outperformed domestic banks and represented the 
best practice banks along the frontier owing to the fact that foreign banks 
have been pioneers in introducing many services, products and standards. 
Domestic banks were reported to be catching up in terms of technological 
progress by imitating foreign banks rather than indepdently pushing their own 
frontiers. For instance the study identified many products and services offered 
by domestic banks such as factoring, forfaiting, on-line computer systems and 
market-oriented management philosophy, which were copied from the pioneer 
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foreign banks. The paper also quoted Pehlivan and Kirkpatrick (1992)8 , which 
stated that even planning, marketing and recruitment policies were imitated 
and diffused through Turkish bank staff who received their training in foreign 
banks and later joined domestic institutions.   
 
Ishik (2002) further explained that the findings pertaining to prevalent 
technical regress run contrary to expectations of improved technology given 
that Turkish banks had invested heavily in computerizing their operations. 
Thus, the results were also inconsistent with studies in the USA, Spain and 
Korea that found productivity growth was mainly driven by technical progress 
rather than efficiency progress. Amongst some of the factors cited to explain 
the findings are; (1) efficiency gains arising from technological investments 
are realized over longer time periods, which are not captured by the study, as 
banks need more time to learn how best to implement costly high 
technologies and (2) the liberalization of the Turkish banking industry 
prompted banks to expand their branch and ATM networks beyond the levels 
that could be justified leading to huge amounts of idle resources. The author 
ascribed such unimpressive performance of Turkish banks on the lack of 
sophisticated market participants, poor managerial talent, restrictive legal 
infrastructure and other factors that are mostly exogenous to Turkish banks. 
 
Shyu (1998) conducted a study on Taiwan’s banking industry for both pre and 
post-deregulation periods with data modeled on the user-cost approach. The 
study reported that although banks experienced improved overall efficiency 
and close to full-scale efficiency, the principal source of inefficiency originated 
from allocative efficiency and not technical efficiency especially during the 
pre-deregulation years. 
 
Leightner and Lovell (1998) meanwhile performed MPI analysis on Thai banks 
to identify the effects of deregulation relative to the individual banks’ 
objectives and the Thai central bank’s objectives. In the early 1990s, the Bank 
of Thailand began to exert informal pressures on Thai banks to reduce 
                                                 
8 As cited in Isik (2002) 
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speculative investments in the property market. The study covers the period 
1989-1994 before the 1997 financial crisis. The authors found that on 
average, deregulated Thai banks are more adept in achieving individual 
organizational objectives as opposed to central bank’s objectives where a 
regress in TFP was reported (especially the largest Thai banks). An 
interesting finding was that small foreign banks (only small foreign banks were 
allowed to operate in Thailand during the study period) experienced rapid 
productivity growth based on both objectives. This led the authors to conclude 
that under the right market conditions, financial liberalization can lead to 
productivity growth and that such strong growth may not be always desirable 
to the public and economy. 
 
In a study on a full-fledged Islamic banking system, Nazirrudin and Abd 
Elrhman (2003) measured the technical efficiencies of Sudanese Islamic 
banks. Among national banks, private domestic banks and foreign joint 
venture banks, all banks were reported to be technically inefficient. The 
results however showed that foreign joint venture banks are technically more 
efficient than domestic banks. The sources of inefficiency appeared to be 
problems of ownership, lack of banking technologies, severe economic 
sanctions and lack of competency in managing the high risks of Islamic 
financing modes. 
 
However as noted by Isik (2002), different ownership and organizational forms 
could result in different impacts of financial liberalization on different forms of 
banks. For instance, foreign and domestic banks have different levels of 
familiarity with different economic environments, different attitudes towards 
risk, different resource and talent endowments and different degrees of 
support from regulators. In general foreign banks utilize more purchased 
funds than domestic banks in funding assets and have a tendency towards 
managing investment securities that require operating large networks of 
branches, competent management and continual technological innovations 
and adoption rather than loan production where domestic banks, both public 
and private, are more involved.  
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It appears that the reported findings by Hassan and Bashir (2003) and Brown 
(2003) suggest that the appropriateness of the data complied by BankScope 
is questionable at least in the Islamic Banking context. More specifically, there 
are no clear indications provided on the sampling design used, data selection 
and inclusion policy and the extent of specific country coverage in respect to 
different size variables. Bhattacharya (2003) for example found strong 
selectivity bias towards large banks in BankScope that renders the database 
sample somewhat unrepresentative of the actual financial market. Ehrman et 
al (2001) observed that since small banks are not adequately covered, 
BankScope proves to be a poor instrument to investigate micro effects across 
banks but is capable of giving fair descriptions of likely macro effects. 
 
4.1.4: Empirical Evidence from Malaysia and Singapore 
While there have been many studies on the productivity of banks in developed 
countries, the same cannot be said of the Malaysian and Singaporean 
banking environment.  Despite the importance of efficiency in banking 
markets of the region, few studies have investigated bank efficiency and no 
studies appear to have provided productivity measures. One related study, 
which also refers to an oligopolistic Stoekelberg type market was conducted 
by Chu and Lim (1998) on cost and profit efficiencies of banks in Singapore, 
in the pre consolidation period. Employing DEA, this study found less 
dispersion in efficiency scores  - appearing to have been the result of the 
small sample size used.  This may be overcome by extending the population 
to include banks in the region as attempted in this proposal. 
 
There are very limited studies probing the technical efficiencies of Malaysian 
conventional and Islamic banking operations. Earlier studies on efficiency in 
the Malaysian banking industry appeared to focus on the determinants of 
commercial bank profitability15. Only recently have there been formal analyses 
using the analytic techniques of economics.   
 
                                                 
15 Although, the scope of Haron (1996) was merely limited to Islamic banks. 
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Yahya et al. (2001) followed the intermediation approach and applied DEA to 
rate the relative efficiencies of domestic banks against 3 foreign banks in the 
period 1997-98 to gauge the success of the financial consolidation program. 
The study  found considerable inefficiency among domestic banks. The major 
cause of this inefficiency is the oversupply of inputs especially ATMs. They 
also identify capital, reserves and total assets as the core strength of all 
efficient banks. One interesting discovery is that the relative efficiencies of 
domestic banks did not change much throughout the crisis. This suggested 
improvements in loan and advances management as well as deposit 
attraction. 
 
Katib (1999) assessed the efficiencies of pre-crisis domestic banks from 1989 
to 1995 using an intermediation DEA model. He noted efficiency deterioration 
under both assumptions and summarized that banks tend to waste resources. 
He also investigated the determinants of efficiency though a regression 
analysis and found that while bank size has an inverse relationship with 
efficiency, the reverse is found for market power and cost structure difference.  
 
In terms of Islamic banking, one recent, closely related study was by Hamid 
and Ahmad (2001) who used cross-sectional regression analysis in 
comparing the performance of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) and the 
Islam counters of conventional banks from 1996 to 1999. Results were 
inconsistent with one another, However, they found that in general, Islamic 
banking counters appear to be on a better platform in terms of performance 
and structure than does a full-fledged Islamic bank. Another study of Islamic 
banking in Singapore by Gerard and Cunningham (1997) only investigated the 
awareness of the country’s population to Islamic banking.  
 
 
4.2: Literature Review: Evidence of Productivity Gains from Mergers  
and Benefits to the Public 
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4.2.1: Rationales for Market-Based Bank Mergers 
There are many rationales that motivate market-based bank mergers. Over 
the years, a wealth of competing literature has emerged attempting to 
conceptualize the possible rationales. In a rather simple approach, Vennet 
(1996) outlined that generally merger theories can be categorized as value-
maximizing explanations and non-value maximizing explanations. Under the 
former category, banks seek to merge or acquire another to embark on hostile 
takeovers of potentially lucrative but poorly managed banks through the 
market for bank control, to realize economies of scale and scope from 
operational synergies or to enhance market power in a relatively oligopolistic 
market. Meanwhile under the latter category, mergers can be the result of 
managers channeling expenditures according to private preferences with the 
motivation to perhaps increase balance sheet amounts to notable levels or 
raise power and prestige. 
 
Regardless, these theories are not of much use in this study to explain 
Malaysian bank mergers because the Malaysian experience was after all 
directed by the BNM and not  market-based.  
 
Rather it is more worthwhile to investigate some economic theories that are 
widely held in regards to the relationship among mergers, industry market 
structure and outcomes on performance and benefits to the public.  
 
4.2.2: Mergers, Gains from Mergers, Industry Structure and Benefits to 
the Public: The Theories 
Traditionally the market power hypothesis MPH suggests that tacit or explicit 
collusion is more likely to exist in markets with few competitors and should 
result in a significant positive relationship between structure and performance 
(Devaney and Weber, 2000). On the contrary, the efficient structure 
hypothesis ESH maintains that firms with superior management and 
production technology have lower costs and higher profits capturing more 
market share and thus resulting in greater concentration (Demsetz 1974)9. 
                                                 
9 As cited in Devaney and Weber (2000).  
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The MPH and ESH have radically different implications for the industry 
structure and consumers’ economic welfare. If increasing concentration 
occurs as a consequence of efficient banking firms displacing inefficient ones, 
then consolidation should enhance social welfare. Alternatively, increasing 
concentration without efficiency gains may be undesirable, especially in small, 
localized and concentrated markets where local banks are more likely to loan 
to small business and local enterprises. Meanwhile, according to Peltzman 
(1977)10 and Smirlock (1985)11 the positive relationship between structure and 
profits is a consequence of economic efficiency rather than an exercise of 
market power. 
 
Schumpeter (1942) and Galbraith (1956) are of the view that large firms with 
market power are necessary for a rapid rate of technological progress. This is 
because market power provides captured markets and monopolistic prices 
and profits enabling firms to achieve economies of scale in R&D and to erect 
barriers to entry that are necessary to reap any profits associated with 
successful innovations. Presumably, market concentration reduces 
uncertainty and increases the returns on technological investments since 
firms share profits among fewer competitors. In contrast, the Efficient 
Structure Hypotheses (ESH) argues that firms with superior production 
technology have lower costs and higher profits which result in the acquisition 
of market share and an increase in concentration.  
 
Petersen and Rajan (1995)12 found that banks in concentrated markets 
frequently price discriminate as a means of building long-term “lending 
relationships”. As a result they may provide low cost credit to emerging high-
risk firms, while mature firms in the local market rely more on internally 
generated financing. Therefore, they conclude that loan pricing retains 
significant “local effects” consistent with the structure-performance paradigm. 
 
                                                 
10 As cited in Devaney and Weber (2000). 
11 As cited in Devaney and Weber (2000) 
12 As cited in Devaney and Weber (2000).  
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The studies of contestable markets have shown that if entry and exit are 
costless, the economic outcome in even highly concentrated markets can 
approximate to perfect competition (Baumol et al, 1982)13. This is because 
persistent monopoly profits can only exist in markets with imperfect 
competition with no threat of entry by potential competitors. Because potential 
competition is usually not directly observed, empirical tests of contestable 
markets infer potential competition from market entry, differential regulatory 
barriers or change in market share or market concentration (Morrison and 
Winston 1987, Whalen 1992). 
 
Berger (1995) introduced the relative market power hypothesis where profits 
are hypothesized to be only significantly related at high concentration levels. 
Berger (1995)14 found little evidence supporting both hypotheses but 
concludes that neither are of great importance in explaining bank profits. 
Overall, research suggests that efficiency gains from scale are small (Berger 
and Humphrey 1991)15 and that larger, multi-office banks tend to loan a 
smaller percentage of assets to small business than small banks (Keaton 
1995)16. 
 
4.2.3: Mergers, Gains from Mergers, Industry Structure and Benefits to 
the Public: The Empirical Evidence  
Over the past two decades, the banking industry has been experiencing 
profound restructuring changes with most of the effects stemming from 
mergers in consolidation exercises. The trend started off with merger deals in 
the US but more recently, mergers of European banks and banks from 
developing countries are slowly dominating the scene (Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia, 2000). To date most of the studies, which provide evidence of 
economic gains from mergers, were conducted in the US market.  
 
How Mergers Can Result in Productivity Gains 
                                                 
13 As cited in Devaney and Weber (2000).  
14 As cited in Devaney and Weber (2000).  
15 As cited in Devaney and Weber (2000).  
16 As cited in Devaney and Weber (2000). 
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Mergers can be considered as economically motivated moves that result in 
the involved entities moving along the profit function through changes in size, 
scope and distance from the efficient frontier (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 
2000). Alternatively it can be seen that bank mergers can increase value by 
reducing costs or increasing revenues. Costs can be reduced when redundant 
managerial, overlapping bank branches, facilities and headquarters and 
identical back office functions can be eliminated. Cost reduction may be 
greater when merging banks have geographic overlap because banks often 
claim that overlap elimination can result in cost savings amounting to around 
30% of the target’s non-interest expenses (Houston et al. 2001). Likewise, 
revenue enhancements are often attributed to cross-selling of bank services 
and the improved ability to raise fees revenues and lower interest rates on 
deposits (Houston et al. 2001). (However, this may be done through the 
exercise of market power). 
 
Mergers can increase efficiency when larger merged entities reach required 
critical mass to gain access to cost-saving technologies, spread fixed costs 
over a larger production base catering to a larger market share, exploit 
economies of scale, improve managerial efficiency and enter new markets 
while cross selling their products to a wider customer base. This seems to be 
the dominant argument behind BNM’s systematic merger move to improve 
Malaysian banking productivity. 
 
In general however, there has been no consensus among researchers on the 
benefits of mergers to the productivity of the merging entities, to the public or 
to the shareholders. However, despite the fact that many academic studies 
show no substantial gains from mergers, the number and value of new 
mergers in the US and elsewhere go on unabated (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 
2000).  
 
Moreover, while merged entities may become more productive, there is no 
certainty that the gains will be passed on to consumers via lower prices, wider 
product range of improved quality and better services. This is because 
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consolidation yields increased market power to the merged entities thus 
resulting in higher prices and a less desirable product mix, quality and 
services. For instance while an in-market merger is expected to result in cost 
savings when redundant bank branches are closed down, such savings 
cannot be sustained over the long run unless the savings result from 
improved institutional efficiencies in both the acquiring and the target banks 
(Avkiran ,1999). If not, the public could end up paying for products and 
services at above competitive prices.  Furthermore, many bank products are 
price inelastic especially when it comes to the retail banking sector and 
localized market. Customers may agree to pay more if there is little option or 
incentive in shifting to a new bank or when there is a general maneuver made 
by all banking groups in unison. The eventual outcome therefore rests on the 
eventual magnitude of efficiency effects relative to that of market power. 
Previous studies have also found that consolidation leads to concentration of 
market power and thus less competitive pricing that would hurt consumers. 
 
4.2.4: Literature Review 
Much of the literature suggests substantial potential for efficiency 
improvements from mergers of banks. Recent studies discovered unexploited 
scale economies even for the large banks in US and Europe (Berger and 
Mester, 1997; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Allen and Rai, 1996)17. For 
instance, a recent analysis found that substantial cost scale economies have 
been realized (20% of costs for bank sizes of $10 million to $25 million in 
assets) (Berger and Mester, 1997)18. 
 
However, the potential for enhancing banks’ scale efficiency made possible 
through size enlargement following bank mergers is controversial. Haynes 
and Thompson (1999) summarized the studies of US banks. The studies 
generally found that (1) economies of scale are usually found for smaller 
banks, (2) economies of scale tend to become negative for very large banks, 
(3) the measured extent for scale economies to be exploited was small and 
                                                 
17 As cited in Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999).  
18 As cited in Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999).  
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(4) banks tend to exhibit higher levels of technical or X-inefficiency rather than 
scale efficiency. Rather than enhancing productivity growth through increased 
scale efficiency, Dutz (1989)19 pointed out that merging banks with 
overlapping coverage may result in economies arising from selective 
deployment of assets. Specifically the study found that horizontal mergers 
could generate savings surplus capital is reassigned to more productive uses. 
On the other hand, Haynes and Thompson (1999) also cited that if a bank 
mergers result in transferring assets to better quality managers, X-efficiency 
gains are likely to result: where potential acquirers are usually more efficient 
than target banks (under performers). In Haynes and Thompson (1999), the 
authors discovered in the acquisitions of UK building societies, the gains are 
not the result of scale but attributed to assets being transferred for more 
productive use and management. Resti (1998) meanwhile found increased 
efficiency levels for small Italian banks with considerable market overlaps. 
Thus, the literature suggests that bank mergers have some limitations on 
raising efficiency through scale economies but there is room for improvement 
in terms of enhancing technical efficiency 
 
Berger and Humprey (1997) showed because the banking industry exhibits 
substantial X-inefficiencies ranging from 20-25% of total costs, mergers may 
substantially improve cost efficiency when relatively efficient banks acquire 
relatively inefficient banks. However, the results of cost X-efficiency studies 
were quite similar to those concluded for scale economies. The studies on US 
banking generally show very little or no cost X efficiency improvement on 
average from bank mergers in the 1980s with order of 5% of costs or less 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Rhoades, 1993; DeYoung, 1997 and Peristiani, 
1997)20. Studies using data from the 1990s were meanwhile mixed. Rhoades 
(1998)21 and Berger (1998)22 found modest cost x-efficiency gains for US in-
market mergers. Berger et al (1999) summarized these findings by indicating 
that even if there were technological gains on average from consolidating 
                                                 
19 As cited in Haynes and Thompson (1999).  
20 As cited in Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999). 
21 As cited in Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999). 
22 As cited in Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999).  
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branches, operations and processes, these may have been offset by 
managerial difficulties in monitoring larger organizations, conflicts in corporate 
culture and system integration problems.  
 
In contrast, Akhavein et al (1997) and Berger (1998) found substantial 
efficiency gains to be realized if either or both consolidating participants were 
less efficient than their or its peer banks suggesting mergers may have 
resulted in synergies and streamlining inefficient bank management.  
Wheelock and Wilson (1998) studied US bank mergers and found that banks 
with a high degree of cost inefficiency are likely to be acquired without 
government assistance. In another study of US banks, Peristiani (1993)23 
reported that acquiring banks are more profitable and have smaller NPL loan 
ratios than target banks.  
 
European studies correlate closely with most of the US studies. In Vander 
Vennet (1997) and Focarelli at al (1998), large efficient banks tended to 
acquire small less efficient banks. In a comprehensive study of European 
M&A in the 90s covering 52 banks, Huizinga et al (2001) indicated that there 
are significant unexploited scale economies even among large banks. Large 
banks however, exhibited lower profit efficiency than their peers although 
small merging banks exhibit higher level of profit efficiency. Much of the 
evidence shows that increases in cost efficiency are larger when merging 
banks have relatively poor pre-merger cost efficiency levels. Meanwhile 
mergers tend to reduce profit efficiencies for large banks and vice versa for 
small banks.  
 
It can be seen that the affirmative studies often conclude that the potential 
gains in efficiency and productivity are due to one factor or another. Yet, many 
studies also found that these gains are seldom realized. Studies of US bank 
mergers found little or no cost x-efficiency improvements (DeYoung, 1997; 
Peristiani, 1997; Berger, 1998). In reviewing the voluminous empirical 
                                                 
23 As cited in Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999). 
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literature relating to US banking mergers, Pilloff and Santomero (1998) 
pointed out that despite academic studies showing little or no gains in value 
for bank mergers, the number and value of new mergers continues to grow. 
Huizinga et al (2001) explained that the potential gains from consolidating 
banks may have been offset by resultant managerial inefficiencies in 
integrating merged entities.  
 
In the midst of the conflicting conclusions as to the existence of gains from 
bank mergers, Calomiris (1999) summarized the literature on the assessment 
of bank consolidations into three broad areas: 
 
• Cross-regime comparisons that contrast performance of banks under a 
regulatory regime that permit consolidation and another that forbids it. 
• Analysis of the causes and subsequently the likely benefits of 
consolidation. 
• Studies of the consequences in terms of individual bank performance 
following a merger. This involves event studies such as stock price 
responses and analysis based on pre and post merger bank financial 
statements. 
 
The author found that in general, the first two categories of research yield 
positive results suggesting that consolidation enhances competition and 
efficiency. Meanwhile studies in the third category are generally pessimistic in 
that they found small or no average savings. The study is however silent on 
the source of efficiency gains if there are any, and the debate on market 
power and efficiency enhancement is incomplete. 
 
In a study of price effects of mergers in the US airline industry, Kim and Singal 
(1993) found that merged airlines companies on average raised airfares by 
9.44% relative to those unaffected by the mergers. In the banking study by 
Prager and Hannan (1998)24, the authors highlighted that bank mergers 
                                                 
24 As cited in Focarelli and Paneta (2002). 
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reduced deposit rates. Sapienza (2002)25 meanwhile reports that loan rates 
increase when the target has a large local market share. Kahn et al. (2000)26 
concluded that large in-market mergers lead to increased market power that 
causes a rise in personal loan rates.  
 
These studies however only study the effects over the short run and may 
have missed the effects that take longer to manifest. Focarelli and Paneta 
(2002) highlighted that although the merged entity may exert market power 
over the short run, improvements in efficiency may emerge after some time 
resulting in more favorable future pricing for consumers. For bank mergers, 
empirical evidence has shown considerable lags are likely between the 
completion of a merger and the realization of the gains. This is because 
integrating the merged banks is no easy task. Firstly, cost cutting takes time 
while rationalization of overlapping capacities is exercised and there is usually 
reluctance or resistance by staff to retrenchment. Even when this factor has 
been discounted, reorganization of the merged entities into a coherent entity 
is often met with difficulties in harmonizing different management and 
communication styles, customer profiles and distribution channels.  
 
To complicate matters, there is also disagreement among researchers on the 
length of the gestation period following a merger before the dominant effect 
can be assessed. Berger et al. (1998)27 and Calomiris and Karceski (2000)28 
mentioned 3 years are needed before the effects of a merger can be safely 
evaluated. In contradiction to this view; interviews with staff of the Federal 
Reserve Board involved with bank mergers proclaimed that “the cost savings 
would be fully achieved within 3 years after merger with the majority of cost 
savings being achieved after 2 years (Rhoades, 1998)29. Finally in a more 
recent study on large US bank mergers, Houston et al. (2001) found that 
costs savings and revenue enhancements would be evident after  between 2 
to 4 years.  
                                                 
25 As cited in Focarelli and Paneta (2002) 
26 As cited in Focarelli and Paneta (2002). 
27 As cited in Focarelli and Paneta (2002).  
28 As cited in Focarelli and Paneta (2002). 
29 As cited in Focarelli and Paneta (2002). 
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 Focarelli and Paneta (2002) showed that a comprehensive assessment 
requires analysis of price changes that resulted from bank mergers over the 
long run. By examining interest rates for different categories of deposits of 
Italian banks over 9 years, the authors found that, consistent with previous 
studies, short run consolidation increases market power, evidenced by a 
lowering of deposit rates by about 3.3% of market rates within the first year of 
merger. Subsequently however, the deposit rate of merged banks rose over 
time to reach some 13 basis points above its pre-merger level. They also 
compared price changes between in-market mergers and out-of-market 
mergers (which do not change the banks’ local market shares) and found that 
there was deposit rate deduction unfavorable to consumers for in-market 
mergers and that this reduction is larger in samples that are sensitive to 
market power such as small retail deposits and concentrated localized 
markets. No changes to the interest rates in the short run were found in the 
case of out-market mergers. However both merger modes generate an 
increase in deposit rates in the long run. They found that in the long run, 
efficiency gains from mergers dominate market power effects. Therefore, 
consumers gain eventually if banks are successful in reducing costs or in 
other words, become more productive. However, the authors cautioned policy 
makers to be sceptical of rapid efficiency improvement claims. Focarelli and 
Paneta (2002) appear to offer the most convincing arguments on the subject. 
 
In another related study, Avkiran (1999) assessed the role of mergers in 
efficiency gains and the degree to which they are passed on to the public in 
the Australian banking system. Avkiran found that three out of four merger 
cases lend support to the hypothesis that acquiring banks are more efficient 
but reported no clear evidence that acquiring banks at least maintained their 
pre-merger efficiency following a merger. The author also found that in the 
case of an in-market merger there was a gradual rise in relative efficiency. By 
using change in market share of deposits as a proxy to measure the extent of 
operating efficiencies being passed on to the public, the author found mixed 
results and attributed this to the possibility that increased market penetration 
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creates monopoly power and as such, merged entities are less inclined to 
improve service at better prices. 
 
4.2.5: Caution in Comparing the Mergers in Malaysia with Existing 
Studies 
It must be noted that most of the merger studies discussed assess market 
motivated mergers. On the contrary, the bank consolidation exercise in 
Malaysia was a pre-emptive move directed by the BNM and not at all guided 
by market forces. This political and regulatory influence may add further 
ambiguity to the consistency of the data about the success of the Malaysian 
experience compared to those of US and Europe. There has also been an 
indication that a second wave of mergers may be coming, this time entirely 
based on market forces. Perhaps it is only after the completion of the new 
consolidation that any meaningful comparisons can be made with the existing 
literature on bank mergers from elsewhere. Until such time, any results must 
be interpreted with care as Calomiris (1999) pointed out, during a continuous 
merger wave, gains accrued over several years, one-time merger costs and 
assumptions that limit time horizons of gains can contribute to substantial 
underestimation of the gains from mergers.  
 
 
4.3:  Conclusion 
 
This chapter explains the different concepts of efficiency and productivity and 
the impact from bank mergers.  These concepts are critical to understanding  
and drawing conclusions from previous literature on the area.     
It is evident from the literature review above, that there is a void in credible 
research relating to comparable productivity measures within the dual banking 
system.  The need for a cross system bank productivity measure is fueled by 
the serious void of any credible empirical research on the comparable 
performance between the two banking systems. Most of the previous studies 
of Islamic banks focused primarily on expounding the conceptual principles of 
interest-free financing. In fact, it has been recognized that the general lack of 
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relevant and reliable data is seriously impeding any comprehensive analysis 
of cross-system bank performance measurement. Most of the few empirical 
studies of Islamic banks’ performance fail to account for these  fundamental 
differences. 
 
As explained above, Islamic banking and conventional differ fundamentally in 
both their principles and operations.   Due to the inadequacies of 
BankScope’s data to attempt a comparable performance data analysis 
between conventional and Islamic banks, a comparison cannot be interpreted 
and applied with confidence. Given these, it is opinioned that because no 
cross-system studies,  have relied on other credible sources than BankScope, 
there is a void within the voluminous banking literature on cross-system 
comparable bank performance measurement in the dual banking industry. 
It is thus, the aim of this study to pioneer one where the productivity aspects 
of conventional and Islamic banks are compared at both the same time and 
across time as well as between banks of the same system at one time and 
across time.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: 
RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
 
PART I 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This study has established the methodological usage of MPI  as the 
comparable bank productivity measure of the Malaysian dual banking system 
in the era of bank mergers.    In order to comprehend  MPI within the DEA, it 
is significant to understand the related variables.   This chapter  explains the 
derivation of the various variables and components of productivity changes 
under the MPI. 
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 5.1: Productivity in terms of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
 
Productivity changes are often defined in terms of Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) changes. Coelli et al (1998) termed TFP as an overall productivity 
measure that encompasses the productivity of all production factors or 
outputs. When the overall productivity of a Decision Making Unit (DMU) or a 
whole industry is considered, distinction must be made between TFP and 
other commonly used partial productivity measures such as labor and capital 
productivity. This is because a DMU usually transforms multiple inputs into 
multiple outputs. The evaluation of partial productivity measures alone can be 
misleading and could result in inconsistent and inaccurate conclusions. As 
with other studies that utilize index number approaches, this paper considers 
TFP changes as indicators of overall productivity changes. Both terms will be 
used interchangeably henceforth. 
 
In a one-input, one-output case, the simplest yet general measure of 
productivity is the ratio of outputs over inputs. This ratio generates a value 
indicating how many output units that can be produced by employing a single 
input unit. A rising ratio generally indicates rising productivity. This view is 
essentially an output orientated one. An input orientated productivity ratio 
looks at how many input units can be reduced to or required by a single 
output unit.  
 
5.2: The Components of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
 
The same output over input ratio is often used in non-technical media as an 
indicator of the overall efficiency of a DMU. This is a flawed statement. Both 
productivity and efficiency are two distinct, although closely related terms. 
This subtle yet important distinction can be illustrated by Figure 5.1. A 
production frontier f is drawn that transforms a single input into a single  
output. This relationship also represents the maximum y output units that can 
be feasibly attained from a single x input unit and hence, it is also called the 
production frontier. It also reflects the current production technology. Note that 
 111
the slope of the frontier is the ratio of y/x, which is also the average product 
AP of all the points that lie along the frontier. Because it rises upward to A 
before tapering off, the technology is said to exhibit non-constant returns to 
scale. Specifically it is Increasing Returns to Scale (IRS) up to A before 
experiencing declining returns to scale DRS after that.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Production Frontier and Technical 
Efficiency 
f 
x 
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x1
y1 
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A 
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5.2.1: Technical efficiency 
A and B are technically efficient producers because both lie on the frontier. 
This means A and B are already producing the maximum possible output 
using inputs via technology f. C is technically inefficient because it could still 
increase its output level by employing the same input level at x1 by moving 
upwards to B. Because the production frontier also defines the feasible 
production set, D is regarded as infeasible to attain by technology f.  
 
5.2.2: Scale Efficiency 
The same diagram is replicated in Figure 5.2 but with rays drawn extending 
from the origin . Notice the slopes of the rays are also of the values x/y and 
AP. Because AP is identical along the rays, these can be viewed as 
technologies with constant returns to scale, CRS specification. As C moves 
to B, the slope of the ray becomes steeper, indicating greater input-output 
transformation and thus, productivity. However, if C moves to A, the steepest 
ray is tangent to production frontier f. Point A thus represents the optimal 
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scale and has the maximum possible productivity. Production on any other 
point along the frontier although technically efficient, results in lower 
productivity. C essentially moves to A by exploiting scale economies. 
Therefore a scale-inefficient DMU may be efficient but it can still exploit scale 
economies to improve its productivity (Coelli et al, 1998). 
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Figure 5.2: Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency 
 
 
5.2.3: Technical Change 
Figure 5.3 brings the discussion one step further by introducing technical 
change. Technical change is an additional source of productivity change but 
takes place over time. Technological advancement is represented by an 
upward shift of production frontier f1 to f2, where at B, the same input level x1 
is associated with a higher output level y2.  
 
It is apparent then, that from the examples shown, a DMU can alter its 
productivity by altering its technical efficiency, scale efficiency and by virtue of 
technical change. Productivity therefore, is composed of technical efficiency, 
scale efficiency and technical change.  
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Figure 5.3: Technical Change 
 
 
5.3: Economic Efficiency Measures and Their Relationships with 
Productivity 
 
5.3.1: Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency 
In the economic literature, overall economic efficiency EE is made up of 
technical efficiency TE and allocative efficiency AE. AE is defined as the 
effective selection of inputs vis a vis their prices to produce a given quantity of 
output at the minimum production costs (Avkiran (1999)). TE on the other 
hand, investigates how well a DMU implements an effective production plan to 
convert its inputs to outputs (Avkiran, 2000).  
 
These efficiency concepts can be illustrated by Figure 5.3, which illustrate a 
production process that involves 2 outputs (y1 and y2) being produced by a 
single input x. The II concave curve represents the production possibility 
frontier of fully efficient firms while AA represents the slope of the isorevenue 
line or the output price ratio. Note that this is the output-orientated approach 
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to explain economic efficiencies where the objective is to expand output 
production (y1 and y2 at A) as much as feasibly possible from a given level of 
input. The input orientated model meanwhile incorporates a unit isoquant 
between two inputs (x1 and x2) and an isocost line. It attempts to contract the 
inputs as much as permissible by the production isoquant to produce a given 
level of output. Refer to Coelli et al (1998) for a comprehensive coverage of 
the topic. 
 
In terms of Figure 5.4, TE is represented by the distance AB and is expressed 
as a ratio of AB/OB or according to the equivalent specifications of Farrell 
(1957) in the input orientation model as OA/OB which is 1-AB/OB or the 
reciprocal of AB/OB. AE meanwhile is indicated by BC, that is, the reduction 
of production costs that would occur at allocatively efficient point B’. AE is 
expressed as the ratio of OB/OC. Thus; 
 
EE= (OA/OB) x (OB/OC)= OA/OC 
           = TE x AE 
 
A 
B 
C 
I 
A 
 y2/x1 
 A 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 y1/x1  0 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency 
Source: Coelli et al (1998) 
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5.3.2: Pure Technical Efficiency, Scale Efficiency  
The economic measures outlined so far are defined under a CRS technology. 
However, if VRS specification is allowed, scale efficiency SE can be derived. 
To simplify the discussion, the production frontier seen in Figure 5.1 is 
summarised in Figure 5.5. In Figure 5.5, both CRS and VRS frontiers for a 
one-input, one-output scenario are indicated. Under CRS specification, the TE 
of point A is the distance PPC. Under VRS assumption however, TE is only 
PPV. The difference between the CRS and VRS TE scores is due to scale 
inefficiency that can be expressed as APC/APV. The CRS TE therefore, can 
be decomposed into pure technical efficiency PTE (APC/AP) and scale 
efficiency SE (APC/APV). The SE measure can be roughly translated as the 
ratio of average product AP of a DMU operating at point PV to the average 
product of a DMU operating at point R, the point of optimal scale. Any 
divergence of the DMU from the most productive scale size MPSS point (point 
R) represents some degrees of scale inefficiency (Avkiran, 1999). 
 
However if a non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) production technology is 
specified, one is able to determine whether a DMU is experiencing increasing 
returns to scale IRS or decreasing returns to scale DRS. If a particular VRS 
score equals the NIRS score, the DMU is operating under DRS. On the other 
hand, if VRS is not equal to NIRS, the DMU is operating under IRS. If VRS 
equals the CRS score, then the DMU is operating at the MPSS. 
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x  
Figure 5.5: Scale Efficiency, Scale Economies and Most Productive Scale Size 
(MPSS) 
Source: Coelli et al, 1998 
 
Recalling that it has been established above that an overall productivity 
measure is the sum of technical efficiency, scale efficiency and technical 
change, the PTE definition of Figure 5.5 corresponds to the technical 
efficiency mentioned earlier. For the rest of the study, it is referred to as PTE. 
Thus: 
TE= PTE x SE 
 
From the examples given, it is apparent that while EE accounts for AE and 
TE, it leaves out the technical change component. This is yet another proof 
that productivity and efficiency are both the same terms and that y/x does not 
equal efficiency.  
 
 
 
5.4: Derivation and Decomposition of the TFP Index 
 
Coelli et al (1998) demonstrated that a TFP index can be constructed and 
subsequently decomposed into PTE, SE and technical change components. It 
has been shown that average product AP serves as a proxy for productivity. 
Consider a simple one-input, one-output case, and letting (x0, y0) and (x1, y1) 
denote the observed input-output combinations for period 0 and period 1. 
Then, the productivity of a particular DMU in periods 0 and 1 are given by: 
 
AP0= y0/ x0 
AP1= y1/ x1 
 
Any changes in overall productivity (π) for the same DMU over periods 0 and 
1 can be captured by the ratio of AP of period 1 over the AP of period 0 as 
shown by: 
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π = AP1 = y1/ x1 ………………………… Equation 1 
      AP0     y0/ x0 
 
The same expression can be re-arranged as: 
 
π = AP1 = y1/ y0
      AP2     x1/ x0…………………………..Equation 2 
 
Coelli et al (1998) showed that the same ratio is also the TFP index that 
measures productivity changes for periods 0 and 1. 
 
π = AP1 = y1/ y0 = TFP0, 1 
      AP2     x1/ x0…………………………..Equation 3 
 
If the condition of technical inefficiency and differing input levels utilization 
between the two periods are to be factored in (which is usually the case), then 
Coelli et al (1998) demonstrated that the ratio in Equation 3 can be expanded 
into: 
 
TFP0, 1 = λ1 x f1 (κ x0)/ κ x0
                 λ0    f0 (x0) / x0………………….Equation 4 
 
where λt: inefficiency coefficient of period t 
           κ: x1 input usage coefficient of period 1 as a proportion of x0 
     ft (x): observed output levels at period t, as implied by the production 
function of  
               period t. 
 
By rearranging the expression, the arrangement becomes: 
 
TFP0, 1 = λ1 x κε (t)-1 x  f1(x0)
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                 λ0                 f0(x0)………………….Equation 5 
 
where κ: the scale of operations 
           ε: returns to scale parameter 
 
Equation 5 gives the complete decomposition of the overall productivity index, 
where the first term represents technical efficiency change, the second term 
indicates the effects of change in scale of operations and the third term 
computes the technical change. Note that the third term is also controlled by 
the scale of operations κ and the returns to scale parameters ε. If the 
technology is specified as a CRS benchmark, then ε(t)= 1, ε(t) –1=0 and thus 
κε (t)-1= 1. Therefore, the third term becomes irrelevant when CRS is assumed. 
However, if VRS prevails, then the second term will assume some other 
positive value and will become relevant.  
 
From this example, it can be summarized that an index number approach is 
able to compute overall productivity change as well as decompose overall 
productivity change into pure technical efficiency change (PEFCH), scale 
efficiency change (SECH), scale change of technology (SCHTCH) and 
technical change (TECHCH). There are also a number of important 
conclusions that can be drawn from Coelli et al (1998): 
• It is vital to have some knowledge of the production technology to derive 
the TFP index 
• Without extraneous information, it is impossible to break the TFP down 
into the different sources of productivity change 
• The DMU is assumed to be allocative efficient. Otherwise, the TFP index 
may harbor some effects of allocative inefficiency. 
 
Coelli et al (1998) have shown that with these conditions in place, an index 
number approach is able to capture the different sources of TFP changes. 
The question now turns to which index number methodology to adopt. In 
general, there are 4 index number approaches to measure and decompose 
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TFP change: output price, input price, output quantity and input quantity 
indices. 
 
5.5: The Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) 
 
In this study, productivity or TFP changes are calculated using the Malmquist 
Productivity Index MPI as introduced by Caves et al. (1982) and developed by 
Fare et al. (1994). The MPI is capable of being defined as either an output 
quantity index or as an input quantity index. Most of the literature on banking 
productivity assessment that harnesses the MPI uses the output quantity 
index. To maintain consistency with the majority of related studies, this paper 
follows an input quantity index approach. 
 
5.5.1: MPI in terms of Distance Functions 
The MPI can be computed by using only quantity data for both inputs and 
outputs alone and is expressed as the ratio of distance functions. Distance 
functions are function representations of multiple-output and multiple input 
technology that require only data on quantities without the need to specify 
behavioral objectives such as cost minimization or profit maximization 
(Avkiran, 2000). Distance functions alone can either be input or output 
functions. An input distance function defines the production technology by 
referring to the maximal contraction of the input vector given an output vector. 
By contrast, the output distance function seeks maximal expansion of the 
output vector given the input vector. Because the approach adopted in this 
study is essentially an output orientated one, output distance functions are 
used to derive the MPI. 
 
5.5.2: Output Distance Functions 
To define the output based MPI, a general production technology must be first 
defined and understood as the output set P(x) that represents all output 
vectors y that can be produced by employing an input vector x. The 
technology or P(x) is denoted as: 
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P(x) = {y: x can produce y} 
        = {y: (x, y) ∈ St } for all x…………….Equation 6 
 
In equation 6, P(x) models the transformation of inputs x into outputs y for 
each period t= 0, 1…T. St meanwhile represents the feasible output set for 
technology P(x).  
In terms of the output index number model, Equation 6 is slightly modified as 
below. Following Shephard (1970), the output distance function for period t is 
expressed as: 
Dt (x, y) = min { δ: (y/δ, x) ∈ St }…………Equation 7 
                    
δ represents the smallest distance by which the output needs to be deflated 
so as to become feasible to be produced by period t technology (Coelli et al, 
1998). This applies to an output vector that lies above the technology or 
production frontier like y1 in Figure 5.6. In this instance, δ > 1.  On the other 
hand, if the observed output vector is below the production frontier, then δ < 1 
to inflate the output vector thus bringing it onto the surface of the production 
frontier or production possibility set St . In particular, Dt (x, y) ≤ 1 if and only if 
(x, y) ∈ St and Dt (x, y)= 1 if and only if (x, y) is on the frontier, that is, 
technically efficient.  
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Figure 5.6  Output Distance Function: Output Vector Contraction and 
Expansion 
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Source: Coelli et al 1998 
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Figure 5.7 Derivation of MPI: One-Input, One-Output Case with Constant 
Returns to Scale CRS Technology. 
Source: Alam (2001) 
This can be illustrated by Figure 5.7 where scalar input is used to produce 
scalar output. Because (xt, yt) is interior in relation to t technology, it is not 
technically efficient. The distance function would then seek the greatest 
proportional increase in the output such that the output remains feasible. 
Maximum feasible production is yt/θ . Thus, the value of the distance function 
would be Oa/Ob ≤ 1, which is the value of δ through which (xt, yt) needs to be 
inflated through y/δ. Also recall from Equation 7 that if δ > 1, y would be 
deflated via y/δ to bring it back to the surface of the production set p(x) 
associated with x. All output distance functions henceforth, would be 
evaluated in a similar manner.  
 
Note that the production frontiers P(xo) and P(x1) are drawn under CRS 
specification. P(xt) adopts the CCR technology that satisfies the assumptions 
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laid in Charnes et al. (1978) where CRS and free disposability of inputs and 
outputs are specified. 
 
5.5.3: The General Overall MPI Index 
What follows is the derivation of the MPI index as pioneered by Caves et al. 
(1982). In the spirit of the study, CCD computed TFP changes between 2 data 
points as the ratio of distance functions for each (x, y) relative to a common 
technology. In particular, Caves et al. (1982) defined the MPI with period 0 
technology as the benchmark as: 
 
MCCD0 = DC0 (x1, y1) 
                 DC0 (x0, y0)…………………….Equation 8 
 
Where DC0 means the input distance function with CRS technology of period 
0 as the benchmark. A value of more than 1 indicates productivity increase 
while a value of less than 1 indicates productivity regress. A unity value 
means no productivity change. In terms of the output distance function,  
 
DC0 (x1, y1) = min { δ: (y1/δ, x1) ∈ P(x)0 } 
 
Where the distance function measures the maximum proportional change in 
outputs required to make (x1, y1) feasible in relation to period 0 technology. In 
terms of Figure 5, δ = Od/Oe which is > 1. Therefore, (x1, y1) would be 
deflated back to the surface of P(x)0 by δ. 
 
Alternatively, one could define a period 1 technology-based MPI as: 
 
MCCD1 = DC1 (x1, y1) 
                 DC1 (x0, y0)…………………….Equation 9 
 
In order to avoid choosing an arbitrary benchmark, a geometric mean of the 
two ratios is taken instead as the MPI index: 
1/2 
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 MCCD0,1=    DC0 (x1, y1)   DC1 (x1, y1) 
                      DC0 (x0, y0)   DC1 (x0, y0)      ………….Equation 10 
 
5.5.4: The Decomposition of the General MPI 
Apart from the specification of CRS and weak disposability of inputs and 
outputs, CCD also assumed that each DMU both be technically and 
allocatively efficient so that MCCD=TECHCH. However Fare et al (1989, 
1992) and Coelli et al (1998) showed that if sufficient observations in each 
period are available to estimate the technology in each period, then the 
assumption can be dropped. Moreover, it is more common to observe some 
degrees of technical inefficiency in the operations of most banks. Note that all 
DMUs are still being assumed to be allocatively efficient. Following Fare et al 
(1994) where technical inefficiency is present, Equation 10 can be rewritten 
as: 
M (x1, y1, x0, y0) =  
DC1 (x1, y1)  x       DC0 (x1, y1)   DC1 (x1, y1)
DC0(x0,y0)            DC0 (x0, y0)   DC1 (x0, y0)      ……….Equation 11 
 
An index greater than 1 indicates improvement while a value less than 1 
reflects regress. Both components may move in different directions. Note that 
if x0=x1 and y0=y1, M=1, signalling that there has been no change in 
productivity. The two components are reciprocals but not necessarily equal to 
1. In terms of Figure 5 and following Fare et al (1994) and Alam (2001), the 
MPI index is expressed as: 
 
M(x1, y1, x0, y0)=   0E x   0B      0F   x  0D
                                 0F     0A      0C      0B   
1/2 
1/2 
 
The ratios within the brackets measure shifts in the technology or production 
frontier at input levels x0 and x1. Technical change or TECHCH is thus, the 
geometric mean of the 2 shifts. The term outside the bracket computes 
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technical efficiency change at period 1 and 0 determines whether production 
in catching up or deviating away from their contemporaneous frontier. In this 
study’s application, this component would capture the degree of technology 
diffusion among banks. 
 
Even with the MPI now being decomposed into TECHCH and technical 
efficiency change, the expression still falls short of the complete 
decomposition of the TFP index as discussed in Section 3. It has been 
highlighted in Section 2 that the difference between CRS and VRS efficiency 
scores is due to scale inefficiencies. Therefore, in order to calculate changes 
in scale efficiencies SECH, this study follows the FGNZ approach where the 
output distance functions are also computed under VRS. FGNZ outlined this 
enhanced decomposition as: 
 1/2 
M(x1, y1, x0, y0)= DC1 (x1, y1)       DC1 (x1,y1)/ DV1 (x1, y1)       x  
                               DC0 (x0, y0)      DC0 (x0, y0)/ DV0 (x0, y0) 
 
                               DC0 (x1, y1)  DC0 (x0, y0)
                               DC1 (x1, y1)  DC1 (x0, y0)   …………….Equation 13 
1/2 
 
M(x1, y1, x0, y0)= PEFCH x SECH x TECHCH 
 
Where DV0 means the input distance function with VRS technology of period 
0 as the benchmark. Thus, technical change TECHCH is calculated with 
reference to the CRS benchmark, the efficiency change component-now 
represented by pure efficiency change PEFCH is computed as the ratio of 
own period distance functions relative to VRS and the scale efficiency in each 
period is the ratio of distance function restricted by VRS. This leaves scale 
efficiency change SECH as ratio of scale efficiency from each period.  
 
Further decomposition of this expression is possible in order to derive the 
residual scale change of technology (that is whether period 1 VRS is relatively 
closer or further from CRS than period 0 VRS) SCHTCH. This derivation can 
be found in Simar and Wilson (1998), Wheelock and Wilson (1999), Zofio and 
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Lovell (1998) and more recently by Fernandez et al (2001). This paper will not 
pursue a further enhanced decomposition due to the already existing 
disagreements of researchers surrounding Equation 13. In particular, Ray and 
Desli (1997) disputed the simultaneous use of CRS and VRS, stating such 
procedures only generate internal inconsistencies within the model. However, 
this study chooses to apply Equation 13 due to a number of credible reasons, 
which were explained in the literature review. 
 
5.6: Computing MPI within the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
Framework 
 
There are several ways to compute the distance functions that make up the 
MPI. Here this study follows Fare et al (1994) and calculates the output 
distance functions by applying a linear programming approach called Data 
Envelopment Analysis. It was shown in Chapter 3 that it is impossible to 
decompose the TFP into its various subcomponents without some knowledge 
of the relevant technology. Because one can never know the exact 
technology, it needs to be estimated. 
 
Studies of the non-parametric DEA linear programming approach of 
estimating technology following Farrell (1957) suggest the use of a non-
parametric price-wise production possibility frontier as illustrated in Figure 5.6 
that is constructed to fit into a multi-output, single input output orientated 
model so that no observed points lie to the right or above the frontier. 
Therefore, the constructed frontier envelopes all observation points, hence the 
name Data Envelopment Analysis.   
 
5.6.1: The Data Envelopment Analysis DEA Methodology 
Charnes et al. (1978) developed and extended Farrell’s ideas into a non-
parametric methodology known as Data Envelopment Analysis. This 
development addressed a critical shortcoming of the weighted relative 
efficiency ratio expressed below that was originally conceived by Farrell and 
Fieldhouse (1962) to construct an efficient hypothetical unit (on the frontier) 
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against which all other inefficient units are compared. The problem associated 
with the ratio is determining a common set of weights to be applied to all 
DMUs since DMUs value inputs and outputs differently and therefore a 
common standardization may introduce bias into the results.  
 
Efficiency of DMUj = u1 y1j + u2 y2j +… 
 
                                     v1 x1j + v2 x2j +… 
 
where u1 = the weight given to output 1  
             y1j = amount of output 1 from DMU j 
             v1 = weight given to input 1 
             x1j = weight of input 1 to DMU j  
 
Charnes et al (1978) recognized the problem and proposed instead that each 
DMU be allowed to adopt a set of weights that will put the DMU in the best 
light possible relative to all other DMUs in the sample. 
 
 
Mathematically, their model is expressed as:  
 
Max H0 u, v (u’yj / v’xj) 
s.t.             (u’yj / v’xj) ≤ 0 
                  u, v ≥ 0………………………..Equation I 
 
where xj = input vector for DMU j 
           yj = output vector for DMU j 
 
The efficiency of the jth DMU, H0, is thus maximized but subjected to two 
constraints. The first ensures that the relative efficiency score is bounded by 
zero and 1 with value 1 indicating a fully efficient DMU. The second makes 
certain that variables u and v that represent the weights to be uniquely applied 
to each DMU have values more than unity. The solution to the model would 
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yield the most favorable weights u and v, to be applied to DMUj that would 
maximize its efficiency H0 that would be simultaneously obtained from the 
operation as well. The relative efficiency score would take a value between 1 
and 0 as dictated by the first constraint.  
 
5.6.2: A Graphic Illustration of DEA 
Figure 5.8 showcases a production possibility frontier in producing two 
outputs y1 and y2 by employing input x in the most efficient manner possible. 
The convex combination of A and C will create the most combination of 
outputs for a given set of input and thus is defined as the efficiency frontier. 
Since B lies below the efficiency frontier, the DMU is inefficient relative to A 
and C.  However, it would be erroneous to derive B’s efficiency score relative 
to A and C because B is somehow different and unique to A and C. Instead, A 
and C are the peers of B because both A and C define the relevant portion of 
the frontier (AC) to produce efficient production for B.   
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Figure 5.8: A Two-Output, One-Input Output Orientated DEA Model. 
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B’s efficiency would be determined by comparing it to a virtual DMU V or its 
target that is made up by different proportions of A and C. The percentage of 
C in V is AV/AC. Similarly, the proportion of A is CV/AC. The efficiency of B 
would then be calculated as OB/OV, which is the amount by which the output 
V has to contract but with the amount of inputs utilized still unchanged for both 
B and V. Another way of interpreting this is DMU V only needs OB/OV fraction 
of its input to produce as much as B. The figure also highlights that if the 
relative efficiency scores of A and C are to be calculated, the virtual DMUs for 
A and C would be A and C themselves. The ratios OA/OV and OC/OV will be 
equal to 1. Thus inefficient units like B would have efficiency scores of less 
than 1 but more than 0 while fully efficient units would score the value of 1. 
 
5.6.3: DEA as a Non-Parametric Linear Programming Methodology 
Because Equation I is on the fractional linear form, it is converted into more a 
familiar form of linear programming problem in Equation II to facilitate its 
computation. Equation 2 seeks to maximize the ratio in Equation I by setting 
the denominator v’xj to a constant, thus allowing the numerator u’yj to be 
maximized in relation to the denominator (Avkiran, 1999). 
 
 
Max H0 u, v (u’yj) 
s.t.              v’xi = 1 
                   u’yj – v’xj ≤ 0   j= 1, 2…N 
                   u,v ≥ 0………………………….Equation II 
 
The original linear program in Equation II is in the primal or multiplier form. As 
with any linear program, it is possible to formulate a partner program or the 
dual that has less constraints involved as in Equation III. Generally in linear 
programming, the more constraints a model has, the more difficult it is to 
solve (Coelli et al. 1998). Furthermore, as the number of inputs and outputs 
increase, more DMUs tend to get an efficiency rating of 1 as they become too 
specialized to be evaluated with respect to other DMUs. 
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 Max θ,λ θ 
s.t. –y0 + Yλj ≥ 0, 
     θx0 - Xλj ≥ 0, 
     λ ≥ 0………………………………….Equation III 
 
 
5.6.4: Input and Output Orientated DEA Models 
Note that the case illustrated in Figure I is an example of an output-orientated 
efficiency measure. Efficiency itself is capable of being defined by both 
output-orientated and input orientated models. Output orientation addresses 
the question how much output can be feasibly expanded by holding the level 
of input constant. On the contrary, the input orientation looks at how much 
input can be feasibly reduced to produce the same level of output. The two 
DEA orientations would yield the same efficiency measures under CRS 
specification but unequal under VRS (Coelli et al, 1998). In many DEA 
studies, analysts have tended to select input orientated models because in 
most DMUs, input quantities seem to be the primary variables (Coelli, 1996). 
This argument however, is less applicable in the banking industry since banks 
have limited control over their inputs. In Avkiran (1999), it is mentioned that 
when inputs may well be outside the control of managers, the output 
orientated model needs to be applied. Although Avkiran (1999) applied the 
input-orientated model, it is the author’s opinion in this study that the relatively 
regulated Malaysian and Singaporean banking industries (where bank 
managers have little control over input variables such as deposit rates) 
warrant the use of the output-orientated DEA model. 
 
5.6.5: Computing MPI Output Distance Functions 
Also notice that the output distance function as in Equation 7 is the reciprocal 
to the output-based Farrell measure of technical efficiency where: 
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[DCt (xt, yt)]-1 = max θ…………………….Equation 14  
 
According to equation 14 the inverse of an output distance function is 
equivalent to the DEA technical efficiency score. Notice that the production 
function in Equation 7 is the reciprocal of the maximum proportional 
expansion of the output vector y, given the input vector x that has been 
discussed in Chapter 4. Therefore, one can make use of this inverse 
relationship to compute the necessary output distance functions to derive the 
MPI index and its decomposition via a DEA means. There are two DEA 
models to choose from input orientated DEA and output orientated DEA. 
Since this study seeks to derive and decompose the output based MPI index, 
this analysis will follow the output orientated DEA. 
 
DEA calculations can be conducted using a number of computer programs 
that allow linear programming procedures. Apart from simple spreadsheets 
and statistical packages such as Excel, SAS and SHAZAM, there are a few 
DEA specialist software packages available including IDEAS, Frontier 
Analyst, WDEA and DEAP. This study uses DEAP version 2.1 developed by 
Coelli to construct the piece-wise production frontier and derive the technical 
efficiency scores. The output oriented model to be specified into DEAP would 
resemble the following: 
 
Max θ,λ θ 
s.t. –y0 + Yλj ≥ 0, 
     θx0 - Xλj ≥ 0, 
     NI’λ=1 
     λ ≥ 0………………………………….Equation 15 
 
Note that DEAP is instructed to calculate an output-orientated VRS model by 
adding the constraint NI’λ=1 to the output orientated linear programming LP. 
Coelli et al (1998) stated that where there are reasons to believe that the 
DMUs may not be operating at optimal scale due to imperfect market 
competition, the specification of VRS is warranted. In the DEAP model, 
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efficiency θ can assume any positive value but 1-θ would indicate the 
proportional expansion of output that can be feasibly attained by DMU j with 
input quantities held constant (Coelli, 1996). DEAP would report TE scores as 
1/θ, which is bounded by zero and 1 (Coelli, 1996).  
 
The operations of DEAP can be graphically represented in Figure 5.9 that 
shows a hypothetical DEA production possibility frontier. DMU L, M and N 
form a solid line that represents the efficient frontier. Therefore L, M and N are 
technically efficient. All other DMUs beneath the efficient frontier are classified 
as inefficient. K for example, needs to travel to K’ or its target before being 
deemed as efficient because it can still expand its output with the given level 
of input. Because M and N forms the relevant portion of the frontier to produce 
efficient production for K. Therefore, M and N are the peers of K. Here DMU 
M would make a greater contribution to DMU K’s TE score. Meanwhile P 
would be projected on the frontier (the dotted line), not the efficient frontier 
(the solid line) as P’ because production of y1 can be increased by P’L without 
using any more inputs. This is an example of an output slack. 
 
 
 
 
L
M
K 
P
y2/x 
 
P’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 N 
 
 
y1/x 
Figure 5.9: DEAP Output Oriented Model. 
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5.6.6: Solving DEA Linear Programming  
Based on the algebraic expressions for the fully decomposed MPI, it is 
necessary to calculate four distance functions to measure TFP change 
between period 0 and 1 for the jth DMU. Therefore, this requires the solving of 
four linear programming problems as also outlined in LP1 to LP4 below 
(Avkiran, 2000).  
 
Both Equations 1 and 2 represent the case where a datum point observed in a 
period is compared to the production technology or frontier of that period. In 
Equations 3 and 4, the datum points are compared to the technology of the 
previous period. These four LP equations have to be solved for each bank in 
each pair of adjacent periods. To construct a chained index, it is necessary to 
solve N x (3T-2) linear programs, where N is the number of banks while T is 
the number of time periods (Avkiran, 2000). 
 
Note that in linear programs 3 and 4, where the data points are compared to 
the technologies from different time periods, the θ parameter may not be 
greater than or equal to 1 as it must be when calculating standard output-
oriented technical efficiencies (Coelli and Prasada Roa, 2003). The datum 
point could lie above the production frontier. This will most likely to happen in 
LP4 where the production point from period t+1 is compared to the technology 
from the earlier period t. If technical progress has indeed occurred, then θ 
being less than 1 is possible (Coelli and Prasada Roa, 2003). Note that this 
could also happen in LP 3 if technical regress has occurred although such an 
event is less likely. 
 
[D1 (y1, x1)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy1 + Y1λ ≥ 0, 
                    x1 – X1λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (1) 
 
[D0 (y0, x0)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy0 + Y0λ ≥ 0, 
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                    x0 – X0λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (2) 
 
 
[D1 (y0, x0)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy0 + Y1λ ≥ 0, 
                    x0 – X1λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (3) 
 
[D0 (y1, x1)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy1+ Y0λ ≥ 0, 
                    x1 – X0λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (4) 
 
The LPs above are run with CRS specification. To extend the decomposition 
of technical efficiency into pure technical efficiency PTE and scale efficiency 
SE components requires the solution of two additional LPs that imposes a 
convexity restriction when comparing two production points.  
 
This is done by adding the constraint NI’λ=1 to LP 1 and LP 2 as shown below 
where scale efficiency in each period can be constructed as the ratio of CRS 
distance functions to VRS distance functions (Coelli et al, 1998). To obtain the 
nature of returns to scale, NIRS can be specified by substituting NI’λ=1 with 
NI’λ ≤ 1 (Coelli et al 1998). 
 
[D1 (y1, x1)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy1 + Y1λ ≥ 0, 
                    x1 – X1λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (1) 
 
[D0 (y0, x0)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy0 + Y0λ ≥ 0, 
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                    x0 – X0λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (2) 
 
[D1 (y1, x1)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy1 + Y1λ ≥ 0, 
                    x1 – X1λ ≥ 0, 
                    NI’λ=1 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (3) 
 
[D0 (y0, x0)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy0 + Y0λ ≥ 0, 
                    x0 – X0λ ≥ 0, 
                    NI’λ=1 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (4) 
 
[D1 (y0, x0)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy0 + Y1λ ≥ 0, 
                    x0 – X1λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (5) 
 
[D0 (y1, x1)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy1+ Y0λ ≥ 0, 
                    x1 – X0λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (6) 
 
In terms of Figure 5.10, NI’λ ≤ 1 would map out the convex technology 
bounded by 0AB while NI’λ=1 would impose the convex X1AB technology. 
Without both constraints, NI’λ can take any non-negative values, the 
technology becomes the 0AY1 cone.  
 
 
y  
Y1
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Figure 5.10: Returns to Scale Frontiers (CRS VRS NIRS) 
Source: Fare et al 1994 
 
5.7: Summary of Methodology 
 
In summary, this study uses the MPI index as proposed by Caves et al (1982) 
as a measure of TFP index change to compute productivity changes of the 
banks in the sample. To fully account for the effects of technical efficiency 
change, scale efficiency change and technical change, this study follows the 
MPI decomposition suggested by Fare et al (1994). Despite the possibility of 
using an enhanced decomposition methodology to derive the fourth 
component of productivity change, the change in technical scale, this study 
has opted not to implement it in this study due to the general disagreement 
among researchers on both the interpretation of the fourth component and the 
formula expression. Between output and input orientated MPI measures, this 
study uses the former to maintain consistency with the majority of previous 
banking studies that employ MPI measures of productivity change. 
 
The output orientated MPI is the ratio of two output distance functions, each 
with reference to a benchmark technology using different time periods. The 
non-parametric linear programming Data Envelopment Analysis DEA 
technique is adopted here to compute the output distance functions. 
Specifically, the output-orientated DEA model is employed because it is the 
author’s opinion that banks within the study sample do not have full control 
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over their inputs. Subsequently, the DEA model is run with CRS, VRS and 
NIRS production technology specifications. This approach allows one to 
examine not only pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency changes that 
comprise technical efficiency change, but also to determine the nature of 
returns to scale of a particular bank. Thus, this study enables one to 
determine what improvements would need to be made by an inefficient bank 
to become efficient.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
 
PART I 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This study has established the methodological usage of MPI  as the comparable 
bank productivity measure of the Malaysian dual banking system in the era of 
bank mergers.    In order to comprehend  MPI within the DEA, it is significant to 
understand the related variables.   This chapter  explains the derivation of the 
various variables and components of productivity changes under the MPI. 
 
5.1: Productivity in terms of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
 
Productivity changes are often defined in terms of Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) changes. Coelli et al (1998) termed TFP as an overall productivity 
measure that encompasses the productivity of all production factors or outputs. 
When the overall productivity of a Decision Making Unit (DMU) or a whole 
industry is considered, distinction must be made between TFP and other 
commonly used partial productivity measures such as labor and capital 
productivity. This is because a DMU usually transforms multiple inputs into 
multiple outputs. The evaluation of partial productivity measures alone can be 
misleading and could result in inconsistent and inaccurate conclusions. As with 
other studies that utilize index number approaches, this paper considers TFP 
changes as indicators of overall productivity changes. Both terms will be used 
interchangeably henceforth. 
 
In a one-input, one-output case, the simplest yet general measure of 
productivity is the ratio of outputs over inputs. This ratio generates a value 
indicating how many output units that can be produced by employing a single 
input unit. A rising ratio generally indicates rising productivity. This view is 
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essentially an output orientated one. An input orientated productivity ratio looks 
at how many input units can be reduced to or required by a single output unit.  
 
5.2: The Components of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
 
The same output over input ratio is often used in non-technical media as an 
indicator of the overall efficiency of a DMU. This is a flawed statement. Both 
productivity and efficiency are two distinct, although closely related terms. This 
subtle yet important distinction can be illustrated by Figure 5.1. A production 
frontier f is drawn that transforms a single input into a single  output. This 
relationship also represents the maximum y output units that can be feasibly 
attained from a single x input unit and hence, it is also called the production 
frontier. It also reflects the current production technology. Note that the slope of 
the frontier is the ratio of y/x, which is also the average product AP of all the 
points that lie along the frontier. Because it rises upward to A before tapering 
off, the technology is said to exhibit non-constant returns to scale. Specifically it 
is Increasing Returns to Scale (IRS) up to A before experiencing declining 
returns to scale DRS after that.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Production Frontier and Technical 
Efficiency 
f 
x 
y 
x1
y1 
C 
B 
A 
0 
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5.2.1: Technical efficiency 
A and B are technically efficient producers because both lie on the frontier. This 
means A and B are already producing the maximum possible output using 
inputs via technology f. C is technically inefficient because it could still increase 
its output level by employing the same input level at x1 by moving upwards to B. 
Because the production frontier also defines the feasible production set, D is 
regarded as infeasible to attain by technology f.  
 
5.2.2: Scale Efficiency 
The same diagram is replicated in Figure 5.2 but with rays drawn extending 
from the origin . Notice the slopes of the rays are also of the values x/y and AP. 
Because AP is identical along the rays, these can be viewed as technologies 
with constant returns to scale, CRS specification. As C moves to B, the slope 
of the ray becomes steeper, indicating greater input-output transformation and 
thus, productivity. However, if C moves to A, the steepest ray is tangent to 
production frontier f. Point A thus represents the optimal scale and has the 
maximum possible productivity. Production on any other point along the frontier 
although technically efficient, results in lower productivity. C essentially moves 
to A by exploiting scale economies. Therefore a scale-inefficient DMU may be 
efficient but it can still exploit scale economies to improve its productivity (Coelli 
et al, 1998). 
 
 
f 
A 
C 
y  
 
 y1  
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Figure 5.2: Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency 
 
 
5.2.3: Technical Change 
Figure 5.3 brings the discussion one step further by introducing technical 
change. Technical change is an additional source of productivity change but 
takes place over time. Technological advancement is represented by an upward 
shift of production frontier f1 to f2, where at B, the same input level x1 is 
associated with a higher output level y2.  
 
It is apparent then, that from the examples shown, a DMU can alter its 
productivity by altering its technical efficiency, scale efficiency and by virtue of 
technical change. Productivity therefore, is composed of technical efficiency, 
scale efficiency and technical change.  
 
 
 
 y 
 
A 
B 
C 
f2 
 
 
 
y2 f1 
 
 
 
 
 
y1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x  x10  
Figure 5.3: Technical Change 
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5.3: Economic Efficiency Measures and Their Relationships with 
Productivity 
 
5.3.1: Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency 
In the economic literature, overall economic efficiency EE is made up of 
technical efficiency TE and allocative efficiency AE. AE is defined as the 
effective selection of inputs vis a vis their prices to produce a given quantity of 
output at the minimum production costs (Avkiran (1999)). TE on the other hand, 
investigates how well a DMU implements an effective production plan to convert 
its inputs to outputs (Avkiran, 2000).  
 
These efficiency concepts can be illustrated by Figure 5.3, which illustrate a 
production process that involves 2 outputs (y1 and y2) being produced by a 
single input x. The II concave curve represents the production possibility frontier 
of fully efficient firms while AA represents the slope of the isorevenue line or the 
output price ratio. Note that this is the output-orientated approach to explain 
economic efficiencies where the objective is to expand output production (y1 
and y2 at A) as much as feasibly possible from a given level of input. The input 
orientated model meanwhile incorporates a unit isoquant between two inputs 
(x1 and x2) and an isocost line. It attempts to contract the inputs as much as 
permissible by the production isoquant to produce a given level of output. Refer 
to Coelli et al (1998) for a comprehensive coverage of the topic. 
 
In terms of Figure 5.4, TE is represented by the distance AB and is expressed 
as a ratio of AB/OB or according to the equivalent specifications of Farrell 
(1957) in the input orientation model as OA/OB which is 1-AB/OB or the 
reciprocal of AB/OB. AE meanwhile is indicated by BC, that is, the reduction of 
production costs that would occur at allocatively efficient point B’. AE is 
expressed as the ratio of OB/OC. Thus; 
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EE= (OA/OB) x (OB/OC)= OA/OC 
           = TE x AE 
 
A 
B 
C 
I 
A 
 y2/x1 
 A 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 y1/x1  0 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency 
Source: Coelli et al (1998) 
 
5.3.2: Pure Technical Efficiency, Scale Efficiency  
The economic measures outlined so far are defined under a CRS technology. 
However, if VRS specification is allowed, scale efficiency SE can be derived. To 
simplify the discussion, the production frontier seen in Figure 5.1 is summarised 
in Figure 5.5. In Figure 5.5, both CRS and VRS frontiers for a one-input, one-
output scenario are indicated. Under CRS specification, the TE of point A is the 
distance PPC. Under VRS assumption however, TE is only PPV. The difference 
between the CRS and VRS TE scores is due to scale inefficiency that can be 
expressed as APC/APV. The CRS TE therefore, can be decomposed into pure 
technical efficiency PTE (APC/AP) and scale efficiency SE (APC/APV). The SE 
measure can be roughly translated as the ratio of average product AP of a DMU 
operating at point PV to the average product of a DMU operating at point R, the 
point of optimal scale. Any divergence of the DMU from the most productive 
scale size MPSS point (point R) represents some degrees of scale inefficiency 
(Avkiran, 1999). 
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However if a non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) production technology is 
specified, one is able to determine whether a DMU is experiencing increasing 
returns to scale IRS or decreasing returns to scale DRS. If a particular VRS 
score equals the NIRS score, the DMU is operating under DRS. On the other 
hand, if VRS is not equal to NIRS, the DMU is operating under IRS. If VRS 
equals the CRS score, then the DMU is operating at the MPSS. 
 
y  
R 
P 
P
v
Pc
VRS Frontier 
CRS Frontier 
 
 NIRS Frontier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A 
 
 
 
 
 
x  
Figure 5.5: Scale Efficiency, Scale Economies and Most Productive Scale Size 
(MPSS) 
Source: Coelli et al, 1998 
 
Recalling that it has been established above that an overall productivity 
measure is the sum of technical efficiency, scale efficiency and technical 
change, the PTE definition of Figure 5.5 corresponds to the technical efficiency 
mentioned earlier. For the rest of the study, it is referred to as PTE. Thus: 
TE= PTE x SE 
 
From the examples given, it is apparent that while EE accounts for AE and TE, 
it leaves out the technical change component. This is yet another proof that 
productivity and efficiency are both the same terms and that y/x does not equal 
efficiency.  
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 5.4: Derivation and Decomposition of the TFP Index 
 
Coelli et al (1998) demonstrated that a TFP index can be constructed and 
subsequently decomposed into PTE, SE and technical change components. It 
has been shown that average product AP serves as a proxy for productivity. 
Consider a simple one-input, one-output case, and letting (x0, y0) and (x1, y1) 
denote the observed input-output combinations for period 0 and period 1. Then, 
the productivity of a particular DMU in periods 0 and 1 are given by: 
 
AP0= y0/ x0 
AP1= y1/ x1 
 
Any changes in overall productivity (π) for the same DMU over periods 0 and 1 
can be captured by the ratio of AP of period 1 over the AP of period 0 as shown 
by: 
 
 
π = AP1 = y1/ x1 ………………………… Equation 1 
      AP0     y0/ x0 
 
The same expression can be re-arranged as: 
 
π = AP1 = y1/ y0
      AP2     x1/ x0…………………………..Equation 2 
 
Coelli et al (1998) showed that the same ratio is also the TFP index that 
measures productivity changes for periods 0 and 1. 
 
π = AP1 = y1/ y0 = TFP0, 1 
      AP2     x1/ x0…………………………..Equation 3 
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If the condition of technical inefficiency and differing input levels utilization 
between the two periods are to be factored in (which is usually the case), then 
Coelli et al (1998) demonstrated that the ratio in Equation 3 can be expanded 
into: 
 
TFP0, 1 = λ1 x f1 (κ x0)/ κ x0
                 λ0    f0 (x0) / x0………………….Equation 4 
 
where λt: inefficiency coefficient of period t 
           κ: x1 input usage coefficient of period 1 as a proportion of x0 
     ft (x): observed output levels at period t, as implied by the production 
function of  
               period t. 
 
By rearranging the expression, the arrangement becomes: 
 
TFP0, 1 = λ1 x κε (t)-1 x  f1(x0)
                 λ0                 f0(x0)………………….Equation 5 
 
where κ: the scale of operations 
           ε: returns to scale parameter 
 
Equation 5 gives the complete decomposition of the overall productivity index, 
where the first term represents technical efficiency change, the second term 
indicates the effects of change in scale of operations and the third term 
computes the technical change. Note that the third term is also controlled by the 
scale of operations κ and the returns to scale parameters ε. If the technology is 
specified as a CRS benchmark, then ε(t)= 1, ε(t) –1=0 and thus κε (t)-1= 1. 
Therefore, the third term becomes irrelevant when CRS is assumed. However, 
if VRS prevails, then the second term will assume some other positive value 
and will become relevant.  
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From this example, it can be summarized that an index number approach is 
able to compute overall productivity change as well as decompose overall 
productivity change into pure technical efficiency change (PEFCH), scale 
efficiency change (SECH), scale change of technology (SCHTCH) and technical 
change (TECHCH). There are also a number of important conclusions that can 
be drawn from Coelli et al (1998): 
• It is vital to have some knowledge of the production technology to derive the 
TFP index 
• Without extraneous information, it is impossible to break the TFP down into 
the different sources of productivity change 
• The DMU is assumed to be allocative efficient. Otherwise, the TFP index 
may harbor some effects of allocative inefficiency. 
 
Coelli et al (1998) have shown that with these conditions in place, an index 
number approach is able to capture the different sources of TFP changes. The 
question now turns to which index number methodology to adopt. In general, 
there are 4 index number approaches to measure and decompose TFP change: 
output price, input price, output quantity and input quantity indices. 
 
5.5: The Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) 
 
In this study, productivity or TFP changes are calculated using the Malmquist 
Productivity Index MPI as introduced by Caves et al. (1982) and developed by 
Fare et al. (1994). The MPI is capable of being defined as either an output 
quantity index or as an input quantity index. Most of the literature on banking 
productivity assessment that harnesses the MPI uses the output quantity index. 
To maintain consistency with the majority of related studies, this paper follows 
an input quantity index approach. 
 
5.5.1: MPI in terms of Distance Functions 
The MPI can be computed by using only quantity data for both inputs and 
outputs alone and is expressed as the ratio of distance functions. Distance 
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functions are function representations of multiple-output and multiple input 
technology that require only data on quantities without the need to specify 
behavioral objectives such as cost minimization or profit maximization (Avkiran, 
2000). Distance functions alone can either be input or output functions. An input 
distance function defines the production technology by referring to the maximal 
contraction of the input vector given an output vector. By contrast, the output 
distance function seeks maximal expansion of the output vector given the input 
vector. Because the approach adopted in this study is essentially an output 
orientated one, output distance functions are used to derive the MPI. 
 
5.5.2: Output Distance Functions 
To define the output based MPI, a general production technology must be first 
defined and understood as the output set P(x) that represents all output vectors 
y that can be produced by employing an input vector x. The technology or P(x) 
is denoted as: 
P(x) = {y: x can produce y} 
        = {y: (x, y) ∈ St } for all x…………….Equation 6 
 
In equation 6, P(x) models the transformation of inputs x into outputs y for each 
period t= 0, 1…T. St meanwhile represents the feasible output set for 
technology P(x).  
In terms of the output index number model, Equation 6 is slightly modified as 
below. Following Shephard (1970), the output distance function for period t is 
expressed as: 
Dt (x, y) = min { δ: (y/δ, x) ∈ St }…………Equation 7 
                    
δ represents the smallest distance by which the output needs to be deflated so 
as to become feasible to be produced by period t technology (Coelli et al, 1998). 
This applies to an output vector that lies above the technology or production 
frontier like y1 in Figure 5.6. In this instance, δ > 1.  On the other hand, if the 
observed output vector is below the production frontier, then δ < 1 to inflate the 
output vector thus bringing it onto the surface of the production frontier or 
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production possibility set St . In particular, Dt (x, y) ≤ 1 if and only if (x, y) ∈ St 
and Dt (x, y)= 1 if and only if (x, y) is on the frontier, that is, technically efficient.  
 
 
y2 
Y*/δ, (δ<1) 
Y/δ, (δ>1) 
y1 
y* 
y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0 
 
 
Figure 5.6  Output Distance Function: Output Vector Contraction and Expansion 
Source: Coelli et al 1998 
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Figure 5.7 Derivation of MPI: One-Input, One-Output Case with Constant Returns 
to Scale CRS Technology. 
Source: Alam (2001) 
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This can be illustrated by Figure 5.7 where scalar input is used to produce 
scalar output. Because (xt, yt) is interior in relation to t technology, it is not 
technically efficient. The distance function would then seek the greatest 
proportional increase in the output such that the output remains feasible. 
Maximum feasible production is yt/θ . Thus, the value of the distance function 
would be Oa/Ob ≤ 1, which is the value of δ through which (xt, yt) needs to be 
inflated through y/δ. Also recall from Equation 7 that if δ > 1, y would be deflated 
via y/δ to bring it back to the surface of the production set p(x) associated with 
x. All output distance functions henceforth, would be evaluated in a similar 
manner.  
 
Note that the production frontiers P(xo) and P(x1) are drawn under CRS 
specification. P(xt) adopts the CCR technology that satisfies the assumptions 
laid in Charnes et al. (1978) where CRS and free disposability of inputs and 
outputs are specified. 
 
5.5.3: The General Overall MPI Index 
What follows is the derivation of the MPI index as pioneered by Caves et al. 
(1982). In the spirit of the study, CCD computed TFP changes between 2 data 
points as the ratio of distance functions for each (x, y) relative to a common 
technology. In particular, Caves et al. (1982) defined the MPI with period 0 
technology as the benchmark as: 
 
MCCD0 = DC0 (x1, y1) 
                 DC0 (x0, y0)…………………….Equation 8 
 
Where DC0 means the input distance function with CRS technology of period 0 
as the benchmark. A value of more than 1 indicates productivity increase while 
a value of less than 1 indicates productivity regress. A unity value means no 
productivity change. In terms of the output distance function,  
 
DC0 (x1, y1) = min { δ: (y1/δ, x1) ∈ P(x)0 } 
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 Where the distance function measures the maximum proportional change in 
outputs required to make (x1, y1) feasible in relation to period 0 technology. In 
terms of Figure 5, δ = Od/Oe which is > 1. Therefore, (x1, y1) would be deflated 
back to the surface of P(x)0 by δ. 
 
Alternatively, one could define a period 1 technology-based MPI as: 
 
MCCD1 = DC1 (x1, y1) 
                 DC1 (x0, y0)…………………….Equation 9 
 
In order to avoid choosing an arbitrary benchmark, a geometric mean of the two 
ratios is taken instead as the MPI index: 
 1/2 
MCCD0,1=    DC0 (x1, y1)   DC1 (x1, y1) 
                      DC0 (x0, y0)   DC1 (x0, y0)      ………….Equation 10 
 
5.5.4: The Decomposition of the General MPI 
Apart from the specification of CRS and weak disposability of inputs and 
outputs, CCD also assumed that each DMU both be technically and allocatively 
efficient so that MCCD=TECHCH. However Fare et al (1989, 1992) and Coelli 
et al (1998) showed that if sufficient observations in each period are available to 
estimate the technology in each period, then the assumption can be dropped. 
Moreover, it is more common to observe some degrees of technical inefficiency 
in the operations of most banks. Note that all DMUs are still being assumed to 
be allocatively efficient. Following Fare et al (1994) where technical inefficiency 
is present, Equation 10 can be rewritten as: 
M (x1, y1, x0, y0) =  
1/2 
DC1 (x1, y1)  x       DC0 (x1, y1)   DC1 (x1, y1)
DC0(x0,y0)            DC0 (x0, y0)   DC1 (x0, y0)      ……….Equation 11 
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An index greater than 1 indicates improvement while a value less than 1 reflects 
regress. Both components may move in different directions. Note that if x0=x1 
and y0=y1, M=1, signalling that there has been no change in productivity. The 
two components are reciprocals but not necessarily equal to 1. In terms of 
Figure 5 and following Fare et al (1994) and Alam (2001), the MPI index is 
expressed as: 
 1/2 
M(x1, y1, x0, y0)=   0E x   0B      0F   x  0D
                                 0F     0A      0C      0B   
 
The ratios within the brackets measure shifts in the technology or production 
frontier at input levels x0 and x1. Technical change or TECHCH is thus, the 
geometric mean of the 2 shifts. The term outside the bracket computes 
technical efficiency change at period 1 and 0 determines whether production in 
catching up or deviating away from their contemporaneous frontier. In this 
study’s application, this component would capture the degree of technology 
diffusion among banks. 
 
Even with the MPI now being decomposed into TECHCH and technical 
efficiency change, the expression still falls short of the complete decomposition 
of the TFP index as discussed in Section 3. It has been highlighted in Section 2 
that the difference between CRS and VRS efficiency scores is due to scale 
inefficiencies. Therefore, in order to calculate changes in scale efficiencies 
SECH, this study follows the FGNZ approach where the output distance 
functions are also computed under VRS. FGNZ outlined this enhanced 
decomposition as: 
 
M(x1, y1, x0, y0)= DC1 (x1, y1)       DC1 (x1,y1)/ DV1 (x1, y1)       x  
                               DC0 (x0, y0)      DC0 (x0, y0)/ DV0 (x0, y0) 
 
                               DC0 (x1, y1)  DC0 (x0, y0)
                               DC1 (x1, y1)  DC1 (x0, y0)   …………….Equation 13 
1/2 
1/2 
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M(x1, y1, x0, y0)= PEFCH x SECH x TECHCH 
 
Where DV0 means the input distance function with VRS technology of period 0 
as the benchmark. Thus, technical change TECHCH is calculated with 
reference to the CRS benchmark, the efficiency change component-now 
represented by pure efficiency change PEFCH is computed as the ratio of own 
period distance functions relative to VRS and the scale efficiency in each period 
is the ratio of distance function restricted by VRS. This leaves scale efficiency 
change SECH as ratio of scale efficiency from each period.  
 
Further decomposition of this expression is possible in order to derive the 
residual scale change of technology (that is whether period 1 VRS is relatively 
closer or further from CRS than period 0 VRS) SCHTCH. This derivation can be 
found in Simar and Wilson (1998), Wheelock and Wilson (1999), Zofio and 
Lovell (1998) and more recently by Fernandez et al (2001). This paper will not 
pursue a further enhanced decomposition due to the already existing 
disagreements of researchers surrounding Equation 13. In particular, Ray and 
Desli (1997) disputed the simultaneous use of CRS and VRS, stating such 
procedures only generate internal inconsistencies within the model. However, 
this study chooses to apply Equation 13 due to a number of credible reasons, 
which were explained in the literature review. 
 
5.6: Computing MPI within the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
Framework 
 
There are several ways to compute the distance functions that make up the 
MPI. Here this study follows Fare et al (1994) and calculates the output distance 
functions by applying a linear programming approach called Data Envelopment 
Analysis. It was shown in Chapter 3 that it is impossible to decompose the TFP 
into its various subcomponents without some knowledge of the relevant 
technology. Because one can never know the exact technology, it needs to be 
estimated. 
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Studies of the non-parametric DEA linear programming approach of estimating 
technology following Farrell (1957) suggest the use of a non-parametric price-
wise production possibility frontier as illustrated in Figure 5.6 that is constructed 
to fit into a multi-output, single input output orientated model so that no 
observed points lie to the right or above the frontier. Therefore, the constructed 
frontier envelopes all observation points, hence the name Data Envelopment 
Analysis.   
 
5.6.1: The Data Envelopment Analysis DEA Methodology 
Charnes et al. (1978) developed and extended Farrell’s ideas into a non-
parametric methodology known as Data Envelopment Analysis. This 
development addressed a critical shortcoming of the weighted relative efficiency 
ratio expressed below that was originally conceived by Farrell and Fieldhouse 
(1962) to construct an efficient hypothetical unit (on the frontier) against which 
all other inefficient units are compared. The problem associated with the ratio is 
determining a common set of weights to be applied to all DMUs since DMUs 
value inputs and outputs differently and therefore a common standardization 
may introduce bias into the results.  
 
Efficiency of DMUj = u1 y1j + u2 y2j +… 
 
                                     v1 x1j + v2 x2j +… 
 
where u1 = the weight given to output 1  
             y1j = amount of output 1 from DMU j 
             v1 = weight given to input 1 
             x1j = weight of input 1 to DMU j  
 
Charnes et al (1978) recognized the problem and proposed instead that each 
DMU be allowed to adopt a set of weights that will put the DMU in the best light 
possible relative to all other DMUs in the sample. 
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Mathematically, their model is expressed as:  
 
Max H0 u, v (u’yj / v’xj) 
s.t.             (u’yj / v’xj) ≤ 0 
                  u, v ≥ 0………………………..Equation I 
 
where xj = input vector for DMU j 
           yj = output vector for DMU j 
 
The efficiency of the jth DMU, H0, is thus maximized but subjected to two 
constraints. The first ensures that the relative efficiency score is bounded by 
zero and 1 with value 1 indicating a fully efficient DMU. The second makes 
certain that variables u and v that represent the weights to be uniquely applied 
to each DMU have values more than unity. The solution to the model would 
yield the most favorable weights u and v, to be applied to DMUj that would 
maximize its efficiency H0 that would be simultaneously obtained from the 
operation as well. The relative efficiency score would take a value between 1 
and 0 as dictated by the first constraint.  
 
5.6.2: A Graphic Illustration of DEA 
Figure 5.8 showcases a production possibility frontier in producing two outputs 
y1 and y2 by employing input x in the most efficient manner possible. The 
convex combination of A and C will create the most combination of outputs for a 
given set of input and thus is defined as the efficiency frontier. Since B lies 
below the efficiency frontier, the DMU is inefficient relative to A and C.  
However, it would be erroneous to derive B’s efficiency score relative to A and 
C because B is somehow different and unique to A and C. Instead, A and C are 
the peers of B because both A and C define the relevant portion of the frontier 
(AC) to produce efficient production for B.   
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Figure 5.8: A Two-Output, One-Input Output Orientated DEA Model. 
 
B’s efficiency would be determined by comparing it to a virtual DMU V or its 
target that is made up by different proportions of A and C. The percentage of C 
in V is AV/AC. Similarly, the proportion of A is CV/AC. The efficiency of B would 
then be calculated as OB/OV, which is the amount by which the output V has to 
contract but with the amount of inputs utilized still unchanged for both B and V. 
Another way of interpreting this is DMU V only needs OB/OV fraction of its input 
to produce as much as B. The figure also highlights that if the relative efficiency 
scores of A and C are to be calculated, the virtual DMUs for A and C would be 
A and C themselves. The ratios OA/OV and OC/OV will be equal to 1. Thus 
inefficient units like B would have efficiency scores of less than 1 but more than 
0 while fully efficient units would score the value of 1. 
 
5.6.3: DEA as a Non-Parametric Linear Programming Methodology 
Because Equation I is on the fractional linear form, it is converted into more a 
familiar form of linear programming problem in Equation II to facilitate its 
computation. Equation 2 seeks to maximize the ratio in Equation I by setting the 
denominator v’xj to a constant, thus allowing the numerator u’yj to be 
maximized in relation to the denominator (Avkiran, 1999). 
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 Max H0 u, v (u’yj) 
s.t.              v’xi = 1 
                   u’yj – v’xj ≤ 0   j= 1, 2…N 
                   u,v ≥ 0………………………….Equation II 
 
The original linear program in Equation II is in the primal or multiplier form. As 
with any linear program, it is possible to formulate a partner program or the dual 
that has less constraints involved as in Equation III. Generally in linear 
programming, the more constraints a model has, the more difficult it is to solve 
(Coelli et al. 1998). Furthermore, as the number of inputs and outputs increase, 
more DMUs tend to get an efficiency rating of 1 as they become too specialized 
to be evaluated with respect to other DMUs. 
 
Max θ,λ θ 
s.t. –y0 + Yλj ≥ 0, 
     θx0 - Xλj ≥ 0, 
     λ ≥ 0………………………………….Equation III 
 
 
5.6.4: Input and Output Orientated DEA Models 
Note that the case illustrated in Figure I is an example of an output-orientated 
efficiency measure. Efficiency itself is capable of being defined by both output-
orientated and input orientated models. Output orientation addresses the 
question how much output can be feasibly expanded by holding the level of 
input constant. On the contrary, the input orientation looks at how much input 
can be feasibly reduced to produce the same level of output. The two DEA 
orientations would yield the same efficiency measures under CRS specification 
but unequal under VRS (Coelli et al, 1998). In many DEA studies, analysts have 
tended to select input orientated models because in most DMUs, input 
quantities seem to be the primary variables (Coelli, 1996). This argument 
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however, is less applicable in the banking industry since banks have limited 
control over their inputs. In Avkiran (1999), it is mentioned that when inputs may 
well be outside the control of managers, the output orientated model needs to 
be applied. Although Avkiran (1999) applied the input-orientated model, it is the 
author’s opinion in this study that the relatively regulated Malaysian and 
Singaporean banking industries (where bank managers have little control over 
input variables such as deposit rates) warrant the use of the output-orientated 
DEA model. 
 
5.6.5: Computing MPI Output Distance Functions 
Also notice that the output distance function as in Equation 7 is the reciprocal to 
the output-based Farrell measure of technical efficiency where: 
 
[DCt (xt, yt)]-1 = max θ…………………….Equation 14  
 
According to equation 14 the inverse of an output distance function is equivalent 
to the DEA technical efficiency score. Notice that the production function in 
Equation 7 is the reciprocal of the maximum proportional expansion of the 
output vector y, given the input vector x that has been discussed in Chapter 4. 
Therefore, one can make use of this inverse relationship to compute the 
necessary output distance functions to derive the MPI index and its 
decomposition via a DEA means. There are two DEA models to choose from 
input orientated DEA and output orientated DEA. Since this study seeks to 
derive and decompose the output based MPI index, this analysis will follow the 
output orientated DEA. 
 
DEA calculations can be conducted using a number of computer programs that 
allow linear programming procedures. Apart from simple spreadsheets and 
statistical packages such as Excel, SAS and SHAZAM, there are a few DEA 
specialist software packages available including IDEAS, Frontier Analyst, 
WDEA and DEAP. This study uses DEAP version 2.1 developed by Coelli to 
construct the piece-wise production frontier and derive the technical efficiency 
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scores. The output oriented model to be specified into DEAP would resemble 
the following: 
 
Max θ,λ θ 
s.t. –y0 + Yλj ≥ 0, 
     θx0 - Xλj ≥ 0, 
     NI’λ=1 
     λ ≥ 0………………………………….Equation 15 
 
Note that DEAP is instructed to calculate an output-orientated VRS model by 
adding the constraint NI’λ=1 to the output orientated linear programming LP. 
Coelli et al (1998) stated that where there are reasons to believe that the DMUs 
may not be operating at optimal scale due to imperfect market competition, the 
specification of VRS is warranted. In the DEAP model, efficiency θ can assume 
any positive value but 1-θ would indicate the proportional expansion of output 
that can be feasibly attained by DMU j with input quantities held constant 
(Coelli, 1996). DEAP would report TE scores as 1/θ, which is bounded by zero 
and 1 (Coelli, 1996).  
 
The operations of DEAP can be graphically represented in Figure 5.9 that 
shows a hypothetical DEA production possibility frontier. DMU L, M and N form 
a solid line that represents the efficient frontier. Therefore L, M and N are 
technically efficient. All other DMUs beneath the efficient frontier are classified 
as inefficient. K for example, needs to travel to K’ or its target before being 
deemed as efficient because it can still expand its output with the given level of 
input. Because M and N forms the relevant portion of the frontier to produce 
efficient production for K. Therefore, M and N are the peers of K. Here DMU M 
would make a greater contribution to DMU K’s TE score. Meanwhile P would be 
projected on the frontier (the dotted line), not the efficient frontier (the solid line) 
as P’ because production of y1 can be increased by P’L without using any more 
inputs. This is an example of an output slack. 
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Figure 5.9: DEAP Output Oriented Model. 
 
5.6.6: Solving DEA Linear Programming  
Based on the algebraic expressions for the fully decomposed MPI, it is 
necessary to calculate four distance functions to measure TFP change between 
period 0 and 1 for the jth DMU. Therefore, this requires the solving of four linear 
programming problems as also outlined in LP1 to LP4 below (Avkiran, 2000).  
 
Both Equations 1 and 2 represent the case where a datum point observed in a 
period is compared to the production technology or frontier of that period. In 
Equations 3 and 4, the datum points are compared to the technology of the 
previous period. These four LP equations have to be solved for each bank in 
each pair of adjacent periods. To construct a chained index, it is necessary to 
solve N x (3T-2) linear programs, where N is the number of banks while T is the 
number of time periods (Avkiran, 2000). 
 
Note that in linear programs 3 and 4, where the data points are compared to the 
technologies from different time periods, the θ parameter may not be greater 
than or equal to 1 as it must be when calculating standard output-oriented 
technical efficiencies (Coelli and Prasada Roa, 2003). The datum point could lie 
above the production frontier. This will most likely to happen in LP4 where the 
production point from period t+1 is compared to the technology from the earlier 
period t. If technical progress has indeed occurred, then θ being less than 1 is 
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possible (Coelli and Prasada Roa, 2003). Note that this could also happen in LP 
3 if technical regress has occurred although such an event is less likely. 
 
[D1 (y1, x1)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy1 + Y1λ ≥ 0, 
                    x1 – X1λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (1) 
 
[D0 (y0, x0)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy0 + Y0λ ≥ 0, 
                    x0 – X0λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (2) 
 
 
[D1 (y0, x0)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy0 + Y1λ ≥ 0, 
                    x0 – X1λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (3) 
 
[D0 (y1, x1)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy1+ Y0λ ≥ 0, 
                    x1 – X0λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (4) 
 
The LPs above are run with CRS specification. To extend the decomposition of 
technical efficiency into pure technical efficiency PTE and scale efficiency SE 
components requires the solution of two additional LPs that imposes a 
convexity restriction when comparing two production points.  
 
This is done by adding the constraint NI’λ=1 to LP 1 and LP 2 as shown below 
where scale efficiency in each period can be constructed as the ratio of CRS 
distance functions to VRS distance functions (Coelli et al, 1998). To obtain the 
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nature of returns to scale, NIRS can be specified by substituting NI’λ=1 with 
NI’λ ≤ 1 (Coelli et al 1998). 
 
[D1 (y1, x1)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy1 + Y1λ ≥ 0, 
                    x1 – X1λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (1) 
 
[D0 (y0, x0)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy0 + Y0λ ≥ 0, 
                    x0 – X0λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (2) 
 
[D1 (y1, x1)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy1 + Y1λ ≥ 0, 
                    x1 – X1λ ≥ 0, 
                    NI’λ=1 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (3) 
 
[D0 (y0, x0)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy0 + Y0λ ≥ 0, 
                    x0 – X0λ ≥ 0, 
                    NI’λ=1 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (4) 
 
[D1 (y0, x0)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy0 + Y1λ ≥ 0, 
                    x0 – X1λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (5) 
 
[D0 (y1, x1)]-1 = max φ,λ φ 
s.t.              -φy1+ Y0λ ≥ 0, 
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                    x1 – X0λ ≥ 0, 
                    λ ≥ 0………………………….LP (6) 
 
In terms of Figure 5.10, NI’λ ≤ 1 would map out the convex technology bounded 
by 0AB while NI’λ=1 would impose the convex X1AB technology. Without both 
constraints, NI’λ can take any non-negative values, the technology becomes the 
0AY1 cone.  
 
 
y  
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Figure 5.10: Returns to Scale Frontiers (CRS VRS NIRS) 
Source: Fare et al 1994 
 
5.7: Summary of Methodology 
 
In summary, this study uses the MPI index as proposed by Caves et al (1982) 
as a measure of TFP index change to compute productivity changes of the 
banks in the sample. To fully account for the effects of technical efficiency 
change, scale efficiency change and technical change, this study follows the 
MPI decomposition suggested by Fare et al (1994). Despite the possibility of 
using an enhanced decomposition methodology to derive the fourth component 
of productivity change, the change in technical scale, this study has opted not to 
implement it in this study due to the general disagreement among researchers 
on both the interpretation of the fourth component and the formula expression. 
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Between output and input orientated MPI measures, this study uses the former 
to maintain consistency with the majority of previous banking studies that 
employ MPI measures of productivity change. 
 
The output orientated MPI is the ratio of two output distance functions, each 
with reference to a benchmark technology using different time periods. The non-
parametric linear programming Data Envelopment Analysis DEA technique is 
adopted here to compute the output distance functions. Specifically, the output-
orientated DEA model is employed because it is the author’s opinion that banks 
within the study sample do not have full control over their inputs. Subsequently, 
the DEA model is run with CRS, VRS and NIRS production technology 
specifications. This approach allows one to examine not only pure technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency changes that comprise technical efficiency 
change, but also to determine the nature of returns to scale of a particular bank. 
Thus, this study enables one to determine what improvements would need to be 
made by an inefficient bank to become efficient.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
PART II 
DATA SELECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
This study employs the DEA framework to calculate the values of the output 
distance functions and subsequently, derives the MPI before decomposing it 
into three components: technical change, technical efficiency change and scale 
efficiency change.  
 
5.8: The Population, Sample and Time Period of Study 
 
The sample used for the study comprises 10 domestic Malaysian conventional 
banks, 11 Malaysian Islamic banking units (IBS) that are being benchmarked 
against 13 Malaysian foreign banks, 4 of which offer Islamic banking services 
and 3 other Singaporean banks. The study covers the time period between 
1996 and 2002 in order to capture the rapid changes within the Malaysian 
banking industry that occurred in both conventional and Islamic banking areas 
following the onset of the Asian financial crisis. This hit Malaysia during the 
1997-1999 period and ushered in a subsequent banking consolidation phase 
that saw the systematic merger of 54 pre-crisis Malaysian domestic banks into 
10 domestic post-crisis anchor banks. The consolidation process was directed 
by the Malaysian central bank as a policy response to strengthen a number of 
floundering banks in an effort to avert a deeper financial crisis and to enhance 
the competitiveness of domestic banks in the wake of growing competition from 
foreign banks, as Malaysia progressed towards deregulating the industry. The 
base year 1996 also represented the year when domestic IBS began to report 
their operations to the central bank and the investing public, finally making 
reliable and consistent data available. Meanwhile foreign banks were included 
into the sample amid reports by the central bank authorities that due to their 
asset sizes and competencies, they were outperforming the domestic banks 
even in the context of Islamic banking. This is an area where local banks were 
once thought to have an advantage. Singaporean banks are included in the 
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study   given that Singapore serves as the regional financial center and was 
largely unscathed by the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis,  Singaporean banks 
are thus generally considered to be  the best practice banks of the region.  
 
Because the first bank mergers took place in 1998 with the majority of the rest 
exercised towards the year 2000 before the dateline of September 30th 2000 as 
stipulated by BNM, the upper period limit of 2002 meant that the effects of the 
mergers can only be assessed after a time period ranging between 2-4 years. 
Although this may satisfy the prescribed minimum adjustment and assimilation 
periods mentioned in Berger et al. (1998)1, Calomiris and Karceski (2000)2 and 
Houston et al. (2001)3 that average around 3 years, the observed post-merger 
effects from mid 1999 to 2000 may be too premature to be conclusive. 
 
5.9: Qualitative Characteristics of Data 
 
5.9.1: Sources of Data 
To ensure reliability, consistency and comparability of the results, the data are 
obtained from individual commercial bank’s audited annual reports produced in 
accordance with company reporting standards in Malaysia and Singapore, the 
central bank’s annual report, as well as other publicly available published 
information from stock exchanges and libraries.  Unlike previous studies, we do 
not incorporate data inputs from the BankScope database by IBCA as done by 
Hassan and Bashir (2003) and Brown (2003). This was for two reasons.  
 
First, although BankScope features a specialized category for Islamic banking, 
we are not confident about the applicability of some of the data as being 
appropriate to describe the actual operations of Islamic banking. This is 
because BankScope does not disclose anything about its data selection and 
inclusion policy and studies that have relied on data inputs from BankScope 
have reported variables or ratios that show interest-related characteristics that 
do not apply to Islamic banks since they operate on interest-free principles.  
                                                 
1 As cited in Focarelli and Paneta (2002). 
2 As cited in Focarelli and Paneta (2002). 
3 As cited in Focarelli and Paneta (2002). 
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 Second, this approach is consistent with the findings of Bhattacharya (2003), 
Ehrmann et al (2001)4, De Brandt and Davis (1999)5 and Corvorsier and Gropp 
(2001)6 who all cautioned that despite the usefulness of BankScope for the 
purposes of examining the financial statements of individual banks across 
several years and the comparison of these figures with the majority of peers 
and competitors. The samples compiled by BankScope suffer from an implicit 
selectivity bias in favour of large banks and are not representative of the actual 
banking industry and thus may yield biased and inaccurate results in country 
specific and even cross-country studies that serve to obscure heterogeneity 
across banks. There are many factors that contribute to this shortcoming but 
Ehrmann et al (2001)7 noted that the biases appear to be stronger between 
1992 and 1999 since the coverage of BankScope was relatively poor during its 
earlier years of data compilation. Bhattacharya (2003) and Ehrmann et al 
(2001)8 recommended comparable databases, such as those maintained by 
central banks, because they usually have more complete data and therefore  
produce more consistent, robust and stable results. 
 
In order to assist stakeholders to decide on efficient financial resource allocation 
between and among conventional and Islamic banks, productivity and efficiency 
measures and variables must be comparable so that the users of the 
information are able to discern and evaluate the similarities and differences 
between and amongst conventional and Islamic banks at one time and across 
time and yet be able to juxtapose them in terms of performance measurement 
on a level playing field. This has to be done without omitting relevant and 
reliable information items that may adversely affect the accuracy of the results 
and subsequently, impair decision making about scarce financial resource 
allocation by users of such information. A variable should possess the primary 
qualitative characteristics of relevance and reliability in order to become 
comparable. Relevant in that the information should help users to predict and 
                                                 
4 As cited in Bhattacharya (2003) 
5 As cited in Bhattacharya (2003) 
6 As cited in Bhattacharya (2003) 
7 As cited in Bhattacharya (2003) 
8 As cited in Bhattacharya (2003) 
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confirm performance outcomes and reliable in that the information should be 
sufficiently representative of the operations of the bank concerned without the 
existence of bias and undue gross errors. Hence, comparable bank 
performance measures should assist users to accurately measure and 
meaningfully compare the performance of conventional and Islamic banks and 
this should ultimately lead to sound decisions about efficient scarce recourse 
allocation. 
 
5.9.2: The Need for Balanced Panel Data 
It must be noted that in order to complete the derivation of the MPI by running 
DEAP Version 2.1, one must have panel data (across banks and time) and this 
panel data must be “balanced” in the sense that all observations for a particular 
bank must be present throughout the period of the study. This is because the 
MPI employed in this study is constructed by comparing two data points with 
reference to two technologies, those of period t and period t+1. An “unbalanced” 
panel of data is likely to give rise to internal inconsistency. This is often termed 
as transitivity and is an important issue in studies that consider cross-sectional 
elements such as this one. For instance if productivity change can be measured 
from period t to period t+1 and then from period t+1 to t+2, would a comparison 
between period t and t+2 yield the same results? Coelli et al (1998) suggested 
that this is not likely since analytically, although technical efficiency change is 
transitive, technical change is neutral. This subject was also studied by Balk 
and Althin (1996)9 who proposed the EKS method that is capable of generating 
transitive multilateral MPI from non-transitive bilateral MPI. The EKS method 
was created by Elteto-Koves (1964)10 and Szulc (1964)11. Although Coelli et al 
(1998) expounded some of the concepts behind the EKS method, they 
generally found that the approach is somewhat mechanical and concluded that 
further work is needed to fine-tune the methodology. The EKS method is not 
considered in this paper. Transitivity of data is however not an issue in the DEA 
application. 
 
                                                 
9 As cited in Coelli et al (1998) 
10 As cited in Coelli et al (1998) 
11 As cited in Coelli et al (1998) 
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5.9.3: Absence of Suitable Data and Bank Exclusion from Sample 
Thus, the samples used for our study would be slightly less than the population. 
This is because over the study period, some banks have to be excluded. This is 
necessary since over a period of active mergers and acquisition, the availability 
of suitable data is inconsistent at best while the lack of transparency of foreign 
banks’ financial statements may inhibit the inclusion of some Singaporean 
banks and foreign banks in Malaysia into the study sample.  
 
 
 
5.10: Choice of Modeling Banking Behavior 
 
Complexity of Modeling Banks 
 
To derive the MPI through the DEA framework, an output orientated DEA model 
is run. To do so requires data on inputs and outputs to be fed into the model. 
There appears to be no consensus among researchers into banking efficiency 
and in the productivity literature about the selection of inputs and outputs. This 
is because, unlike other DMUs in the primary and secondary sectors, banks use 
multiple funds sources and offer multiple services and financial products that 
are not easily defined into clear cut physical measures. As a result, a model of a 
multi product bank that uses multi inputs needs to be employed (Humphrey, 
1991). 
 
The Production and Intermediation Approaches 
 
In general, there are two alternative approaches commonly adopted in modeling 
bank behavior: the production approach and the intermediation approach. The 
production approach views the bank as producers of loans and deposits utilizing 
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input resources such as labor and capital. This approach is also known as the 
traditional banking approach and was introduced by Benston (1965)12.  
According to this model, banks use three input factors; namely labor, capital 
and banking funds to produce a vector of 3 outputs in the form of short-term 
loans, long-term loans and other earning assets. On the other hand the bank 
borrows depositor’s funds and channels them to deficit units as loans and other 
assets in the intermediation approach. This is also dubbed as being the non-
traditional banking approach as it views the bank as a financial intermediary 
between surplus units and deficit units.  Using the second approach, 4 inputs 
(staff numbers, deposits, interest expense, and non-interest expense) and 3 
outputs (net loans, net interest income and non-interest income) have been 
identified (Avkiran, 1999b). Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest that the 
production approach is more appropriate to measuring bank branch level 
efficiency while the intermediation approach is better for measuring bank level 
efficiency.  
 
Almost all DEA frontier studies have adopted the intermediation approach 
except for Ferrier and Lovell (1990). Wheelock and Wilson (1995)13 compared 
both approaches and found that technical efficiency is greater for the 
intermediation approach. Meanwhile Hefferman (1996) found that most studies 
employed the intermediation approach because there are fewer problems with 
the data. Although Aly et al (1990)14 suggested that interest expense could be 
excluded since it is purely financial and is not an accurate measure of x-
efficiency, nevertheless, Elyasiani and Mehdian (1995) and Berger and 
Humphrey (1991) found that interest expense often accounts between one half 
to two thirds of total banking costs. For this reason, much of the literature on 
banking efficiency favors the intermediation approach whereby the focus seems 
to be on x-efficiency or the ability of bank management to control costs and 
generate revenues.  
 
                                                 
12 As cited in Mukherjee et al (2001) 
13 As cited in Yahya et al. (2001). 
14 As cited in Yahya et al.  (2001). 
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Another advantage that the intermediation approach has over the production 
approach is the inclusion of off balance sheet activities (OBS) in non-interest 
income. OBS’s involve trading financial instruments and generating income 
from fees and loan sales. These affect banks’ profits but do not appear in a 
bank’s balance sheets. These non-traditional banking activities however, are 
increasingly seen as a potentially dependable income source to balance the 
competitive erosion and volatility of interest income in relatively deregulated 
banking industries that are characterized by consolidation, convergence and 
innovation. Berger and Mester (1997)15 stated that with weights imposed by the 
Basle Accord, OBS items are perceived to have roughly the same risks and 
production costs as loans. These non-traditional operations are also 
concentrated among local and foreign banks that are typical of those in our 
sample. Thus, if no account is taken of these items, banks could be shown as 
having disproportionately higher costs compared to their measured output. 
 
The intermediation approach is adopted in this study. The primary reason is that 
by using the functional perspective of the financial intermediation concept to 
model the operations for both conventional banks and Islamic banks as 
illustrated in Part 1: Introduction, banks are viewed as financial intermediaries 
whose primary function is to facilitate the allocation and deployment of financial 
resources effectively and efficiently from surplus units to deficit units, spatially 
and temporarily in an uncertain economy. Apart from this, it is also thought that 
consistent with earlier studies, the use of the intermediation approach is more 
relevant and appropriate to measure the entire bank level performance since it 
includes interest expense, which represents a significant fraction of total 
banking costs for conventional banks whilst being able capture the effects of 
OBS operations that seem to have dominated the operations of banks as they 
provide the means to augment earnings and manage risks. 
 
 
                                                 
15 As cited in Isik (2002).  
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5.11: Estimating the Parameters of Conventional Banking and Islamic 
Banking under the Intermediation Approach 
 
The Need to Derive Comparable Variables for Islamic Banking  
When estimating the parameters of our DEA model, care is taken to account for 
the specific characteristics of Islamic banks. This is because Islamic banking 
differs from conventional banking in that it is based on the concept of 
investment profit and loss (PLS) sharing rather than only interest returns and 
costs. Islamic banking forbids the charging and acceptance of interest because 
it represents the notion that profit is pre-determined in advance and does not 
appear commensurate with an equal amount of risk taken. This notion is 
rejected by the Sharia. Hence, in order to perform a meaningful yet accurate 
productivity comparison among conventional and Islamic banking operations, it 
is a pre-requisite that a set of comparable variables or parameters be 
determined first for Islamic banking. Previous studies that attempt to assess the 
performance of Islamic banking such as Abdullah and Elzira Said (2003), 
Hassan and Bashir (2003), Hamid and Ahmad (2001) and Brown (2003) 
employed conventional variables such as net interest revenue and gross loans 
but did not disclose anything about  the appropriateness of using them within 
the Islamic banking framework nor provide any explanation as to  how the 
variables are qualified to be used as suitable proxies for items found in Islamic 
banks’ balance sheets. 
 
Choice of Inputs and Outputs in Modeling Banks 
For simplicity’s sake, the list of comparable variables for both conventional and 
Islamic banking used in thus study is outlined in Table 5.1 below. The 
qualification of the variables is discussed next. The first input is interest 
expense- a proxy for deposits in which to model bank behavior (Avkiran, 2000).  
This comparable input in Islamic banking operations is income attributable to 
depositors. The second input is non-interest expense which is comparable to 
expenses not related to income-attributable to depositors. This represents the 
resources expended in converting deposits to loans. When a less direct 
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approach (as in DEA model B) is taken to measure efficiency, deposits will be 
used to replace net interest income and staff numbers replace non-interest 
expense. The two outputs are net interest income, which is a proxy for net loans 
the equivalent term to income from financing; and non-interest income - a proxy 
for non-traditional activities which compares to the Islamic variable non-
financing related income. 
 
Qualifications of Inputs and Outputs 
The parameters outlined in Table 5.1 must be accurately estimated because 
banks remain the most difficult entities to value despite the multitude of 
regulatory and reporting requirements imposed on them and therefore a 
considerable degree of complexity is involved in defining the inputs and outputs.  
 
 Conventional Banking Variable Islamic Banking Comparable Variable 
Interest Expense Income attributable to depositors Inputs 
Non-Interest Expense Expenses not related to income 
attributable to shareholders 
Interest Income Income from financing Outputs 
Non-Interest Income Non-financing income  
 
Table 5.1: The List of Comparable Variables for Conventional and Islamic 
Banking following the Intermediation Approach of Modeling Bank Behavior.  
 
The variables used in this study are defined by slightly extending the financial 
intermediation models for both conventional and Islamic banks that have been 
introduced in the Part 1-Introduction as Figure B and C.  With reference to 
Figure B and Table 5.1, one would notice that the only differences are 2 
additional items- non-interest expense and non-interest revenue found in Table 
5.1. Both non-interest expense and non-interest revenue are important 
components in the financial intermediation role of the banks but are difficult to 
incorporate into the graphical depiction of the models without sacrificing the 
simplicity of the models. Expressed simply - banks incur non-interest expense 
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(such as employee wages and technology maintenance costs) in carrying out 
their financial intermediation processes. Furthermore banks do not only earn 
interest revenues from advances extended. A significant proportion of a banks’ 
total revenue is earned in the form of fees for services provided for their 
customers as well as by off balance sheet OBS operations. It is worthwhile to 
note that banks are involved in OBS activities to better manage the risks 
emanating from their loan portfolios besides augmenting their earnings. The 
Islamic banking equivalents of both non-interest expense and non-interest 
revenue are expenses not related to income attributable to shareholders and 
non-financing income. 
 
The definition of the variables in this study also follows closely the discussion in 
Schoon et al (2003) that aimed at studying the applicability of the Residual 
Income Model to the valuation of conventional and Islamic banks in a way that 
accounts for the different characteristics of Islamic banking. Although a different 
methodology was adopted in the paper, the authors highlighted the need to 
account for the effects of risks and returns on the banks’ balance sheet items 
that may affect the choice between an accounting value reported in the financial 
statements or some other more-desirable values that need to be derived. 
 
Accordingly, expected returns related to both on and off balance sheet items 
need to be considered when the total returns of a bank are determined. 
Penman 1992)16 argued that net income attributable to shareholders provides a 
measure of change in value and thus any adjustments to incorporate effects of 
marked-to-market revaluation of financial assets available for sale and currency 
translation gains and losses that may affect equity also need to be incorporated. 
This value is also known as the clean surplus. Schoon et al (2003) however 
also cited Walker (1997)17 that advocate accounting book values as being 
superior due to the fact that reported book values guide rational investment 
decisions and therefore accounting numbers. Reference was also made to 
Stark (1997)18 who argued that accounting values alone are sufficient unless 
                                                 
16 As cited in Schoon  et al, (2003).  
17 As cited in Schoon  et al, (2003) 
18 As cited in Schoon et al, (2003) 
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the components of clean surplus inherit predictive ability. Since Stark (1997)19 
also concluded that clean surplus components in general have no information 
content, earnings or revenues for conventional banks in this study will follow the 
accounting values as disclosed by the banks’ financial statements. 
 
In terms of Islamic banking, bank earnings are capable of being defined as (1) 
income attributable to shareholders and (2) income attributable to shareholders 
and unrestricted investment account (Schoon et al, 2003). The difference stems 
from the fact that investment accounts in Islamic banking can be either included 
in or extracted from capital. Restricted investment accounts are set up with the 
investment purpose specifically indicated by the account holder and therefore, 
the bank only manages funds in the account. On the other hand, funds in 
unrestricted investment accounts can be invested on the discretion of the bank 
and holders bear full risk of the losses. 
 
In accordance to the Accounting, Auditing and Governance Standards for 
Islamic Financial Institutions AAOIFI standards, restricted investment accounts 
are treated as off balance sheet items. Unrestricted investment accounts 
meanwhile may exhibit some characteristics of capital but at the same time can 
be compared with discretionary portfolio management related funds in 
conventional banks and therefore cannot be treated as being part of permanent 
capital (Schoon et al, 2003). The AAOIFI position is that investment accounts 
whether restricted or unrestricted would not be included into equity since it 
defines equity as the residual value after liabilities have been deducted from the 
assets (Schoon et al, 2003). Thus under approach (1), returns of investment 
accounts would be included within expenses not related to income attributable 
to shareholders within the framework of this study. On the other hand if 
approach (2) is taken, then returns on investment accounts would be excluded. 
The decision about the choice however, needs to be implemented consistently. 
 
Earnings for Islamic banks also need to be determined carefully in the sense 
that profits may be shared in two different ways,  the pooling and the separation 
                                                 
19 As cited in Schoon et al, (2003) 
 175
methods. These variations may have material impacts on reported earnings. 
Under the first method, all sources of funds should share in all the revenues and 
expenses from the investments except for the revenues and expenses 
attributed to subsidiary and affiliated companies and employee remunerations 
(Schoon et al, 2003). Under the separation method, revenues and expenses 
related to investments are shared among investment account holders only 
although some equity funds may have partly funded an investment (Schoon et 
al, 2003). Although these may not affect the outputs in our model, they affect 
the income attributable to the depositors’ component if they are subsequently 
retained and reinvested.  
 
 
5.12: Determining Degrees of Gains Passed to the Public 
 
To determine the extent of productivity gains from Australian bank mergers that 
are passed on to the public, Avkiran (1999b) and Rhoades (1986) suggested 
that a good proxy to measure this is the change in deposit market share. The 
authors reasoned that if the pricing and quality of banks’ products and services 
improve as a result of improved productivity from mergers, it is reasonable to 
expect the bank’s post-merger market share will rise. Meanwhile, Focarelli and 
Panetta (2002) described the deposit market share as the ideal testing ground 
in studying the effects of enhanced consumer welfare and adverse pricing due 
to the exercise of market powers. Both authors attributed this to the fact that 
because deposits are highly standardized products (since the characteristics of 
deposits are regulated and sanctioned by laws), they can be meaningfully 
compared between different banks over time. In addition given the assumptions 
that (1) the competition is at the local level, (2) that barriers to entry into local 
deposit markets exist and (3) by holding the industry constant, the local deposit 
market allows an effective examination of the pricing effects of bank mergers 
that can alter the competitive conditions in markets with different characteristics. 
This study follows Avkiran (1999b) and use market share of deposits of a bank 
as a proxy to investigate whether post-merger productivity gains have been 
passed on to the public.  
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 However, extreme caution needs to be exercised here. In adopting the 
approach in Avkiran (1999b) it is assumed firstly that there have been 
productivity gains as a result of the mergers. Secondly we assume a positive 
correlation to exist between change in market share of deposits and change in 
productivity when the benefits are actually passed on to the public. Avkiran 
(1999b) highlighted that this assumption may not hold because a decline in 
productivity may not increase price and lead to decline in banking quality. 
Finally, all domestic banks in Malaysia were merged (almost simultaneously) 
within a 2-3 years period. If all banks have in fact improved their productivity 
following the mergers and pass the benefits to the public, it is likely that deposit 
market shares for each banking group may not change very much at all. This is 
because banks are measured relative to one another. However, it would be 
erroneous to conclude that no productivity gains have been passed to the 
public. 
 
5.13: Research Design 
 
The key research objective is to investigate the empirical evidence about 
productivity changes within the Malaysian dual banking system (including 
Islamic banking operations), benchmarked to Singaporean banks, surrounding 
the period of bank consolidation.  This evidence will be examined  using the 
Malmquist Productivity Indices (MPI), which enable the decomposition of 
productivity into technological changes, technical efficiency and scale efficiency.  
The breakdown provides insight into sources of inefficiencies and also indicates 
whether banks operate closer to the optimal scale size as a result of mergers.    
MPI Indices Derivation using DEAP 2.1 
Input data are firstly keyed into Microsoft Excel templates before being 
computed  using Formula 1 as introduced in the Methodology section to 
estimate the MPI in the form of indices. Here, the MPI indices will be derived 
using the program DEAP Version 2.1 (Coelli, 1996). The DEAP 2.1 is a DOS 
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language computer program developed by Tim Coelli of the Center for 
Productivity and Efficiency Analysis (CEPA) that can be easily run on any 
Windows based IBM-compatible PCs. In order to generate MPI indices, DEAP 
firstly runs a DEA to generate the following four technical efficiencies needed to 
compute the ratio of distance functions as identified in Coelli (1996): 
• The CRS DEA frontiers from previous period 
• The CRS DEA frontiers for the current period 
• The CRS DEA frontiers for the next period 
• The VRS DEA frontiers for the current period 
 
A principal requirement to compute MPI indices using DEAP is that a panel of 
data for the sample must be used. In other words, all firms must be observed in 
terms of inputs and outputs in all time periods. In our sample of 41 separable 
banking units, we can only include 30 units in order to satisfy this requirement. 
Descriptive statistics on the 2 inputs and 2 outputs used are presented in Table 
X.  
 
Based on the calculation of distance function ratios, 5 indices relative to the 
previous periods are produced for each DMU beginning in the 2 period namely: 
(1) the technical efficiency change index, (2) the pure technical efficiency 
change index, (3) the scale efficiency change index, (4) the technical change 
index and (5) a product of all previous indices, is the total factor productivity or 
TFP change index. Index values above 1 indicate productivity progress between 
periods t-1 and t while index values below 1 indicate productivity regress. 
Unitary values signify no productivity changes between the periods.  The TFP 
change index results of the analysis denote the values of MPI indices. Indexes 
1 to 4 provide the complete decomposition of the MPI index. 
 
The Need for Careful Selection of Suitable Study Samples. 
It must be noted that our sample of 30 banking units represents the enlarged 
sample that includes conventional commercial banks and Islamic banks 
regardless of ownership and regulatory environment. The DEA MPI is initially 
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run with this “universal” sample to project common grand frontiers to enable the 
derivation of MPI indices. This approach provides the simplest and most direct 
way of comparing productivity levels of all banking units relative to one another. 
However, it is not by any means the most accurate and desirable. Avkiran 
(2000) explains that one major limitation of generating MPI scores using 
enlarged samples is that one needs to assume that all banking units share the 
same common technology or frontier. However, this assumption may be too far-
fetched if banking units within a sample operate in different markets or are 
subjected to different regulatory environments or are of different asset size or 
differ by ownership type. In such a scenario, productivity differences are likely to 
prevail and it can be difficult to attribute this to either differences in 
characteristics or actual operations on an equal footing (Avkiran, 2000).  
 
Such factors may have been responsible for large divergent results between 
large and small US banks on productivity levels that have been reported and 
documented by numerous studies. Recently, Wheelock and Wilson (1999) 
found that it was only a few innovator banks that push the frontier, while most, 
especially small banks, lag behind resulting in overall technological regress that 
ultimately decreased bank productivity levels in their study. In an earlier paper, 
Elysiani and Mehdian (1995)20 proposed that small and large banks have 
different efficient frontiers following contrarian results between large and small 
US banks in their study. 
 
This apparent problem has been acknowledged by Alam (2001) who opted to 
run the DEA MPI program separately on differentiated samples based on the 
type of regulatory environment as advocated by Berger and Humphrey 
(1991,1992)21, Berger (1993)22 and Adams et al. (1999)23 to highlight the fact 
that banks under different regulatory environments are unlikely to share the 
same technology and thus are heterogeneous. The author however did 
                                                 
20 As cited in Avkiran (2000) and Alam (2001). 
21 As cited in Alam (2001). 
22 As cited in Alam (2001). 
23 As cited in Alam (2001). 
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complement the analysis with a sample that contains all differentiated banking 
units despite the fact that doing so violates the homogeneity requirement in 
order to provide comparison and acts as a control sample.  
 
Following Alam (2001), it was decided to implement the DEA MPI on 
differentiated samples categorized on the basis of regulatory environment 
alongside the construction of the grand frontier to enhance comparison. These 
sub samples are namely: domestic commercial banks, foreign commercial 
banks, domestic IBS, foreign IBS and Islamic banks. However, it must be noted 
at the same time that there is a major caveat involved. Despite recognizing the 
fact that a common grand frontier may be technically flawed, Avkiran (2000) 
proceeded to analyze the enlarged sample instead citing that the small sample 
size may restrict the ability of DEA to discriminate between efficient and 
inefficient DMUs. Indeed as explained by Coelli et al (1998), by reducing the 
number of units entering the DEA, the comparison set is thus reduced, resulting 
in many units being identified as efficient. In this way, the discriminatory power 
of DEA would be greatly reduced rendering the scores generated questionable. 
 
Choice of Study Samples. 
Thus, to strike a balance between two undesirable ends to the same problem, 
we run the DEA MPI on both the enlarged samples and the sub samples. This 
way, the samples can be used to control one another besides aiding 
comparison.  Specifically: 
• To discriminate the MPI scores between conventional commercial and 
Islamic banking units, the enlarged sample of 30 banking units observed 
during the period would be used. 
• To discriminate the performance between domestic and foreign 
commercial banks, 3 samples are used: (1) commercial banks (that 
includes both domestic and foreign commercial banking units), (2) 
domestic commercial banks and (3) foreign commercial banks. 
• To discriminate the performance of Islamic banking operations, no 
differentiated samples would be used. This is because of the lack of 
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availability of suitable panel data to compute the MPI, and the sample is 
necessarily small. Instead, the sample of Islamic banking operations IBO 
will be used instead that includes domestic IBS, foreign IBS and Islamic 
banks. 
 
The Need for Inclusion of DEA Efficiencies. 
The MPI indices and their decomposition provide a robust approach to assess 
the magnitude and direction of changes in productivity measures.  By their use, 
it is possible to identify the TFP, the TE, the PTE or the SE. Thus, the 
methodology is suitable to indicate whether a bank is progressing or regressing 
or remaining stagnant and the speed of change relative to other banks. One 
major drawback of the MPI is that the indices do not tell one how efficient is a 
banking unit relative to the others at any point of time. Therefore, while the MPI 
can indicate productivity/efficiency changes between 2 time periods, it cannot 
indicate the level of productivity/efficiency. 
 
This distinction is critical because a bank may be reporting a MPI score of 1 
(constant efficiency relative to previous period) or less than 1 (efficiency regress 
relative to previous period), but the bank may be very efficient relative to the 
others throughout the study period. On the contrary, a bank with an MPI score 
of more than 1 (efficiency progress relative to previous period) may on the 
whole be inefficient relative to the others. Furthermore, by capturing progress 
and regress between 2 time periods, MPI scores are highly volatile and time 
series analysis may not be very useful to identify trends. 
 
Thus, a thorough analysis of banking productivity and efficiency based solely on 
the MPI indices is insufficient. Often one also needs to assess the levels of 
efficiency of one bank against another. This is particularly important as there 
has been noted shift towards studying x efficiencies of banks recently (Avkiran 
2000; Elysiani and Mehdian, 1990; Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Allen and Rai, 
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1996)24. This trend is generally traced to the findings of existing studies that 
report x inefficiencies constituting up to 20% of operational costs for banks while 
inefficiency in scale and scope economies make up less than 5% or less of 
costs (Berger et al, 1993)25. Therefore, there is a consensus on the significance 
of x efficiencies (or the ability of management to control costs and maximize 
revenues) to the performance of banks. Following this, it is an objective of this 
paper to report on the levels of this x-efficiency as well as the productivity 
changes to our sample banks to complete the performance analysis in a dual 
banking system. 
 
DEA Efficiencies Derivation using DEAP 2.1 
As explained within the Methodology part, x-efficiency can be computed by 
DEA. To do so, DEAP is instructed to compute one-stage VRS DEA scores 
based on the output orientated model to provide full decomposition of technical 
efficiency into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Here it is assumed 
that the DEA technical efficiency serves as an exact proxy for x-efficiencies. In 
truth, x-efficiency comprises of both technical and allocative efficiencies.  
 
The same 2 inputs and 2 outputs employed within the MPI framework are used 
to generate DEA efficiency scores. However, the sample size differs from year 
to year because (1) balanced panel data is not a requirement and (2) banking 
units are excluded in a particular year if there are zero or negative values for the 
inputs and outputs reported for that year. The optimal sample selection issue 
highlighted for MPI applies to DEA computation as well. Therefore, to preserve 
fair and accurate degrees of discrimination and comparison, the DEA 
specification is run on the same sample sets for MPI as identified earlier.  
 
 
 
                                                 
24 As cited in Avkiran (1999a).  
25 As cited in Avkiran (1999a).  
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5.14: Summary  
In summary this  paper applies the output orientated DEA model.  Avkiran 
(1999a) highlighted that when inputs may well be outside the control of 
managers, the output orientated model needs to be applied. It is opinioned that 
within the relatively regulated Malaysian and Singaporean banking industries, 
bank managers have little control over input variables such as deposit rates, 
and thus it warrants the output-orientated DEA specification. 
This study follows the intermediation approach of modeling bank production 
primarily because the intermediation approach is more appropriate for 
measuring bank-level efficiency as opposed to branch-level performance since 
it includes interest expense, that represents a significant fraction of total 
banking costs for conventional banks (Goddard et al, 2001). Another advantage 
that the intermediation approach has is the inclusion of off balance sheet 
activities (OBS). Furthermore, this study seeks to establish consistency with 
other DEA frontier studies, an overwhelming majority of which have adopted the 
intermediation approach. 
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CHAPTER   6: 
RESULTS26
 
6.1: Introduction 
 
This section examines the relative efficiency and productivity levels of the banks 
featured in the sample (see description below). The results are obtained  by 
running the DEA model using the DEAP program to firstly construct a grand 
frontier that envelopes all the input-output observations for all banks. The 
sample used in this study comprised of Malaysian domestic commercial banks 
(DCB), foreign commercial banks in Malaysia (FCB), Singaporean commercial 
banks (SCB), Islamic Banking Schemes provided by Malaysian domestic banks 
(DIBS), Islamic Banking Schemes provided by foreign commercial banks (FCB) 
and pure Islamic Banks in Malaysia (IB).  
 
Note that the primary objective of this study is to investigate and compare the 
relative efficiency and productivity performance of commercial banks and 
Islamic banking operations (IBO) within the Malaysian dual banking system. 
SCB units are included into the sample with the sole purpose of enhancing the 
discriminatory ability of the DEA and MPI models by acting as benchmarks 
against which to calculate relative efficiency and productivity for each banking 
unit in each year as previously mentioned. Thus, the focus of our analysis will 
be on Malaysian banks although brief explanations of the notable SCB 
performance features will be disclosed.  
 
                                                 
26 Tables and Figures relating to Results appear at the end of this chapter. 
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6.2: Analysis Organization  
 
6.2.1: General Trends in Relative Efficiency and Productivity Performance 
for All Banks 
To facilitate the accessibility and intelligibility of the presentation of the results, 
this section is broken down into several sections. The presentation commenced 
with Section 6.3 where an attempt is made to examine the whole banking 
industry in a broad sweep that encompasses all conventional and Islamic 
banking operations in Malaysia and Singapore. Attention will firstly be given to 
the average or mean relative efficiency scores across the study years (from 
1996 to 2002). Here, the average TE, PTE and SE scores for each banking 
group from 1996 to 2002 will be analyzed. Subsequently, the variability of the 
annual average TE, PTE and SE scores (denoted by coefficients of variations) 
for each group are examined to determine the consistency of performance 
across the study periods. Section 1.1 plays a crucial role in revealing which 
banking groups have the highest efficiency level on average. This facilitates the 
analysis in determining whether conventional banking outperforms Islamic 
banking or otherwise. Section R1.1 however can only give a partial view of the 
productivity performance of banks. 
 
To fully comprehend the relative productivity performance of the banks over 
time, trend analysis on the DEA efficiency levels will also be presented. With 
trend analysis, information relating to efficiency improvement and deterioration 
is made available that would be impossible to derive by the static benchmarks 
since benchmarks are also likely to change from one year to another. Yet, 
another crucial objective that can be accomplished is to provide another missing 
piece in the puzzle of determining the relative productivity level of banks. It may 
be recalled that the productivity of any DMU or the Total Factor Productivity of a 
DMU is the sum of (1) pure technical efficiency, (2) scale efficiency and (3) 
technical change. Because the third component involves a shift in the efficient 
frontier between two time periods, it is possible to compute and decompose the 
MPI index. In doing so, it is possible not only to determine the index value for 
technical change (Tech Change) but also TE change, PTE change and SE 
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change indices. These subcomponents of the MPI index thus would provide 
additional insights that would further enrich our analysis on the nature and 
behavior of the banks’ efficiency and productivity performance. This of course 
would have been impossible if we confined the study was confined to DEA 
relative efficiency scores. 
 
 
6.2.2: Results Interpretation 
Caution however must be exercised when interpreting DEA relative efficiency 
scores and MPI relative productivity index scores together before making any 
inference. By definition DEA relative efficiency scores assign numerical values 
(between 0 and 1) to the efficiency level of a DMU relative to others whereas 
MPI indices assign numerical vales ( ≥ 0; where values of < 1 denote regress 
while values >1 indicates progress) to denote (1) any progress or regress as 
pertaining to TE, PTE, SE and Tech Change and (2) the speed of such 
changes. Thus, one can ascertain that while DEA can reveal how efficient is a 
DMU relative to the others, the MPI sub indices indicate the direction and speed 
of DEA efficiency levels from one period to another. For instance a declining 
MPI PTE change index would indicate deterioration not of DEA PTE levels, but 
rather a decline in the rate of DEA PTE improvement. It should be nooted that 
the absence of balanced panel data for a number of banks, the samples that 
were used to generate DEA efficiency scores and MPI productivity indices differ 
from one year to another. Therefore, the changes portrayed by DEA trend 
analysis may not be accurately reflected by the MPI indices. 
 
Research Question 1  
Section 6.3 to 6.6 state the results and answers to the principal research 
questions of the relative efficiency and productivity levels of all banks as found 
within the sample used to construct the grand frontier. Section 6.3 is dedicated 
to the determination and assessment of whether conventional commercial 
banks or Islamic banking operations were more efficient and productive based 
on a comparison of average efficiency and productivity measures between the 
CBS and IBO. Section 6.4 probes the same research question whilst 
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distinguishing between the many different banking groups within CBS and IBO. 
Section 6.5 meanwhile presents an analysis of the results to establish whether 
FCB outperformed DCB over the study period. Thus Section 6.3 for instance will 
discuss average DEA relative efficiency levels and the measures of 
performance variations between conventional banks and IBO to scrutinize the 
DEA efficiency trends and MPI sub indices trends for both conventional banks 
and IBO.  
 
Research Question 2 
The results pertaining to the second research question are presented in Section 
6.6. If bank mergers and consolidations improve banks’ efficiency and 
productivity performance, then increased efficiency would be observed for a 
particular banking group in the years following a merger. To this end, annual 
post-merger TE, PTE and SE scores for up to 3 years after a bank merger are 
provided. Furthermore, the relative efficiency scores are disclosed for both the 
acquiring bank and the target bank for the year prior to a merger to determine 
whether acquiring banks are more efficient than target banks. This also enables 
us to investigate if acquiring banks manage to maintain their pre-merger 
efficiency levels during the post-merger period. 
 
 
Research Question 3 
Finally, Section 6.7 attempts to answer the final research question with respect 
to detecting any evidence of transmission of efficiency gains to the public, if 
there is any at all, as a result of the bank mergers and consolidation. To 
establish this, we include (1) measures of change of deposit market share are 
included for each merged entity (DCB) for each of the 3 years after a bank 
merger and (2) measures of change in TE levels for DCB to enable a correlation 
to be established with changes in deposit marker share. The second component 
thus examines the results for any indications that suggest that efficiency gains 
are passed on to the public in the form of enhanced service and better pricing 
(higher deposit rates). Inferences in this section would also establish the degree 
of market power enjoyed by the merged domestic banking groups as a result of 
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the mergers that significantly reduced the number of major players within the 
Malaysian dual banking system that has so far posed many regulatory 
restrictions on foreign banks’ operations. A response to this question would thus 
indicate the level of competition within the Malaysian dual banking system. 
 
6.3: Relative Efficiency and Productivity Results for All Banking Groups 
 
First, DEA was applied on x bank/year observations comprising of all banking 
groups (DCB, FCB, SCB, DIBS, FIBS and IB) to construct the grand frontier 
against which the radial efficiency for all banking units are computed on an 
annual basis. The results for DEA technical efficiency (TE), pure technical 
efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE) for all banking groups and units are 
tallied and presented in Table 6.1, Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 where the 
discussion will be focused. Note that variations in performance for each banking 
group can be divided into (1) mean variation scores across all periods as 
denoted by the coefficients of variation in Table 6.1, Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 
and (2) the average annual variation scores for each year of the study and are 
denoted by the coefficients of variation in Table 6.2, Table 6.3 and Table 6.5.  
 
6.3.1: DEA Efficiency Results: General Findings 
The presentation of data is begun by considering the TE results for all banks 
between 1996 and 2002. With reference to Table 6.1, it is noted that throughout 
1996 to 2002, SCB were the most efficient banks on average relative to all other 
banking groups in the study. Within the Malaysian dual banking system, DIBS 
were the most efficient and followed closely by FCB, FIBS and DCB. IB 
meanwhile turned out to be the most inefficient group of banks.  
There was however, a considerable gap, between the most efficient banks 
(SCB with average score of 0.734) and the least efficient banks (IB with 
average score of 0.589), with an average range of 0.145. Nevertheless, 
efficiency value ranges declined over time from 1996 to 2002. However, due to 
the concurrent rise in the coefficient of variation (CV) of annual efficiency 
means, banks’ efficiency scores became volatile overtime. This indicates that 
banks’ performances were diverging but standard-practice banks, especially 
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small and less efficient banks, generally managed to catch up with the best 
practice banks. 
 
Overall, all banking groups did not boast very high levels of technical efficiency. 
Even SCB’s on average could still improve output levels by 26.6% without 
increasing the level of inputs. Furthermore, although SCB have been the most 
efficient, their performance over the years was nevertheless not very consistent 
as shown by their average coefficient of variation (CV) of 23.9%. This measure 
of variation is however small compared to all other banks. DIBS for instance 
had the most consistent performance with the lowest CV score of 12.5%. DIBS 
also had the second highest efficiency score of 0.704 outperforming foreign IBS 
with a score of 0.669. In terms of conventional banking, FCB on average 
outperformed domestic banks. IB meanwhile were the least efficient with a 
mean of only 0.589. In all, DIBS, FIBS and FCB had quite similar efficiency 
performances and they outperformed DCB and IB. Meanwhile, FIBS had the 
most variable efficiency performance over the study years (0.343) followed 
closely by DCB (0.341) while DIBS were the least volatile (0.125).  
 
The mean of annual PTE and SE scores for all banks presented in Table R5 
and R6 show that banks on average were more PTE efficient than scale 
efficient. A close study of the CV values for each banking group show that on 
average, SE changes were more significant in commercial banks while PTE 
changes were more prevalent among IBO. Nevertheless, the CV measures for 
PTE and SE in each year show that changes in TE were primarily sourced from 
SE changes between 1997-1998 while PTE effects were more prevalent from 
1999 to 2001. By 2002 however, both PTE and SE had equally influenced 
banks’ efficiency.  
 
Table 6.7 meanwhile revealed that conventional commercial banks and IBO 
operated mostly under DRS although 2 FCB managed to attain MPSS in 2002. 
On the other hand, most IBS operations achieved MPSS consistently 
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throughout 1996-2002. Only one small DIBS operation managed to attain IRS 
consistently since 2000.  
 
Table 6.4 shows that there is considerably more efficiency variation among 
Islamic banking operations on a year to year basis. This indicates that Islamic 
banking units were quite heterogeneous among one another even within the 
same banking group. For instance there was higher variation among DIBS than 
other IBO units in 1996 although the trend declined. Variation among FIBS on 
the other hand dominated other banks from 1999-2001. IB’s meanwhile were 
the most heterogeneous group in 2002. Among all Malaysian banks, DCB 
banks were the most homogeneous group (0.088). Throughout the study 
period, DCB were more consistent than FCB (0.188). Variation among FCB 
peaked in 1998 and 2001. Both Table 6.5 and 6.6 explain that variations among 
DCB, FCB, DIBS and FIBS were mostly due to PTE differences while IB were 
influenced more by SE differences.  
 
6.3.2: Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) Levels 
In regards to the contribution of x-efficiency by managerial competence levels, 
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 showcase the PTE levels for all banks. Both show on 
average PTE levels were quite uniform throughout but were visibly trending 
downwards at a very gradual pace with a shallow trough in 2001. Pure technical 
efficiencies however improved in 2002. Evidence was less certain on the 
degree of performance convergence. Both the range and the CV showed both 
ups and downs throughout 1996-2002. Both experienced peaks in 1998 and 
2001 and troughs in 2000. It should be noted that towards 2002, both measures 
actually increased compared to the 1996 measures. Thus, banks’ managerial 
efficiency actually diverged somewhat from 1996 to 2002. 
 
 
Overall, Singaporean banks were the most efficient (0.980), followed by FCB in 
second place with 0.869 and DCB in third with 0.864. In contrast, IB were the 
worst performers in terms of PTE (0.727). On the other hand, FIBS had the 
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most volatile PTE scores (CV of 23.5%) throughout the study period followed by 
IB (CV of 23%). 
 
Figure 6.2 illustrates that SCB were the top tiered performers with relatively 
stable performance. DCB had declining PTE up until 1999, before it rose in 
2000 only to decline once more in 2001. The year 2002 however saw a modest 
recovery. FCB on the other hand, dominated DCB until 2000 but experienced 
increased inefficiency in excess of their domestic counterparts in 2001. By 2002 
however, PTE levels for DCB and FCB were almost identical. PTE performance 
for both DIBS and FIBS meanwhile closely mirrored that of TE although the 
decline of PTE in 1997 for DCB was more pronounced. The same conclusion 
can be made about IB except in 1996 when banks experienced declining 
efficiencies. 
 
In terms of PTE performance homogeneity among member banks of the same 
banking group however, Table 6.5 shows that FIBS units appeared to be the 
most heterogeneous, followed by DIBS, IB, FCB and lastly, DCB. This indicates 
that DCB banks share greater bank managerial similarities among themselves 
than any other banks. Trend analysis meanwhile points out that FIBS and DCB 
were more heterogeneous than other conventional and Islamic banks 
throughout the study period. For conventional banks in Malaysia, PTE variability 
peaked in 2001. IBO however did not share similar performance variability 
characteristics. DIBS for instance were the most heterogeneous in the earlier 
years of 1996 and 1997, FIBS in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2002 and IB in 2001. 
Nevertheless, all banks showed stable variation levels except for FIBS and IB.   
 
6.3.3: Scale Efficiency (SE) Levels. 
In terms of scale efficiency or the ability to gain scale economies arising from 
the optimal/ideal scale size, Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3 highlight the findings that 
for all banks, SE experienced a sharp decline from 1996 to bottom out in 1998 
(0.572).  
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Nevertheless, a strong SE recovery was evident beyond 1998 reaching 
maximal SE efficiency (0.928) in 2000 before charting another decline in 2001 
and a slight recovery in 2002. Similar to PTE, the range and CV both exhibited 
cyclical features. Range was the widest in 1997 and 2000 while CV peaked in 
1998 and 2001. Both measures however revealed a gradually declining pattern 
but the results were inconclusive and it cannot inferred that banks are 
converging in terms of SE. 
 
 
FIBS operated with the best scale size, realizing average SE of 0.886, followed 
by DIBS (0.850) and FCB (0.804). IB however were not far behind with 0.770. 
Overall, Islamic banking operations had better operation scale sizes (i.e. more 
scale efficient) than conventional banks. Meanwhile FCB (0.804) continued to 
outperform DCB (0.733). A distinction was also apparent in measures of SE 
variability. DCB had the highest volatility on average (26.7%) while domestic 
IBS had the least volatility (8.9%) but all in all, Islamic banking operations had 
lower volatility SE measures compared to conventional banking operations. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 exhibits that from 1996 to 2002, in terms of SE, DCB and FCB 
moved closely together. However DCB were more prone to SE changes after 
having experienced the greater SE deterioration in 1998 and 2001 which was 
more than by any other banking groups. By the end of the study period, both 
DCB and FCB had almost identical SE scores. Both DIBS and FIBS however 
improved their SE even when all other banking groups showed declines in 
1998. For DIBS, SE rose but fell slightly in 2001 but SE improved dramatically 
in 2002. FIBS meanwhile enjoyed sustained SE improvement from 1998 to 
2000 but gradually tapered off in the beginning of 2001 although FIBS were 
almost fully scale efficient (SE levels were very close to 1).  
 
Table 6.6 explains that DIBS banks were the most heterogeneous in terms of 
SE performance, followed by IB, SCB, FCB and DCB. FIBS banks on the other 
hand, had the most homogeneous SE performance. When analyzed across 
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time, both IB and FIBS had the most varied scale efficiency scores among 
banks in 1997. IB and DCB banks were also converging in terms of 
performance towards 2002. However FCB began to become more 
heterogeneous after being the most homogeneous group in 2000.   
 
Table 6.7 and Figures 6.13 to 6.16 summarize the nature of scale returns for all 
banks. DRS scale size dominated commercial banks most notably in DCB 
where DRS were was most prevalent. Some FCB managed to achieve MPSS 
towards the end of the study period. IRS was reported in both 1996 and 2000 
but foreign banks seemed to have exhausted these to the optimum level. DIBS 
and FIBS on the other hand were operating with better scale sizes with fair 
shares in both IRS and MPSS. Both MPSS and IRS were however on the 
decline for domestic IBS indicating that banks were growing beyond the MPSS. 
FIBS were much more characterized by IRS throughout, although these were 
giving way to MPSS as banks began to expand to reach their optimal sizes. IB 
however were mostly operating under DRS.  
 
6.3.4: Trend Analysis 
 
6.3.4.1 Technical Efficiency Trend Analysis: 1996-1998 Financial Crisis and 
Falling Efficiency 
Figure 6.1 charts the trends for the annual DEA technical efficiency scores for 
all banking groups over the study period. It is apparent that most banks suffered 
increased inefficiency between 1996 and 1998 before recovering in 1999 and 
2000 before becoming more inefficient again in 2001 only to recover yet again 
in 2002. Also note that the efficiency trends for DCB, FCB and IB were very 
similar. Efficiency trend for DIBS and FIBS on the other hand declined earlier in 
1997 and later improved towards 2002 even as all the other banking groups 
charted a different course. 
 
The financial crisis coincided with the 1997-1998 period. Except for FIBS, all 
banking groups operated at their most inefficient levels in 1998. This general 
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performance deterioration was largely due to a deep contraction in SE 
especially within DCB and FCB, indicating that banks were somehow oversized 
and overstaffed, and thus it made  banks vulnerable to the effects of the crisis. 
The banking industry was in disarray in 1998 and the financial crisis certainly 
did affect different banking groups with different levels of severity. This is 
because 1998 also recorded the highest CV score. Nevertheless, the efficiency 
gap between the best practice bank and the worst practice bank was narrowing. 
 
6.3.4.2: Technical Efficiency Trend Analysis: 1999-2000: Recovery 
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 both illustrate that the banks recovered strongly over 
the 1999-2000 period.  
 
The narrowing range and CV values in Table 6.1 also suggest that banks were 
becoming more homogeneous amongst one another in terms of technical 
efficiency levels as the less efficient banks managed to catch up with the best 
banks. The efficiency recovery however was largely attributed to sharp 
improvement in scale efficiency among both conventional and Islamic banking 
operations alike as Table 6.2, Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3 suggest. PTE levels 
were somewhat more stable even since 1996. This indicates that between 1996 
and 1999, banks were more prone to changes in scale efficiency rather than 
managerial efficiency. 
 
6.3.4.3: Technical Efficiency Trend Analysis: 2001-2002: The Effects of Bank 
Consolidation 
Banks however grew inefficient again in 2001 just as the bank merger exercise 
initiated in 2000 was successfully completed. Efficiency levels were at the 
second lowest point in 2001 after the worst bank performance was registered in 
1998 and were greatly affected by exceptionally low efficiency scores for DCB, 
FCB and IB. The increased inefficiencies this time were attributed to both 
deterioration in SE and PTE in DCB, FCB and IB although scale inefficiency 
played a larger role. During 2001, DRS were prevalent among them. The higher 
CV value (second only to the value of 1998) for 2001 in Table 6.1 highlights the 
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fact that once again that banks’ performances were not only deteriorating but 
deviating from each other as well. Table 6.4 points out however that the highest 
variation was attributed to both FIBS and DIBS. Thus, all DCBs, FCBs and IBs 
were quite homogeneous in terms of their performance, perhaps this was linked 
to common trigger factors and/or common organizational and market structures. 
The depressed efficiencies eventually resulted in a TFP regress between 2000-
2001. Although Table 6.13 illustrates that the banks recorded the highest 
technical change during this period, the decline in TFP can be traced to both 
PTE and SE regresses (Table 6.11 and Table 6.12). 
 
Banks’ efficiency recovered yet again in 2002 due to the banks becoming more 
PTE and SE efficient. Only FIBS recorded a small SE deterioration. 
Nevertheless, Figure R1-3 highlights that banks were diverging. However, the 
figure also shows an interesting grouping feature, in that towards 2002 (1) FIBS 
were converging with SCB to become the best in PTE, (2) DIBS, DCB and FCB 
converged together in PTE, (3) FIBS and DIBS converged together to attain the 
highest SE, (4) SCB, FCB and DCB converged in SE and (5) IB had the lowest 
PTE and SE levels.  
 
6.3.5: Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Change 
With reference to Table 6.9, it is noted that on the whole, all banks within the 
sample considered together, recorded the strongest TFP growth between 1999 
and 2000 (1.098), followed by  more modest growth during the  2001-2002 
period (1.042). In contrast, the industry suffered TFP regress by 0.976 during 
the first period (1998-1999) as well as the final study period (2001-2002) by 
0.981. Thus, the industry experienced rather short-lived productivity growth that 
was tightly concentrated over a 3-year period-1999, 2000 and 2001.  
 
The productivity of banks however displayed a trend towards convergence as 
illustrated by (1) the narrowing range and (2) the decreasing volatility of 
productivity indices among different banking groups as indicated by the 
coefficient of variation (CV). Therefore, standard practice banks managed 
appeared to keep up with the best practice and banks were becoming more 
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homogenous. Accordingly, the early 1998-1999 period saw the most volatile 
performance (54.2%) while the most recent 2001-2002 period recorded the 
lowest score dispersion value of (24.2%). 
 
Based on the results shown in Table 6.9, all banking groups enjoyed TFP 
progress except for IB that experienced TFP regress with a mean regress of 
0.921. On average, FIBS had the strongest TFP growth with a progress index of 
1.199 followed by DIBS with a progress of 1.148. All conventional commercial 
banks recorded very modest TFP growth on average with the benchmark SCB 
leading with 1.080 and trailed by foreign banks with 1.046 and finally domestic 
banks with 1.043. Thus, IBS had superior productivity growth (especially FIBS) 
to those of conventional banks and pure IB.  
 
Finally, in Figure 6.5, the 1999-2000 period saw the largest TFP growth 
although the largest single increase occurred within the 2000-2001 period. The 
earliest study period (1998-1999) and the final study period (2001-2002) had 
the most dismal performance with most banking groups experiencing TFP 
regress.  
 
6.3.6: Technical Efficiency (TE) Change 
In terms of technical change or x-efficiency change, both Table 6.10 and Figure 
6.6 suggest that collectively, all banks registered sustained TE regress from 
1998 up until 2001 (with the lowest index regress score of 0.807) rebounding 
strongly between 2001 and 2002 to even surpass the performance of 1998-
1999 with a TE progress of 1.188. Thus, banks had only improved their x-
efficiency management in a much more accelerated manner more recently after 
a period following 1998 where the pace had been slower. With the inconsistent 
standard deviations and CVs, there is little evidence to show whether banks’ 
performance was converging or diverging in terms of improvement in x-
efficiency although differences had generally narrowed over the years. The 
most volatile period was between 1998-1999 (0.472) while the period between 
1999-2000 was the least volatile (0.194). 
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Table 6.10 again suggests that FIBS had the strongest TE growth (index of 
1.320). Consistent with the findings in TFP change, DIBS again comes in 
second with a commendable progress of 1.182. Both DCB and FCB were close 
with foreign banks slightly better than domestic banks (with 1.069 over 1.028). 
Nevertheless, the performance gap in TE change is more pronounced than the 
gap in TFP change. Finally, although IB registered the lowest mean TE score of 
1.027 (very close to that of DCB), the banks were at least  progressing. DCB 
had also been most consistent with the lowest CV score of 18.5% while IB had 
the highest score of 49.7% which is considerably much higher than any other 
banking groups. 
 
Figure 6.6 provides some new insights. Almost all banking groups were 
regressing or showing decreasing TE progress over the 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 
2000-2001 periods, TE change rebounded strongly between 2001 and 2002. 
The progress “recovery” was the strongest for IB. On the other hand, DIBS only 
managed a slight TFP progress increase from a TE regress between 2000-
2001. FIBS were the exception. After having regressed from 1998 to 1999, 
FIBS recorded the only sustained TE progress over the remaining study 
periods. It is also apparent that IB had the most volatile performance. Overall, 
Islamic banking seemed to have outperformed conventional banking with an 
early contribution from DIBS and a later contribution from both FIBS and IB. 
 
Meanwhile Figure 6.7 charts a rough U shaped trend from 1998 to 1999 with a 
TE performance trough during the 2000-2001 period despite the performance of 
FIBS that seemed to have defied the prevailing trend. In all, the final period of 
2002-2002 saw the largest TE increase in terms of number and magnitude for 
all banks. Thus by the end of 2002, most banking groups experienced higher x-
efficiency growth than in the earlier periods. In the early period of 1998-1999, all 
banks progressed except for FIBS. Thereafter FIBS dominated the rest. Only IB 
rose during the final period of 2001-2002 to match that of FIBS.  
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6.3.7: Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) Change 
Table 6.11 and Figure 6.8 show that throughout the study period, Malaysian 
and Singaporean banks experienced unchanged PTE between 1998-1999 but 
progressed in 1999-2000. This was followed by a regress during 2000-2001 
only to progress again between 2001-2002. Thus, PTE changes were  
inconsistent throughout with rising and falling rates from period to the next. 
Nevertheless, the range had dropped considerably from a wide gap of 2.982 
recorded during the early period of 1998-1999. Both the range and the CV 
trended in a U shape over the study period with both troughs in 2000-2001 
period. Hence, banks’ managerial competence to minimize costs and maximize 
revenues appeared to be converging prior to 2000-2001 but diverging beyond 
this time period. 
 
Table 6.11 illustrates that once more FIBS and DIBS outperformed other 
banking groups. However, although DIBS had the highest growth of 1.112, FIBS 
were very close behind with a mean index 1.111. Thus, both FIBS and DIBS 
were almost similar in their bank management competence or PTE progress. 
FIBS however, had a much higher variation as conveyed by the CV of 31.5% 
compared to a more stable 17.8% recorded by  domestic IBS. The difference in 
PTE change was more marked between DCB and FCB with FCB dominating 
(mean index of 0.987) over DCB (mean index of 0.972). In other words, FCB 
continued to outperform DCB although both banking groups suffered PTE 
regress on average. IB fared poorly with an overall PTE regress of 0.927. 
Therefore, Table 6.11 concludes that only DIBS and FIBS consistently improved 
their managerial competence. All other banks, except for SCB with a score that 
remained unchanged, experienced overall managerial deterioration. 
 
Figure 6.8 shows a more complete picture. Both DIBS and FIBS had high levels 
of PTE progress but these occurred in different time periods. DIBS recorded 
their highest PTE growth between 1998-1999 before registering slight progress 
and regress thereafter while FIBS experienced that later during 1999-2000 and 
2000-2001. Another markedly visible feature is that while IB regressed on a 
continuous basis from 1998 to 2001 and had the lowest mean PTE index score, 
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they made a huge progress jump between 2001-2002. Note also that FCB 
followed the same trend although the final progress was less spectacular. DCB 
on the other hand, had been mostly regressing although they experienced a 
marked PTE progress between 1999-2000. 
 
In terms of Figure 6.9, there had been marked PTE change progress in each 
period but this was dominated by different banking groups. Between 1998-1999, 
DIBS led the way while FIBS was experiencing the worse PTE regress. 
Fortunes changed however during 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 when FIBS 
dominated with a large lead. By the 2001-2002 period however, both DIBS and 
FIBS progress were negligible. On the other hand, IB dominated along with a 
lower but nevertheless considerable PTE progress of FCB. 
 
 
6.3.8: Scale Efficiency (SE) Change  
Table 6.12 and Figure 6.10 show that on average, the industry followed a U-
shaped trend throughout the study periods. The industry experienced the worst 
SE change (a SE regress of 0.912) during 2000-2001 from the highest SE 
progress of 1.177 between 1998-1999. It is also worth noting that the SE 
progress made during the final period of 2001-2002 was somewhat slower than 
the pace attained by banks during the first period of 1998-1999.  
 
The general trend however indicated a slowing SE growth since 1998 for most 
banks except for DIBS. Both the range and the CV also followed a U-shaped 
course, indicating that banks were converging in terms of SE change before 
2000-2001 and diverging thereafter. 
 
In Table 6.10, on average, all banks registered SE progress. FIBS scored the 
highest SE progress of 1.120. They were trailed by IB with index value of 1.103. 
FCB (1.087) also outperformed DCB (1.062). DIBS meanwhile experienced the 
smallest SE progress of all with a mean index of 1.019. Thus, between Islamic 
banking operations and conventional banking, the results for SE change are 
mixed. In terms of performance consistency, FIBS (the best overall performers) 
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had the most volatile SE changes (25.4%) followed by IB (33.9%). On the other 
hand, DCB experienced the least volatility (with 16.3%) compared to FCB 
(17.7%). 
 
Figure 6.10 provides additional insights. Notable trends are (1) both DCB and 
FCB  shared the same SE change patterns although DCB had a higher SE 
change index in 2001-2002 while FCB dominated during 1998-1999 and (2) 
both for FIBS and IB meanwhile also exhibited the same trend. FIBS however 
peaked between 2001-2002 while IB peaked in 1998-1999. In both time 
periods, DIBS and IB progressed. The most marked progress was made by 
FIBS between 2001-2002. DIBS on the other hand only made significant 
progress in 1999-2000 whilst they regressed in all other time periods. 
 
In Figure 6.11, it is evident that the 2000-2001 period saw all banks experience 
a SE regress. However another less visible feature was that the SE trends 
roughly followed a U-shaped development path with most banks having SE 
regress during the 2000-2001 period. IB dominated in 1998-1999 (although all 
banks except for DIBS recorded commendable SE progress), domestic IBS in 
1999-2000 and foreign IBS in 2001-2002. Both the 1999-2000 and 2001-2002 
time periods also saw significant progress in other banks. From 1998 to 2001, 
FCB dominated DCB but DCB outperformed FCB during the last period of 
2001-2002. 
 
6.3.9: Technical Change   
Technical change tracks the changes of TFP resulting from shifts of the efficient 
frontiers. Table 6.13 and Figure 6.12 summarize that between 1998 and 2002, 
all banks experienced technical regress from 1998 to 1999 but progressed 
between 1999 to 2001, except for the DIBS and FIBS. Both regressed between 
1999-2000. By 2001-2002, however, all banks experienced technical 
regression. Technical progress peaked during the 2000-2001 period with an 
index of 1.292 only to plunge into the deepest regression from 2001 to 2002 
with an index value of only 0.826. Both the range and CV were rising throughout 
the study periods signaling that the banks began to push the frontier at different 
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paces whilst some were left behind. Although the range was the widest during 
2000-2001, technical change was most volatile (21.1%) during the final period 
of 2001-2002. 
 
From Table 6.13, it can be seen that most banks had technical regress on 
average except for DCB and SCB. SCB experienced the strongest technical 
progress (1.032) with DCB in second with an index value of 1.018. FCB 
regressed on average (0.980). Thus between 1998-2002, only DCB within the 
Malaysian dual banking system managed to display technical change 
progression on average. DIBS, FIBS and IB on the other hand regressed with 
mean index values of 0.984, 0.953 and 0.922 respectively. Hence, of all Islamic 
banking operations, FIBS still fared better than both DIBS and IB. The best 
banks- SCB- also had the lowest variation in their performance. Displaying a 
contrary trend, IB had the most volatile technical change performance. 
Figure 6.10 shows all banks, with the exception of DIBS, followed the same 
pattern of technical change with technical change peaking during the 2000-2001 
period. Figure 6.13 meanwhile traces a discernable up and down trend (akin to 
an inverted U shape). Generally, technical change progressed the most during 
the 2000-2001 period only to fall to lower levels between 2001 and 2002. Also 
note that almost all banks had made technical progress in 2001-2002 while all 
banks regressed in 2001-2002. The highest technical progress was made within 
the 2000-2001 period by the DCB and FCB and IB. The FCB performed better 
than the DCB during 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 and vice versa in 1998-1999 
and 2001-2002. The DIBS meanwhile dominated Islamic banking operations in 
1998-1999 and 2001-2002 while IB were superior in 1999-2000 and 2000-2001.  
 
6.4: Comparative Efficiency and Productivity Performance between CBS 
and IBO: Comparing All Banking Groups 
 
The empirical findings in relation to the separate different banking groups under 
CBS and IBO are outlined. It should be noted that CBS comprise of DCB and 
FCB while IBO are made up of DIBS, FIBS and IB. What follows are 
summarized excerpts derived from Section R1.  
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 6.4.1: Summary of DEA Efficiency Performance 
Within the Malaysian dual banking system, DIBS on average outperformed all 
other banks from 1996 to 2002, followed by FCB, FIBS, DCB and finally IB. 
Thus, a simple generalization of comparative efficiency performance between 
components of CBS and IBO cannot be reached. In terms of performance 
consistency across the years, DCB had the most consistent TE performance 
between 1996 and 2002 while FIBS had the least. Table 6.4 shows that there is 
actually more efficiency variation among IBO. This indicates that Islamic 
banking units were quite heterogeneous among one another. There was higher 
variation among DIBS than other IBO units in 1996 but the trend has been 
declining. Variation among FIBS on the other hand dominated from 1999-2001. 
IB meanwhile were the most heterogeneous group in 2002.  
 
All conventional banks (DCB, FCB and SCB) tended to follow a common TE 
trend: decreasing in 1997-1998, recovering in 1999 and 2000, declining once 
more in 2001 before rising yet again in 2002. IBS operations (DIBS and FIBS) 
meanwhile experienced TE decline in 1997 but made a sustained increase after 
1999 to dominate other banking groups by 2002. Throughout the study period, 
IB were the least efficient banks. Another notable feature is that IB were inclined 
to follow the trends of CBS.  
 
Both DIBS and FIBS became more efficient than DCB and FCB beyond year 
2000 with FIBS showing eventual dominance. In fact towards the end of the 7-
year study period, FIBS were more efficient than any other banking groups. 
Figure 6.1 however also testifies to the efficiency volatility inherent in FIBS prior 
to 2000, where FIBS banks plunged from being fully efficient in 1996 to hit a 
bottom in 1997 before efficiencies began to make sustained strong recovery 
thereafter. DIBS on the other hand had more stable efficiency scores with only a 
shallow trough in 1998.  
 
Tables 6.2 and Table 6.3 show that on average, SE was dominant in DIBS and 
FIBS while PTE was more dominant in IB. Against all Islamic banking groups, 
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FIBS were more scale efficient in 1996 and from 1999-2001 and more PTE 
efficient in 2002, DIBS were more scale efficient in 1998 and more PTE efficient 
in between 2000 and 2001 while IB dominated SE in 1997 and PTE in 1996-
1997 and 1999.  
 
Trends with the IB were however more or less congruent (rising and falling at 
almost the same time) as those of DCB and FCB. Nevertheless, it is interesting 
to note that while banks in general were becoming less efficient in the years 
leading to 1998 IB emerged to become the most efficient banks in that year. 
Efficiency for IB however deteriorated after 1999 even as other banks were 
becoming more efficient during 1999 but somehow IB managed to recover in 
2002 to match DCBs’ efficiency levels. On the whole, DCB, FCB and IB tended 
to exhibit the same trends although the timing and magnitude differed but only 
slightly. The highest correlation was perhaps seen in 1998 during the financial 
crisis when all three banks experienced a sharp rise in inefficiency. These 
banks made strong recovery in 2000. On the other hand, FIBS and DIBS 
followed yet another set of common trends although a close fit was difficult to 
identify due to the greater volatility of FIBS efficiency levels.  
 
In terms of PTE, Table 6.2 highlights that conventional banking had better 
managerial competence compared to Islamic banking. Table 6.5 shows that 
IBO had more variation in PTE performance on both their 1996-2002 average 
and their annual averages compared to CBS banks. FIBS appeared to be the 
most heterogeneous, followed by the DIBS, and IB. This finding thus points out 
that not only do IBO banks show less consistency in their performance between 
1996 and 2002 but also that the FIBS and DCB were more heterogeneous than 
CBS and IB throughout the study period. In fact, the FIBS and IB also exhibited 
less stable PTE variation measures.   
 
Within the Malaysian dual banking system, commercial banks on average had 
better managerial efficiency but Islamic banking (except for IB) had better scale 
efficiency. Nevertheless by 2002, both DIBS and FIBS had higher PTE and SE 
performance than any other banks in Malaysia. In Islamic banking, FIBS 
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dominated DIBS and IB in SE but DIBS had higher PTE results than the DIBS 
and IB on average. 
 
For the FIBS, efficiency was equally influenced by both PTE and SE. PTE 
however dominated in 1996-1999 and from 2001 to 2002 while SE was more 
influential between 1999 and 2000. Similarly, declining PTE dominated DIBS 
performance between 1998-1999 although SE was rising. Improving SE 
however managed to offset declining PTE from 2001 to 2002. Throughout the 
study period, both IBS operations were more scale efficient as opposed to  PTE 
efficient. In contrast  to IBS, Islamic banks had higher PTE rather than being 
more scale efficient. This made Islamic banks more similar  to commercial 
banks than IBS operations. 
 
Overall, SCB dominated PTE. However, towards the end of the study period, 
FIBS recorded superior PTE performance to match that of SCB  in 2002. Both  
DIBS and FIBS also shared the best SE scores in 2002. IB remained the least 
efficient banks on both PTE and SE accounts 
 
6.4.2:  Summary of MPI Productivity Performance 
In Table 6.9, the results show the banking industry only had a brief period of 
TFP growth from 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. During this time, almost all 
banking groups enjoyed TFP progress Only IB experienced TFP regress with a 
mean regress of 0.921. Except for DCB, FIBS and DIBS outperformed all other 
conventional banks as well as full-fledged Islamic banks. Towards the end of 
the study periods however, only FIBS managed to maintain TFP growth but at 
decreasing rates while DIBS began to show a tendency to regress. All other 
banks had TFP regress by 2002. Thus,  IBS operations had superior 
productivity growth (especially FIBS) to those of conventional banks and pure 
IB. Nevertheless, FIBS was progressing at decreasing rates towards the latter 
periods while DIBS were fast slipping into TFP regress. 
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Between conventional banking and Islamic banking, FIBS and DIBS 
consistently outperformed other banking groups in TFP change, TE change and 
PTE change measures. FIBS also dominated SE change. Both DCB and FCB 
however outperformed Islamic banking operations in SE change (except for 
FIBS) and technical change. Overall, FIBS had the strongest performance 
followed by DIBS, SCB, DCB and FCB. IB meanwhile became the worst 
performers in terms of relative and almost all productivity measures except for 
SE change.  
 
FIBS were more or less equally influenced by both PTE and SE change, DIBS 
by PTE and IB by SE. Thus, technical change did not make significant 
contributions to IBO TFP change. In fact, all IBO experienced technical regress 
on average between 1998 and 2002 although all IBO banking groups had 
technical progress between 2000-2001. Among IBO groups, DIBS had the least 
technical regress followed by FIBS and finally IB.  
 
In general, all banks experienced TFP progress throughout the study period 
except for IB that experienced TFP regress in all but one of the study periods 
and thus, had the least desirable TFP change results. 
 
 
6.5: Comparative Efficiency and Productivity Performance between DCB 
and FCB  
 
This section looks into the comparative efficiency and productivity performance 
between the DCB and FCB. The section is begun by analyzing the trends for 
DEA relative efficiency in terms of TE, PTE and SE. It should be noted that in 
this section, summarized empirical findings are explained in length in Section 
R1 which relate to the second research question. This is because unlike Section 
R2 in which banks were aggregated into CBS and IBO,  here it is only 
necessary to examine the trends between DCB and FCB. 
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6.5.1: Summary of DEA Efficiency Performance  
With reference to Table 6.2, it is apparent that FCB (0.698) were more efficient 
than DCB (0.632) in terms of TE throughout 1996 to 2002. In addition, FCB also 
had more consistent TE performance on average with a lower CV (0.272) than 
DCB (0.341). Nevertheless, Table R7 illustrates that FCB were more 
heterogeneous among one another relative to DCB. Hence FCB had higher 
annual CV among individual foreign banks’ TE scores for all years. Variation 
among FCB peaked in 1998 and 2001. In comparison, variation among DCB 
peaked in 2001 but with a much CV measure of 0.144.  
 
Table 6.2 and Table 6.4 meanwhile show that FCB dominated DCB in terms of 
both PTE and SE. Nevertheless, FCB had comparatively higher mean PTE 
scores. Thus, FCB had better managerial efficiency and were operating on a 
more productive scale size than DCB. DRS scale size dominated commercial 
banks most notably in DCB where DRS were was most prevalent. Some FCB 
managed to achieved MPSS towards the end of the study period. IRS was 
reported in both 1996 and 2000 but foreign banks seemed to have exhausted 
these to the optimum level. 
 
SE effects dominated TE performance for both DCB and FCB as SE scores 
exhibited more volatile performance across time. On average however, both 
DCB and FCB had higher PTE than SE scores although PTE for both banking 
groups were trending downwards. Nevertheless by 2002, DCB were at least as 
efficient as FCB in PTE. SE trends however saw deep troughs in 1998 due to 
the fallout of the 1997-1998 financial crisis and 2001 following the full 
completion of the coordinated domestic bank merger exercise. By 2002 
however, the SE for DCB and FCB were similar.  
 
Figures 6.1 to Figure 6.3 depict the trends for TE, PTE and SE for both DCB 
and FCB. In terms of TE, there was a deep TE contraction in 1998 followed by a 
recovery between 1999 and 2000. In 2001, there was “less severe” efficiency 
deterioration. Finally in 2002, TE for FCB largely improved as opposed to a 
negligible improvement for DCB. There was indeed high correlation between 
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the trends for both DCB and FCB. Nevertheless, FCB had been consistently 
more efficient than DCB. 
 
Efficiency levels however appeared to be diverging from 2001 onwards as 
foreign banks improved while domestic banks stagnated. Figure 6.10 illustrates 
that the difference in efficiency performance between DCB and FCB peaked in 
1998 and 2002 and that the gap had increased since 2000. The performance 
difference in 1998 was dominated by SE difference. Figure 6.10 also shows that 
there was a peak in PTE differential in 1999 and a combination of PTE-SE 
differential in 2001. The efficiency differentials in 1998 and 1999 were in favor of 
FCB. As for the PTE-SE difference in 2001, DCB dominated PTE while FCB 
dominated SE. 
 
In all saw a combination of a PTE-SE peak. Table 6.8 shows that DCB only 
managed to outperform FCB in terms of TE in 1997, PTE in 1997 and 2000-
2001 and SE in 1999.  
 
 
6.5.2: Summary of MPI Productivity Performance 
Within conventional banking, FCB on average outperformed DCB with a higher 
TFP change index. Specifically, FCB dominated DCB in TE change, PTE 
change and SE change measures but vice versa when technical change 
measure is considered. On average, Table 6.10 shows that FCB (1.069) had 
higher TE change relative to DCB (1.028). FCB also had greater TE change 
variability (CV of 0.268). In terms of trends, FCB experienced higher TE 
progress in the earliest studied 1998-1999 period and the most recent 2001-
2002 period. DCB meanwhile had better performance in 1999-2000 and 2000-
2001. Both DCB and FCB however regressed from 2000 to 2001.  
 
In Table 6.11, FCB outperformed DCB although both banking groups suffered 
PTE regress on average. Figure 6.3 shows that FCB regressed from 1998 to 
2001 but made a huge PTE progress between 2001-2002. DCB on the other 
hand, had been mostly regressing throughout the study periods of 1998-1999, 
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2000-2001 and 2001-2002 although they experienced a marked PTE progress 
between 1999-2000. In terms of performance consistency, FCB exhibited higher 
PTE change variability (0.172) relative to DCB (0.115). 
 
Figure 6.10 highlights that both DCB and FCB shared the same SE change 
patterns although in general, FCB dominated DCB in SE change from 1998 to 
2001 while DCB managed to catch up with FCB and outperformed FCB during 
the last study period of 2001-2002. Furthermore, DCB experienced the less 
volatility (with 16.3%) compared to FCB (17.7%). 
 
Table 6.11 shows that from 1998 to 2002, only DCB managed to experience 
technical progress on average (1.018) within the Malaysian banking industry. 
FCB on the other hand regressed with a technical change index of 0.980. FCB 
nevertheless performed better than DCB during 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 and 
vice versa in 1998-1999 and 2001-2002. 
 
6.6: Examining Pre- and Post-Merger Efficiency Levels and Gains 
 
The empirical findings obtained from the DEA TE results are presented here to 
probe whether there is evidence to suggest that (1) acquiring banks were more 
efficient than target banks prior to bank mergers (2) that bank mergers initiated 
by BNM in 2001 led to enhanced efficiency to the merged banking entities 
during the post-merger period and (3) that acquiring banks maintained their pre-
merger efficiency levels during the post-merger period. Table 6.14 to Table 6.16 
summarize the DEA TE, PTE and SE scores for participating DCB banks 
involving 9 merger cases. It should be noted that there are 10 anchor DCB 
banking groups in Malaysia. One banking group, namely Ambank Bhd, has 
been excluded because the group had been internally transformed through the 
study period without merging with other banking institutions.  
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6.6.1: Examining Efficiency Levels of Acquiring and Target Banks 
In analyzing the efficiency scores within the “pre-merger year” column, it is 
apparent that in 8 out of 9 the cases in Table 6.14, the acquiring bank were 
more efficient in terms of TE than the target banks one year prior to their 
respective mergers. Furthermore Table 6.15 shows that in all 9 cases, the 
acquiring banks had higher PTE levels than the target banks during the pre-
merger period. However results from Table 6.16 show that only 2 of the 9 cases 
where the acquiring banks had higher SE than the target banks. In all the 
remaining 7 cases, the acquiring banks had lower SE scores than the target 
banks. Thus, in the case of the Malaysian banking consolidation, it has been 
established that the acquiring banks were more efficient than the target banks in 
terms of TE and PTE. However, it appears that in the majority of the cases, the 
acquiring banks had lower SE than the target banks. 
 
6.6.2: Examining Post-Merger Efficiency Levels- TE 
Meanwhile according to Table 6.14, in 9 out of 10 cases, bank mergers led to 
an increase of TE during the merger year but subsequently fell during the first 
post-merger period. The only exception is Case 4 where TE fell during and after 
the merger. In Case 1, 3, 7 and 9, TE eventually improved during the second 
post-merger year. In Cases 2, 5 and 6, TE continued to deteriorate. In Case 6, 
TE subsequently improved marginally. Thus, for a majority of DCB, bank 
mergers initially boosted TE during the merger year but subsequently led to 
growing inefficiency in the first year after the merger. However, DCB were more 
or less equally split as to the time taken by the merged entities to fully integrate 
their operations among themselves to become more efficient. 4 cases saw TE 
improvement beginning the second post-merger year while 3 cases show TE 
deterioration in the second year. In one exceptional case where there was the 
opportunity to observe the bank’s performance beyond 2 post-merger years, it 
was found that TE improved in the first year, deteriorated in the second year 
and improved once more in the third year.  
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6.6.3: Examining Post-Merger Efficiency Levels- PTE and SE 
With reference to Table 6.15, it was found that for 8 out of 9 cases, PTE 
improved during the merger year, but declined during the first post-merger year, 
only to increase again in the second post-merger year. The exceptional case is 
Case 5 where multiple mergers at different time frames led to an apparent 
decrease in TE during the merger year but improved beginning in the first post-
merger year and eventually became fully efficient during the first, second and 
the third post-merger year. In terms of SE, Table 6.16 shows that in all cases 
SE rose during the merger year. Nevertheless in Cases 1, 3, 5 and 7, SE 
subsequently worsened during the first-post merger year but improved in the 
second year. For Cases 2 and 9, SE declined during the first and second post-
merger years. For Case 4, SE worsened in the first post-merger year. There 
was however some delay due to the usual initial fall in efficiency and 
subsequent SE improvement due to the presence of multiple bank mergers that 
seem to have confounded the efficiency results. 
 
6.7: Examining Transmissions of Post-Merger Efficiency Gains to the 
Public 
 
Finally, this section probes the existence of transmission of efficiency gains to 
the public. Table 6.17 details that in 9 out of the 10 DCB cases, changes in 
market share of deposits rose during the first post-merger year. At the same 
time however, only 2 cases reported increase in TE for 2 DCB while the 
remaining 8 cases reported TE declines. However only Case 2 sees a positive 
correlation between increase in both market share of deposits and TE. During 
the second post-merger year however, 3 cases (Case 3, 5 and 7) reported such 
a relationship. As for the third post-merger year, Case 2 and 3 reported declines 
in both market share of deposits and TE. Thus, as to the question of whether 
post-merger efficiency gains are passed on to the public, our empirical findings 
permit  no conclusive inference.  
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6.8 Summary  
 
In summary this chapter reveals the results of the study; covering the general 
trends in relative efficiency and productivity performance of all banks in the 
sample and also provides an  interpretation of results of the three research 
questions.   The results on various components of Total Factor Productivity, 
Technical Efficiency, Scale Efficiency, Pure Technical efficiency and Technical 
Changes are stated and displayed in tables and figures.   The related 
discussions are pursued in detail in the next chapter.  
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Figure 6.1: All Banks Technical Efficiency 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: All Banks Pure Technical Efficiency 
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Figure 6.3: All Banks Scale Efficiency 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Annual Total Factor Productivity Change (by bank type) 
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Figure 6.5: Annual Total Factor Productivity Change (by period) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Annual Technical Change (by bank type) 
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Figure 6.7: Annual Technical Change (by period) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Annual Pure Technical Efficiency hange (by bank type) 
 
 
 
 215
  
 
 
Figure 6.9: Annual Pure Technical Efficiency Change (by period) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Annual Technical Change (by bank type) 
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Figure 6.11: Annual Technical Change (by period) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Comparative Pure Technical Performance between Coomercial Bank 
and Islamic Banking Operations 
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Figure 6.13: Nature of Scale Returns (Singaporean Banks) 
 
Figure 6.14: Nature of Scale Returns (Foreign Islamic Banking Services) 
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Figure 6.15: Nature of Scale Returns (Domestic Islamic Banking Services) 
 
Figure 6.16: Nature of Scale Returns (Islamic Banking Services) 
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* mean values across years are geometrical means 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of Annual DEA Technical Efficiency Means (All Banks) 
BANKS   1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 MEAN* SD CV 
Domestic 
Commercial Banks 0.849 0.817 0.335 0.675 0.891 0.535 0.536 0.632 0.215 0.341
Foreign 
Commercial Banks 0.889 0.814 0.424 0.741 0.909 0.583 0.67 0.698 0.19 0.272
Singaporean 
Commercial Banks   0.855 0.463 0.886 0.824 0.673 0.807 0.734 0.175 0.239
Domestic 
IBS   0.759 0.606 0.567 0.753 0.773 0.727 0.773 0.704 0.088 0.125
Foreign 
IBS   1 0.311 0.553 0.692 0.695 0.778 0.936 0.669 0.23 0.343
Domestic Islamic 
Banks 0.569 0.79 0.639 0.753 0.612 0.346 0.538 0.589 0.158 0.268
ALL 
BANKS                       
  MAX 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.663     
  MIN 0.137 0.077 0.188 0.194 0.239 0.27 0.391 0.719     
  RANGE 0.863 0.923 0.812 0.806 0.761 0.73 0.609 0.751     
  MEAN 0.847 0.749 0.467 0.734 0.829 0.615 0.682 0.708     
  SD 0.174 0.229 0.22 0.194 0.198 0.213 0.187 0.709     
  CV 0.205 0.306 0.471 0.264 0.239 0.346 0.274 0.607     
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Table 6.2: Summary of Annual DEA PTE Means (All Banks) 
BANKS   1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 MEAN* SD CV 
Domestic 
Commercial 
Banks 0.936 0.925 0.871 0.823 0.931 0.808 0.77 0.864 0.057 0.066
Foreign 
Commercial 
Banks 0.941 0.905 0.9 0.913 0.926 0.709 0.814 0.869 0.086 0.099
Singaporean 
Commercial 
Banks   0.993 1 0.988 0.949 0.949 1 0.98 0.025 0.025
Domestic IBS 0.881 0.824 0.694 0.799 0.884 0.873 0.84 0.825 0.073 0.089
Foreign 
IBS   1 0.453 0.71 0.737 0.7 0.787 1 0.748 0.176 0.235
Domestic Islamic 
Banks 1 0.849 0.657 0.829 0.735 0.481 0.659 0.727 0.167 0.23 
ALL BANKS                     
  MAX 1 1 1 1 1 1 1       
  MIN 0.578 0.257 0.196 0.21 0.427 0.36 0.522       
  RANGE 0.422 0.743 0.804 0.79 0.573 0.64 0.478       
  MEAN 0.935 0.874 0.838 0.851 0.889 0.787 0.829 0.856 0.047 0.055
  SD 0.101 0.187 0.203 0.181 0.155 0.195 0.145       
  CV 0.108 0.214 0.242 0.213 0.174 0.248 0.175       
 
Table 6.3: Summary of Annual DEA Scale Efficiency Means 
BANKS   1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 MEAN* SD CV 
Domestic 
Commercial Banks 0.908 0.884 0.389 0.824 0.956 0.665 0.697 0.733 0.196 0.267
Foreign 
Commercial Banks 0.948 0.903 0.47 0.813 0.983 0.82 0.822 0.804 0.169 0.211
Singaporean 
Commercial Banks   0.861 0.463 0.894 0.871 0.707 0.807 0.749 0.163 0.218
Domestic 
IBS   0.797 0.73 0.906 0.934 0.86 0.817 0.928 0.85 0.076 0.089
Foreign 
IBS   1 0.701 0.722 0.935 0.99 0.976 0.936 0.886 0.127 0.144
Domestic Islamic 
Banks 0.569 0.916 0.711 0.887 0.844 0.72 0.806 0.77 0.121 0.157
ALL 
BANKS                       
  MAX 1 1 1 1 1 1 1       
  MIN 0.237 0.077 0.301 0.582 0.354 0.546 0.549       
  RANGE 0.763 0.923 0.699 0.418 0.646 0.454 0.451       
  MEAN 0.898 0.85 0.572 0.862 0.928 0.777 0.818 0.807 0.118 0.146
  SD 0.161 0.161 0.235 0.114 0.143 0.146 0.141       
  CV 0.179 0.189 0.411 0.132 0.154 0.188 0.172       
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Table 6.4: Measures of TE variation (Coefficient of Variation) 
BANKS   1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 MEAN*
Domestic 
Commercial 
Banks 0.061 0.045 0.103 0.091 0.089 0.144 0.127 0.088 
Foreign 
Commercial 
Banks 0.107 0.113 0.364 0.229 0.128 0.296 0.218 0.188 
Singaporean 
Commercial 
Banks - 0.036 0.335 0.181 0.1 0.141 0.216 0.137 
Domestic 
IBS   0.55 0.839 0.68 0.313 0.412 0.305 0.331 0.456 
Foreign 
IBS   - 0.216 0.703 0.629 0.422 0.494 0.118 0.365 
Domestic Islamic 
Banks - 0.376 0.801 0.447 0.053 0.098 0.386 0.254 
 
 
Table 6.5: Measure of PTE Variation (Coefficient of Variation) 
BANKS   1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 MEAN*
Domestic 
Commercial 
Banks 0.057 0.044 0.081 0.11 0.063 0.147 0.125 0.082 
Foreign 
Commercial 
Banks 0.104 0.113 0.139 0.132 0.134 0.216 0.126 0.134 
Singaporean 
Commercial 
Banks - 0.013 0 0.02 0.094 0.092 0 0 
Domestic 
IBS   0.231 0.376 0.478 0.269 0.219 0.24 0.229 0.28 
Foreign 
IBS   - 0.33 0.355 0.619 0.411 0.47 0 0.437 
Domestic Islamic 
Banks - 0.253 0.369 0.293 0.136 0.009 0.293 0.146 
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Table 6.6: Measures of PTE Variation (Coefficient of Variation) 
BANKS   1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 MEAN*
Domestic 
Commercial Banks 0.042 0.026 0.156 0.061 0.043 0.109 0.092 0.064 
Foreign 
Commercial Banks 0.08 0.072 0.298 0.184 0.014 0.141 0.14 0.098 
Singaporean 
Commercial Banks - 0.026 0.335 0.164 0.089 0.057 0.216 0.108 
Domestic 
IBS   0.469 0.459 0.127 0.1 0.304 0.233 0.167 0.228 
Foreign 
IBS   - 0.118 0.34 0.064 0.015 0.042 0.118 0.076 
Domestic Islamic 
Banks - 0.13 0.576 0.166 0.189 0.109 0.1 0.172 
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Table 6.7: Nature of Scale Returns 
FIRM BANK 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1 AFFIN drs drs drs drs drs drs drs 
2 ALLIANCE  drs drs drs drs mpss drs drs 
3 AMBANK drs drs drs drs drs drs drs 
4 BCB drs drs drs drs drs drs drs 
5 EONBANK drs drs drs drs irs drs drs 
6 
HONG 
LEONG drs drs drs drs drs drs drs 
7 MAYBANK drs drs drs drs drs drs drs 
8 PUBLIC drs drs drs drs drs drs drs 
9 RHB drs drs drs drs drs drs drs 
10 SOUTHERN drs drs drs drs drs drs drs 
11 ABN AMRO irs drs drs drs mpss drs drs 
12 BANGKOK B - drs drs drs irs drs drs 
13 BOAMERICA - drs drs - - drs mpss 
14 BOCHINA - - - - irs drs drs 
15 BTOKYO drs drs drs drs drs - - 
16 CITIBANK drs drs drs drs mpss drs drs 
17 
DUETSCHE 
B drs drs drs - - - - 
18 HSBC drs drs drs drs drs drs drs 
19 OCBC drs drs drs drs drs drs drs 
20 
STD 
CHARTERED drs drs drs drs drs mpss drs 
21 
NOVA 
SCOTIA drs drs drs drs - drs drs 
22 JPMORGAN mpss mpss drs mpss - drs mpss 
23 UOB mpss drs drs drs drs drs drs 
24 DBS (S) - drs drs drs drs drs mpss 
25 OCBC (S) - drs drs mpss drs drs drs 
26 UOB (S) - drs drs drs drs drs drs 
27 AFFIN (IB) - mpss drs mpss mpss mpss - 
28 
ALLIANCE 
(IB) - - - - irs irs irs 
29 AMBANK (IB) - - irs - drs drs drs 
30 
EONBANK 
(IB) - drs drs irs mpss drs drs 
31 
HONG 
LEONG (IB) - irs - irs mpss irs mpss 
32 
MAYBANK 
(IB) mpss mpss drs mpss mpss drs mpss 
33 PUBLIC (IB) mpss mpss mpss mpss drs mpss mpss 
34 RHB (IB) drs drs drs drs drs drs drs 
35 
SOUTHERN 
(IB) irs irs drs irs mpss mpss drs 
36 
CITIBANK 
(IB) mpss - mpss mpss - - - 
37 HSBC (IB) - - mpss - mpss mpss mpss 
38 OCBC (IB) - irs drs drs irs mpss mpss 
39 
STD 
CHARTERED 
(IB) - irs drs irs irs irs irs 
40 BIMB drs drs drs drs drs drs drs 
41 BMMB - mpss mpss drs drs drs drs 
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Table 6.8: Difference in Annual Means DEA Efficiency Scores (between DCB and 
FCB) 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
TE 0.040 0.003 0.088 0.066 0.019 0.050 0.135
PTE 0.005 0.021 0.029 0.091 0.005 0.099 0.044
SE 0.040 0.019 0.081 0.011 0.027 0.154 0.124
 
* Numbers in italics denotes efficiency differences in favour of DCB 
 
 
Table 6.9: Summary of Annual TFP Means 
BANKS   
1998-
1999 
1999-
2000 
2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 MEAN SD CV 
Domestic 
Commercial Banks 1.004 1.218 0.995 0.971 1.043 0.115 0.11 
Foreign 
Commercial Banks 1.005 1.128 1.116 0.948 1.046 0.087 0.083
Singaporean 
Commercial Banks 1.175 0.91 1.046 1.217 1.08 0.139 0.128
Domestic 
IBS   1.273 1.249 1.056 1.036 1.148 0.125 0.109
Foreign 
IBS   0.758 1.353 1.764 1.141 1.199 0.42 0.35 
Domestic Islamic 
Banks 0.957 0.778 0.987 0.978 0.921 0.099 0.107
ALL 
BANKS                 
  MAX 3.612 2.821 2.801 1.565       
  MIN 0.341 0.587 0.606 0.374       
  RANGE 3.271 2.234 2.195 1.191       
  MEAN 0.976 1.098 1.042 0.981       
  SD 0.529 0.411 0.405 0.238       
  CV 0.542 0.375 0.389 0.242       
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Table 6.10: Summary of TE Change Annual Means (All Banks) 
 
BANKS   
1998-
1999 
1999-
2000 
2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 MEAN SD CV 
Domestic 
Commercial Banks 1.178 1.102 0.761 1.132 1.028 0.191 0.185
Foreign 
Commercial Banks 1.377 0.997 0.744 1.279 1.069 0.286 0.268
Singaporean 
Commercial Banks 1.196 0.859 0.923 1.267 1.047 0.2 0.191
Domestic 
IBS   1.53 1.341 0.923 1.032 1.182 0.279 0.236
Foreign 
IBS   0.898 1.354 1.46 1.708 1.32 0.339 0.257
Domestic Islamic 
Banks 1.416 0.716 0.653 1.68 1.027 0.511 0.497
ALL 
BANKS                 
  MAX 5.111 1.95 2.371 2.415       
  MIN 0.411 0.589 0.543 0.676       
  RANGE 4.7 1.361 1.828 1.739       
  MEAN 1.172 1.057 0.807 1.188       
  SD 0.781 0.305 0.326 0.387       
  CV 0.666 0.289 0.405 0.326       
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Table 6.11: Summary of PTE Change Annual Means (All Banks) 
BANKS   
1998-
1999 
1999-
2000 
2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 MEAN SD CV 
Domestic 
Commercial Banks 0.948 1.132 0.867 0.958 0.972 0.112 0.115
Foreign 
Commercial Banks 1.011 0.992 0.787 1.201 0.987 0.169 0.172
Singaporean 
Commercial Banks 0.99 1.011 1 1 1 0.009 0.009
Domestic 
IBS   1.415 1.034 0.975 1.071 1.112 0.198 0.178
Foreign 
IBS   0.736 1.485 1.396 1 1.111 0.35 0.315
Domestic Islamic 
Banks 0.961 0.843 0.659 1.385 0.927 0.308 0.332
ALL 
BANKS                 
  MAX 3.454 1.969 1.792 2.127       
  MIN 0.472 0.791 0.601 0.794       
  RANGE 2.982 1.178 1.191 1.333       
  MEAN 0.996 1.057 0.884 1.048       
  SD 0.47 0.205 0.215 0.269       
  CV 0.472 0.194 0.243 0.256       
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Table 6.12: Summary of SE Change Annual Means (All Banks) 
BANKS   
1998-
1999 
1999-
2000 
2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 MEAN SD CV 
Domestic 
Commercial Banks 1.245 0.974 0.881 1.19 1.062 0.173 0.163
Foreign 
Commercial Banks 1.376 1.005 0.942 1.07 1.087 0.192 0.177
Singaporean 
Commercial Banks 1.209 0.85 0.923 1.267 1.047 0.206 0.197
Domestic 
IBS   0.919 1.305 0.938 0.959 1.019 0.184 0.18 
Foreign 
IBS   1.128 0.874 0.936 1.708 1.12 0.38 0.339
Domestic Islamic 
Banks 1.493 0.844 0.991 1.187 1.103 0.281 0.254
ALL 
BANKS                 
  MIN 0.52 0.731 0.549 0.821       
  MAX 1.986 1.923 1.323 2.415       
  RANGE 1.466 1.192 0.774 1.594       
  MEAN 1.177 1 0.912 1.134       
  SD 0.294 0.233 0.132 0.279       
  CV 0.25 0.233 0.144 0.246       
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Table 6.13: Summary of Technological Change Annual Means (All Banks) 
BANKS   
1998-
1999 
1999-
2000 
2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 MEAN SD CV 
Domestic 
Commercial Banks 0.857 1.105 1.316 0.863 1.018 0.22 0.216
Foreign 
Commercial Banks 0.738 1.133 1.484 0.744 0.98 0.358 0.365
Singaporean 
Commercial Banks 0.983 1.059 1.135 0.96 1.032 0.079 0.077
Domestic 
IBS   0.925 0.883 1.154 0.994 0.984 0.119 0.121
Foreign 
IBS   0.839 0.987 1.252 0.797 0.953 0.206 0.216
Domestic Islamic 
Banks 0.694 1.083 1.527 0.629 0.922 0.414 0.449
ALL 
BANKS                 
  MAX 1.252 1.467 1.855 1.508       
  MIN 0.616 0.587 0.629 0.472       
  RANGE 0.636 0.88 1.226 1.036       
  MEAN 0.833 1.038 1.292 0.826       
  SD 0.136 0.167 0.23 0.211       
  CV 0.163 0.16 0.178 0.256       
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Table 6.14: Relative Efficiency Scores (TE) for 1 pre-merger year and 3 post-
merger years 
 
 
 Technical Efficiency 
   
Pre-
merger 
Yr 
Merger 
Yr 
Post 
Merger 
Yr1 
Post 
Merger 
Yr 2 
Post 
Merger 
Yr 3 
Case 1 
Acquiring 
Bank AFFIN 0.631 0.876 0.38 0.484 n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) BSNC 0.602 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 2 
Acquiring 
Bank ALLIANCE  0.755 0.982 0.612 0.5 n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) IBM 0.633 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
   SABAHB 0.634 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 3 
Acquiring 
Bank BCB 0.786 0.384 0.662 0.794 0.477 
 
Target 
Bank(s) BBMB 0.608 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 4 
Acquiring 
Bank EONBANK 0.608 0.923 0.485 0.442 n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) ORIENTALB 0.648 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 5 
Acquiring 
Bank 
HONG 
LEONG 0.722 0.938 0.642 0.607 n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) WTBB 0.601 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 6 
Acquiring 
Bank MAYBANK 0.336 0.732 0.912 0.566 0.602 
 
Target 
Bank(s) PABB 0.339 0.525 0.849 n.a n.a 
   TPBB 0.305 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 7 
Acquiring 
Bank PUBLIC 0.672 0.833 0.494 0.599 n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) HHB 0.656 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 8 
Acquiring 
Bank RHB 0.539 0.571 n.a n.a n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) BUB 0.582 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 9 
Acquiring 
Bank SOUTHERN 0.728 0.91 0.57 0.593 n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) BHL 0.688 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
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Table 6.15: Relative PTE Scores for 1 pre-merger year and 3 post-merger years 
 
  
        
 Pure Technical Efficiency 
   
Pre-
merger 
Yr 
Merger 
Yr 
Post 
Merger 
Yr1 
Post 
Merger 
Yr 2 
Post 
Merger 
Yr 3 
Case 1 Acquiring Bank AFFIN 0.805 0.908 0.571 0.721 n.a 
 Target Bank(s) BSNC 0.678 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 2 Acquiring Bank ALLIANCE  0.908 1 0.874 0.769 n.a 
 Target Bank(s) IBM 0.67 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
   SABAHB 0.705 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 3 Acquiring Bank BCB 0.931 0.854 0.908 0.814 0.803 
 Target Bank(s) BBMB 0.712 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 4 Acquiring Bank EONBANK 0.705 0.946 0.703 0.682 n.a 
 Target Bank(s) ORIENTALB 0.683 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 5 Acquiring Bank HONG LEONG 0.831 0.979 0.878 0.759 n.a 
 Target Bank(s) WTBB 0.615 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 6 Acquiring Bank MAYBANK 1 0.978 1 1 1 
 Target Bank(s) PABB 0.782 0.572 0.905 n.a n.a 
   TPBB 0.81 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 7 Acquiring Bank PUBLIC 0.813 0.894 0.786 0.772 n.a 
 Target Bank(s) HHB 0.882 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 8 Acquiring Bank RHB 0.888 0.829 n.a n.a n.a 
 Target Bank(s) BUB 0.741 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 9 Acquiring Bank SOUTHERN 0.926 0.93 0.731 0.767 n.a 
 Target Bank(s) BHL 0.848 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
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Table 6.16: Relative SE Scores for 1 pre-merger year and 3 post-merger years 
 
 Scale Efficiency SE 
   
Pre-
merger 
Yr 
Merger 
Yr 
Post 
Merger 
Yr1 
Post 
Merger 
Yr 2 
Post 
Merger 
Yr 3 
Case 1 
Acquiring 
Bank AFFIN 0.784 0.964 0.666 0.671 n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) BSNC 0.887 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 2 
Acquiring 
Bank ALLIANCE  0.831 0.982 0.701 0.651 n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) IBM 0.946 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
   SABAHB 0.899 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 3 
Acquiring 
Bank BCB 0.846 0.9 0.562 0.69 n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) BBMB 0.854 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 4 
Acquiring 
Bank EONBANK 0.988 0.69 0.648 n.a n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) ORIENTALB 0.948 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 5 
Acquiring 
Bank 
HONG 
LEONG 0.868 0.958 0.731 0.799 n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) WTBB 0.977 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 6 
Acquiring 
Bank MAYBANK 0.336 0.749 0.912 0.566 0.602 
 
Target 
Bank(s) PABB 0.433 0.917 0.938 n.a n.a 
   TPBB 0.377 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 7 
Acquiring 
Bank PUBLIC 0.827 0.932 0.629 0.776 n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) HHB 0.744 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 8 
Acquiring 
Bank RHB 0.607 0.689 n.a n.a n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) BUB 0.785 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
               
Case 9 
Acquiring 
Bank SOUTHERN 0.785 0.978 0.779 0.772 n.a 
 
Target 
Bank(s) BHL 0.812 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
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Table 6.17: Change in Relative Efficiency Scores (TE) and Market Share of 
Deposits in the 3 years following merger. 
   
 DCB Period 
 
Market 
Share of 
Deposits 
Change in 
Market 
Share of 
Deposits 
Change 
in TE for 
Merged 
Banks 
Case 1 AFFIN During year of merger 2.05%     
   During Post-Merger Year 1 2.50% 22.02% -36.53% 
   During Post-Merger Year 2 2.43% -3.14% 29.74% 
   During Post-Merger Year 3 Nil Nil Nil 
           
Case 2 ALLIANCE  During year of merger 1.04%     
   During Post-Merger Year 1 1.92% 83.83% 23.76% 
   During Post-Merger Year 2 1.97% 2.64% -5.60% 
   During Post-Merger Year 3 1.93% -2.26% -3.18% 
           
Case 3 BCB During year of merger 2.62%     
   During Post-Merger Year 1 7.10% 171.22% -27.50% 
   During Post-Merger Year 2 7.37% 3.76% 13.79% 
   During Post-Merger Year 3 7.06% -4.17% -11.64% 
           
Case 4 EONBANK During year of merger 0.82%     
   During Post-Merger Year 1 1.67% 102.58% -21.69% 
   During Post-Merger Year 2 1.65% -0.77% 4.19% 
   During Post-Merger Year 3 Nil Nil Nil 
           
Case 5 HONG LEONG During year of merger 2.42%     
   During Post-Merger Year 1 2.86% 18.13% -3.60% 
   During Post-Merger Year 2 3.03% 5.88% 3.52% 
   During Post-Merger Year 3 Nil Nil Nil 
           
Case 6 MAYBANK During year of merger 10.29%     
   During Post-Merger Year 1 12.94% 25.71% -11.34% 
   During Post-Merger Year 2 12.93% -0.08% 9.51% 
   During Post-Merger Year 3 Nil Nil Nil 
           
Case 7 PUBLIC During year of merger 4.08%     
   During Post-Merger Year 1 4.97% 21.94% -13.62% 
   During Post-Merger Year 2 5.53% 11.18% 18.15% 
   During Post-Merger Year 3 Nil Nil Nil 
           
Case 8 RHB During year of merger 5.64%     
   During Post-Merger Year 1 5.42% -3.90% 10.33% 
   During Post-Merger Year 2 Nil Nil Nil 
   During Post-Merger Year 3 Nil Nil Nil 
           
Case 9 SOUTHERN During year of merger 1.92%     
   During Post-Merger Year 1 1.97% 2.64% -6.03% 
   During Post-Merger Year 2 1.93% -2.26% -1.61% 
   During Post-Merger Year 3 Nil Nil Nil 
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CHAPTER 7: 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
7.1: The Comparative Productivity Performance between CBS and IBO. 
 
Research Question 1: What Are the Relative Productivity Scores between 
Conventional Banks and Islamic Banks operating within a Dual Banking 
System? 
 
In response to the first research question, the results from the previous Chapter 
illustrate that within the dual banking system environment in Malaysia, Islamic 
banking operations (IBO) had outperformed conventional banking (CBS) 
throughout the study period 1996-2002. Specifically, the study found that: 
 
 
7.1.1: Discussion on Research Question 1, Finding 1  
7.1.1.1: Discussion 1:  The growth of Islamic banking  
 
Research Question 1:  
What Are the Relative Productivity Scores between Conventional Banks and 
Islamic Banks operating within a Dual Banking System? 
Research Question 1, Important Finding 1 
Since the 1997-1998 financial crisis, Islamic banking enjoyed a sudden surge of 
efficiency and productivity growth. The year 1998 marked the rise of Islamic 
banking performance. Subsequently, DIBS evolved to become the most efficient 
banks on average followed closely by FIBS. Both FIBS and DIBS eventually 
progressed to record the highest PTE, SE, TFP change, TE change and PTE 
change by 2002 relative to conventional banking. In addition, FIBS also 
dominated others in SE change. Furthermore, IBO tend to operate at a more 
efficient scale size with a majority of them attaining MPSS. Overall, PTE change 
and SE change were the highest for IBO although SE change was slightly 
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dominant between the two. Nevertheless, all IBO experienced technical regress 
on average. Thus, IBO were better in improving managerial efficiency and 
realizing scale economies than were the CBS but they were not as innovative 
as the CBS.  
 
Discussion 1 on Research Question 1, Important Finding 1 
7.1.1.1: The growth of Islamic banking  
The rise of Islamic banking in 1998 was largely attributed to the 1997-1998 
financial crisis. During the pre-crisis period, Islamic banking generally faced a 
lack of acceptance amongst savers despite the introduction of the Interest Free 
Banking Scheme back in 1993 and a period of sustained and rapid economic 
development. With the participation of 25 commercial banks, 21 finance 
companies and 1 Islamic bank, the Islamic banking sector expanded in 1996 
with higher deposits, a broader financing base and greater product variety but 
the share of deposits and financing was very small in the context of the total 
financial system (BNM, 1996). Financing meanwhile was heavily exposed to the 
property sector, where the majority of funds were extended to finance 
residential properties (BNM, 1997). 
 
The onset of the 1997-1998 financial crisis brought a change in fortunes for 
Islamic banking in Malaysia. In 1997 and 1998, Islamic demand deposits 
suddenly gained popularity due to the migration of deposits from conventional 
banking to Islamic banking.  This was largely because of the better investment 
deposit rates on outstanding balances available to depositors as deposit 
interest rates fell as the BNM pursued easy monetary policy during the latter 
half of 1998 to counter the contraction of the domestic economy (BNM, 1998). 
The growth of the sector was timely as the sector had already received a boost 
in 1996 when BNM required banks to disclose their Islamic banking operations 
and allowed eligible banks to establish full-fledged Islamic banking branches 
rather than through Islamic banking “windows” to encourage banks to focus 
more resources towards developing Islamic banking in Malaysia (BNM, 1996). 
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These empirical findings thus are consistent with the theories presented by Erol 
and El Bdor (1989), Haron et al. (1994), and Gerrard and Cunningham 
(1997).Their results show that religion is not necessarily the overriding factor 
leading to  the public embracement of Islamic banking but rather circumstances 
where there is the expectation of higher returns on deposits or better terms than 
might be available from the conventional banks. In fact, the religious and moral 
appeal of Islamic banking did very little to contribute to the growth of Islamic 
banking in Malaysia prior to 1998. This argument is significant considering that 
Islamic banking in Malaysia has relied heavily on the public awareness among 
its majority Muslim population about the unlawfulness of interest to mobilize 
deposits since March 1983 when the first Islamic bank, the Bank Islam Malaysia 
Bhd (BIMB) was first incorporated.  
Levis and Algaoud (2001) maintain that the most critical factors to sustaining 
growth in Islamic banking are (1) the ability to provide modern banking facilities 
supported by the latest technological advancements and (2) the ability to offer 
rates of return comparable to those received by depositors in conventional 
banks. It is apparent in the results, at least during the early growth years of 
Islamic banking between 1996 and 1998, that the second factor appears to be 
dominant. According to the author’s the Malaysian experience appeared to 
deviate from the religious underpinnings claimed by Islamic banking proponents 
that require the business community to place first emphasis on contribution 
towards the larger economic development and more equitable distribution of 
income and wealth over the institution of individual economic profits. 
Nevertheless, such a strong inference must somehow be counter-balanced with 
the fact that Islamic banking in 1998 was also buttressed by strong interest 
among Malaysia’s non-Muslims whose prime motives were to earn generally 
higher profits in Islamic banking compared to conventional banks.  
 
Another interesting development, that highlights the prevalence of economic 
profit motives among Islamic banking customers, has been the fact that 
although very short-term investment deposits constituted the largest amount of 
Islamic banking fund sources throughout the formative years, it is savings 
accounts that have had the largest number of depositors (Levis and Algaoud, 
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2001). The largest contributors to longer-term investment accounts on the other 
hand, have primarily been the Malaysian government and 5 other government 
institutions (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). Another factor to consider is that the 
principal reason for the popularity of savings accounts is that IBO has chosen to 
distribute a return on savings accounts although the contract from them does 
not guarantee the rate and the banks’ continued ability/willingness to do so. 
Thus, the IBOs had resorted to  incentive mechanisms that were akin to paying 
interest to garner deposits and gain a competitive edge over conventional 
banks. In summary, these findings further lend credence to the notion that 
participation in Islamic banking has been primarily motivated by its profitability 
appeal and on the grounds of ethical banking or the unlawfulness of paying and 
receiving interest. 
 
Nevertheless, the financing expansion was however small and pale compared 
to the deposit growth and was largely set aside to finance investments in 
residential properties within the broad property sector. This is because growth in 
funds demand was mostly restricted towards residential property financing due 
to the fixed rate nature of the Bai Bithaman Ajil facility/service of Islamic banking 
(BNM, 1998). Such a facility provided households and businesses with 
opportunities to refinance their loans to lock in financing rates. As a result, 
financing income rose significantly in 1998 for Islamic banking institutions even 
as interest revenues were depressed in conventional banking.  
 
This asset-liability imbalance highlights one of the most critical issues in Islamic 
banking in mixed systems during the formative years. Levis and Algaoud (2001) 
have already observed in Section 1 that while it is relatively easy to place and 
accept interest-free deposits within the financial system, it has been more 
difficult to implement PLS financing assets. The result is that at present, the 
demand and supply for Islamic deposits and transactions far outstrips the 
supply of suitable financing/investment avenues, creating an imbalance 
between the deposit/liability side and financing/asset side of the IBO. Some of 
the major factors that contributed to this imbalance can be explained by the 
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unique risks inherent in Islamic banking that have been discussed at length in 
Chapter 1. They include the heightened risks to both the IBO and depositors as 
a result of: (1) equity funding as opposed to debt financing, (2) the problem of 
adverse selection and moral hazard arising from financing contracts that are 
unable to protect the IBO from information asymmetries as opposed to debt 
contracts, and (3) the problem of commodity and interest rate risks faced by the 
IBO when extending fixed-rate Islamic financing contracts. 
 
The problems above also reflect the reasons why the public tend to place their 
deposits in both savings and investment accounts over very short-term 
maturities. As expounded in Chapter 1, depositors in investment accounts 
generally face greater risks than a usual shareholder does. This is because 
Islamic banking does not entitle them to voting rights, regular receipts of 
information pertaining to the project’s or company’s management and the ability 
to buy or sell their shares/interests in a company or project. In response 
depositors usually opt (1) for shorter term investments to reduce their risks 
and/or (2) exercise their “shareholders’ activism” on the IBO by placing greater 
and more frequent monitoring of IBO investments although contractual 
provisions usually do not entitle depositors to meddle with the IBO's investment 
policies (unless under the musyaraka investment mode that are longer-term in 
nature). The second factor also led to the banks’ refusal to invest in private 
projects that entail longer-term and higher risks. This is perhaps the most cited 
reason why the IBO generally have excessive liquidity due not to the shortage 
of investment channels but the unfavorable trade-off banks faced that created a 
shortage of “suitable” investment opportunities.  
 
Meanwhile the inability of banks to guarantee certain rates of return on savings 
accounts prompted depositors who migrated from conventional banks in search 
of higher rates of return to concentrate over the short-term maturity span to 
minimize risks. 
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Another distinctive feature of Islamic bank financing in Malaysia has been the 
significant political influence over the IBO operations and the eventual rates of 
return on investments, especially when considering the two Islamic banks that 
leveraged heavily on governmental assistance to establish their presence. As 
noted in Section 1, the ability of the IBOs to attract funds and expand their 
assets owed much of their success to the Islamisation programs initiated by 
many Muslim country governments. Thus, governmental decisions have 
significant bearings on the operations of IBOs since it is relatively easier for the 
government to secure financing from IBOs to fund public projects/expenditures 
that are deemed as ethical and socially desirable. Within the Malaysian 
experience, although the prevalence of investments in residential properties on 
the financing side of banks’ balance sheets can be attributed to the avoidance 
of adverse selection risks by banks (this is because exposure in residential 
properties is considered to be less risky compared to exposures to finance 
production of industries), the trend appears to be more driven by the 
government emphasis and directives to enhance funding towards financing 
residential properties to cushion the decline of the broad property sector of 
residential properties following the 1997-1998 financial crisis. 
 
In contrast, there was a significant contraction in interest income and increase 
in interest expense in conventional commercial bank operations that led to a 
sharp decline in efficiency in 1998 as opposed to the increased efficiency in 
Islamic banking. Inefficiencies were due to decline in interest income that was 
attributed to (1) rising NPLs, (2) negative loan growth and (3) higher loan loss 
provisions. Loan loss provisions and interest in suspense in fact rose some 
208% in 1998 (BNM, 1998). These were further augmented by the regulatory 
adoption of more stringent provisioning requirements under the recently revised 
Guideline on the Suspension of Interest on Non-performing Loans and 
Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Debts that shortened the period during which 
banking institutions were required to make loan provisions for doubtful debts. In 
an environment where interest rates were high  whilst economic progress was 
contractionary, NPLs rose sharply in 1998, especially when the new guidelines 
required that a 3-month NPL classification be made in place of the usual 6-
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month classification. Furthermore, individual banks faced with severe liquidity 
constraints bid up interest rates on deposits to a level that would not justify 
returns on investments for viable business. These resulted in heightened 
interest expenses and as interest income declined at the same time, 
conventional commercial banks grew increasingly inefficient.   
 
Islamic banking meanwhile continued to enjoy rapid asset and deposit 
expansion in 1999 as a result of spillover effects from the improving economy. 
In the same year, Islamic banking also recorded impressive profitability and 
efficiency increase largely due to higher financing income and lower financing 
loss provision expenses as financing write-backs and recoveries increased. 
During 1999, the Islamic banking sector was further enlarged following the 
establishment of the second Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat Malaysia. Islamic 
banking operations by DIBS meanwhile also received a boost when BNM 
allowed DIBS to accept conventional deposit placements to facilitate the 
withdrawal of conventional deposits and to receive payments for conventional 
loans from customers of conventional banking branches (BNM, 1999). This 
allowed customers of the same bank to perform their banking at all branches27.  
 
Since 1999, The Islamic banking sector continued to record robust growth in 
financing and non-financing income in line with the picking up of the domestic 
economy as it recovered from the financial crisis. With the commercial bank 
merger exercise initiated in 1999 in place, the number of market/institutional 
participants were soon reduced to 2 Islamic banks and 13 IBS operational units. 
In March 2001, the BNM launched the Financial Sector Masterplan, where the 
BNM committed itself to assist industry to achieve the targeted market share of 
20% of total banking assets by 2010. Some of the significant measures taken 
by the BNM during the study period include:  
 
                                                 
27 The chief requirement to do so however was that the bank needs to attain at least 5% market share in 
terms of deposits and financing. Although BNM had chosen to defer the compliance to end of 2000, all 
DIBS fulfilled this pre requisite.  
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1. Allowing Islamic banking operation institutions to offer products that were 
based on floating rates and Islamic leasing facilities to reduce the risk of 
asset-liability mis-matching and to stimulate product/service innovation 
within  industry.  
2. The setting up of a standard framework to ensure standardization of rate 
determination, specification, maturity structure and industry practice to 
enable institutions to better adapt and adjust to meet changing needs of 
bank customers that are becoming increasingly differentiated.  
3. Promotion of the consolidation of the IBS with their respective banking 
groups to generate scale economies and cost effectiveness. 
4. Establishment of the Islamic Interbank Money Market (IIMM) to facilitate 
the provision of funds for banks to meet their liquidity requirements. The 
absence of an interbank market for Islamic banking is often cited as a 
primary factor that impedes the growth of Islamic banking elsewhere. 
5. Establishment of the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) to better 
adapt and harmonize standards for Islamic financial products. These 
gave a much needed boost towards attracting depositors and borrowers 
to the industry.  
 
 
 
7.1.1.2: Discussion 2 on Research Question 1, Important finding 1  
The Superiority of Islamic Banking Schemes Operations (IBS) over Full Fledged 
Islamic Banks (IB) 
 
Research Question 1:  
What Are the Relative Productivity Scores between Conventional Banks and 
Islamic Banks operating within a Dual Banking System? 
Research Question 1, Important Finding 1 
Since the 1997-1998 financial crisis, Islamic banking enjoyed a sudden surge of 
efficiency and productivity growth. The year 1998 marked the rise of Islamic 
banking performance. Subsequently, DIBS evolved to become the most efficient 
banks on average followed closely by FIBS. Both FIBS and DIBS eventually 
progressed to record the highest PTE, SE, TFP change, TE change and PTE 
 241
change by 2002 relative to conventional banking. In addition, FIBS also 
dominated others in SE change. Furthermore, IBO tend to operate at a more 
efficient scale size with a majority of them attaining MPSS. Overall, PTE change 
and SE change were the highest for IBO although SE change was slightly 
dominant between the two. Nevertheless, all IBO experienced technical regress 
on average. Thus, IBO were better in improving managerial efficiency and 
realizing scale economies than were the CBS but they were not as innovative 
as the CBS.  
 
Discussion 2 on Research Question 1, Important finding 1  
Against this backdrop, the total of banking assets and deposits continued to 
grow. These regulatory inducements however benefited the IBS operators more 
than Islamic banks. By 2000, the IBS operations had managed to control the 
largest market segment with a total market share of 42.7% (BNM, 2000). This 
trend reflected the increased confidence and acceptance of the general public 
towards Islamic banking’s ability to generate comparable rates of return for 
investors. Following this, both financing and non-financing incomes for FIBS 
and DIBS had begun to increase at a faster rate than IB beyond 2000. Thus, the 
trends indicated a greater efficiency improvement for the IBS operations relative 
to as well as at the expense of IB. However, the streamlining process by the  
DIBS operations led to large gains in technological change for domestic 
institutions but a large dip in SE in 2001 with only a negligible decline in PTE. 
The significant deterioration in SE was largely caused by the sudden increase in 
branch, bank staff and ATM networks that  resulted from the mergers.  
 
The merged banking entities however had fully succeeded in integrating their 
operations by rationalizing common organizational functions and downsizing 
branch, banking staff and ATM networks by the end of 2001. Thus in 2002, the 
DIBS regained some measures of SE by large degree. By the end of 2002, both 
the DIBS and the FIBS were the most efficient in terms of SE although 
managerial inefficiencies continued to rise slightly for the DIBS. Nevertheless, 
the spectacular gains in PTE and SE for both the DIBS and the FIBS relative to 
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all other banks that had taken place since 1998, ensured that both IBS 
operations dominated TFP change, PTE change and SE change. 
 
 
7.1.2 Discussion Research Question 1 Finding 2 
Research Question 1:  
What Are the Relative Productivity Scores between Conventional Banks and 
Islamic Banks operating within a Dual Banking System? 
 
Finding 2 
Although DIBS became the most efficient banks on average for the period from 
1996 to 2002, FIBS nevertheless managed to catch up and even surpassed 
DIBS beginning in TE performance with effect from the year 2000. These 
efficiency performance improvements were largely attributed to greater SE 
scores relative to FIBS beginning 1999. DIBS however continued to dominate 
FIBS in PTE until 2001. By 2002, FIBS not only had the best TE and SE score 
of all banks, but FIBS were also fully PTE efficient. Thus it is not surprising that 
FIBS began to grow more efficient at a faster rate than any other banking 
groups, and consistently outperformed others in TFP change, TE change, PTE 
change and SE change measures. The efficiency of FIBS was heavily 
influenced by both managerial efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE) during 
this period although PTE effects dominated SE effects slightly. Meanwhile DIBS 
were subjected more to PTE rather than SE effects. 
 
Discussion on Research Question 1 Finding 2 
Within Islamic banking, there was a noted difference in productivity performance 
between FIBS and DIBS. First and foremost the FIBS operations were more 
scale efficient than the DIBS especially after 1998. The aftermath of the 
financial crisis left many DCB banks vulnerable to scale inefficiencies in the face 
of the rising costs of bank staff and overheads in the maintenance of 
overextended networks of branches. At the same time, the crisis prompted the 
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BNM to take correctional measures that saw mergers among the DCB and the 
reintegration of finance companies with their parent DCB banks. 
 
The DCB bank merger exercise initiated in 2000 and completed in 2001 had 
significant spill-over effects on the DIBS operations since the DCB are often the 
parent bank of the DIBS operations. Furthermore, the DIBS often share the 
same branch and ATM network as well as banking staff with their parent DCB. 
The sudden enlargement of size following the bank mergers in 2000 eventually 
resulted in increased scale inefficiency among the DIBS. The FIBS on the other 
hand were operated by FCB that were in turn restricted by regulation in terms of 
enlarging their branch and ATM network. Thus, the FIBS often had to rely on 
their marketing and service quality expertise in marketing themselves to the 
public. As the assets, deposits and financing income increased while their 
operation scale remained largely unchanged, the FIBS experienced greater SE. 
In fact as Table 6.7 highlights, the FIBS largely operated under IRS or MPSS 
after 1999. Thus, Table 6.3 highlights that beginning in 1999, the FIBS became 
more scale efficient than the DIBS and the difference peaked in 2001 following 
the completion of the DCB mergers and the beginning of the post-merger 
integration process at the end of 2000. It is also apparent that by 2002, the SE 
difference had started to narrow considerably following a surge in scale 
efficiency among the DIBS. This signals that the merged domestic banking 
entities were successful in integrating their internal functions. Therefore, the 
FIBS advantage in SE is expected to erode further as domestic banks continue 
to consolidate.  
 
Meanwhile the DIBS dominance in PTE eventually gave way in the beginning of  
2000. By 2002 the FIBS became more PTE efficient than the DIBS. The 
sustained but gradual PTE deterioration in the DIBS was a result of the DIBS 
reliance on funds in the form of short term deposits on which rates of return are 
paid rather than investment accounts and the lack of profitable financing 
avenues. 
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Investment deposits in the DIBS tended to concentrate too much on a very 
short-term maturity horizon between 1 to 3 months (BNM 1998, 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002). The lack of interest in longer-maturity deposit investments was 
attributed to the marginal increment in rates of return that were not 
compensatory against the higher long-term risk of Islamic banking investment 
and also the uncertainty of future rates and economic development (BNM, 
2001). Meanwhile, financing activities were largely dominated by proceeds 
being directed towards financing residential properties due to the attraction of 
the fixed-rate nature of Islamic financing.  
 
The FIBS on the other hand, were becoming more reliant on non-financing 
income from fee-based activities to generate profitable returns, due to their 
greater access and participation in international money markets as a result of 
their wide international presence, and the existing supporting framework 
afforded by their conventional banking operations. This distinctive feature that 
sets the FIBS apart from the DIBS and Islamic banks is shown in Figure 7.1 
where it is apparent that although both financing and non-financing income 
increased at faster rates beyond 2000, non-financing income increases 
dominated financing income growth. Notice also that FIBS incurred much higher 
revenue attributable to shareholders’ deposits compared to the DIBS and the 
IB. Nonetheless a combination of high financing and non-financing income was 
enough to afford the FIBS comfortable margins. 
 
As Figure 7.1 and Table 6.2 show, PTE had become the new source of 
efficiency advantage to the FIBS. This inference is apparent in Figure 7.1 where 
towards 2002, the FIBS became more adept in generating very high levels of 
non-financing income after a history of depressed financing income trends prior 
to 2000. Following the increases in financing income levels since 2002, the 
FIBS are expected to earned wider margins in relation to both income 
attributable to shareholders and expenses not related to income attributable to 
shareholders.   
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To summarize, the IBS operations share the same set of difficulties that are 
faced by most Islamic banking operations in mixed systems elsewhere. These 
occur where there is; (1) excess of short-term depositors’ funds, (2) lack of 
longer term depositors’ funds and (3) shortage of suitable longer term and 
higher return investment avenues that entail less risks to banks given the 
distinctive risks mentioned above that are intrinsic to Islamic banking. These 
factors often constrained the growth of domestic IBO’s in Muslim countries. On 
the other hand, a number of foreign institutions with operational locations at the 
international level were able to leverage on their risk management 
competencies, capital markets access, extensive experience in financial 
engineering and wide distribution networks from their existing conventional 
banking operations. These have enabled them to surpass many domestic IBO’s 
in Muslim countries in terms of profitability, efficiency and productivity. Not only 
are they better equipped to manage the unique risks of Islamic banking, but 
they have been more competent in transforming these risks. Thus, foreign 
multinational IBS have been active in Islamic finance by assisting the movement 
and transformation of investment funds to more appropriate and varied avenues 
of investment from one part to another part of the world. Thus, in many 
examinations of Islamic banking performance, foreign “Islamic windows” have 
usually been shown to outperform other IBO by focusing their attention on 
earning non-financing income by transforming the risk-return and maturity 
profiles of investment funds as opposed to a sole focus on earning financing 
income from the mere creation of financing assets and depositor liabilities.  
 
In Levis and Algaoud (2001) the authors show that the critical asset-liability 
inconsistency in Islamic banking can be often be resolved by market forces 
similar to those that recycled the petrodollars in the 1970s following the two 
world oil crises and the more recent Japanese current account surplus to 
finance US current account deficits. In both examples, the creation of 
syndicated credit and securities derivates (such as the Euronote facilities) made 
possible by intensive and innovative financial engineering had been able to 
transform short-term financing into longer-term funding. Similarly, foreign 
multinational institutions owe much of their success in “recycling” the short-term 
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Islamic investment funds pooled from multiple regional locations to fund more 
profitable but riskier and longer maturity investment projects worldwide. In many 
instances, foreign institutions act much like merchant banks that assist in 
funding syndication and the creation of financial derivative securities that are 
aligned to Islamic precepts in return for fee revenues. 
 
7.1.3: Discussion of Research Question 1 Finding 3 
 
Research Question 1:  
What Are the Relative Productivity Scores between Conventional Banks and 
Islamic Banks operating within a Dual Banking System? 
Research Question 1, Finding 3 
The IB had the lowest average TE and PTE scores and the second lowest SE 
mean score relative to all other banking groups. The IB also registered the 
lowest TFP change, TE change, PTE change and Tech change. Apart from 
these considerations, IB were inclined to follow the trends of the CBS as the 
efficiency trends of the IB were more or less congruent (rising and falling at 
almost the same time) to those of DCB and FCB. PTE effects were more 
dominant in IB. 
 
Discussion of Research Question 1 Finding 3 
 
Full fledged Islamic banks (IB) had more similarities in terms of their operations 
with conventional commercial banks. This is because unlike the DIBS and the 
FIBS, the IB need to maintain their own branch and ATM networks as well as 
bank staff. Being part of a parent DCB or FCB bank; it must be noted that both 
DIBS and FIBS had a number of advantages. These include 
 
(1) The ability to utilize their parent banks’ existing wider distribution network 
to market their products and services. IB on the other hand had to build 
and expand their own distribution network in order to compete. Given the 
need to maintain their own bank branches and ATM outreach, it is not 
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surprising then that the IB tended to be more scale inefficient compared 
to the DIBS and the FIBS. Thus, PTE effects played a larger role in 
determining the changes in TE for the IB. 
 
(2) The ability to leverage on the existing competencies of the parent bank in 
areas that lend great degrees of competitive edge such as treasury 
operations and risk management. These also include ready access to 
large customer segments within their conventional banking sector to 
which the DIBS and the FIBS could market their products and services. 
This aspect is vital as many bank customers desire to transact and 
manage their wealth under both conventional and Islamic banking. This 
is not surprising as it has been shown earlier than both depositors and 
borrowers tended to take on Islamic banking for very specific purposes 
subject to the comparative economic incentives between conventional 
banking and Islamic banking. Thus, it seems that to a large degree, 
Islamic banking has assumed a role that complements conventional 
banking rather than competing with conventional banks head on as an 
alternative banking mode. Another advantage that has often been 
enjoyed by the FIBS is the ability to access large capital markets in the 
world as well as to mobilize massive Islamic deposits/funds from the 
Middle East region where Islamic banking has been practiced for quite 
some time compared to Malaysia. This aided the FIBS in securing cost-
effective funds as well as having more profitable financing avenues. This 
helps to explain why the FIBS earned larger incomes from non-financing 
activities as previously pointed out. 
 
(3) Both the DIBS and the FIBS also benefited immensely when the DCB 
bank merger program implemented in 2000 triggered increased 
investments in technology, human capital and operational innovations 
among not just the DCB but also the FCB. Being part of the DCB and the 
FCB bank groups, the DIBS and the FIBS thus did not have to make 
huge expenditure outlays but stood to share the gains of enhanced 
banking operations arising from such investments. Thus, this explains 
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why technological0 change for the DIBS and the FIBS as shown in Table 
6.13 was lower than the CBS and the IB in 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 
periods. In contrast, the IB had to undertake investments and thus 
exhibited  more similarities with the DCB and the FCB during both 
periods. 
 
It must be noted as well that throughout the study period, the IB were not only 
constrained by the financing difficulties that the IBO often face due to the 
heightened risks arising from asset-liability mismatches unique to Islamic 
banking, but were also subjected to greater degrees of political pressures in 
their operations. The study conducted by Lewis and Algaoud (2001) on the 
financial statements of one Malaysian Islamic bank (BIMB) revealed that the 
BIMB’s operations had over 60% of murabaha investments dedicated towards 
longer term (over 5 years) investments as compared to other IBS operations in 
Malaysia. Nevertheless, the bank had the largest exposure (40% of total 
financing) in the real estate markets in line with the government’s economic 
policy to enhance the provision of housing to consumers to revive the property 
sector.  
 
These findings suggest that the IB in Malaysia much like other Islamic banks 
elsewhere in Muslim countries, may have undertaken government priorities due 
to (1) the assistance extended by governments in the Islamization of the 
financial system and (2) the principal requirement of Islamic banks to support 
community-enhancing programs. In the case of Islamic banks in Malaysia, the 
“politicization” of Islamic banking is even more prevalent due to the fact that 
government agencies and religious bodies have jointly subscribed most of the 
paid-up capital of Islamic banks and thus, are in a position to control the 
operation, management and investment policies of Islamic banks (Lewis and 
Algaoud 2001).  These constraints often result in investment decisions that run 
contrary to economic profit interests and limit Islamic banks in allocating 
resources to other more profitable but less morally optimal projects. At the same 
time however, one cannot conclude that the interests of depositors are not 
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taken care of since in Islamic banking, “shareholders’ activism” places the 
advancement of social interests first. 
 
 
7.1.4: Discussion on Research Question 1 Finding 4 
Research Question 1:  
What Are the Relative Productivity Scores between Conventional Banks and 
Islamic Banks operating within a Dual Banking System? 
Research Question 1, Finding 4 
Only the DCB experienced technical change progress  whilst all other banking 
groups in Malaysia experienced technical regress. All IBO on average 
regressed. The IB regressed the most followed by FIBS and lastly DIBS. Thus, 
Islamic banking in Malaysia was better at implementing innovation diffusion 
whilst the DCB were the more innovative banks. 
 
Discussion on research question 1 finding 4 
One striking feature in Table 6.13 has been that from 1998 to 2002, only the 
DCB within the Malaysian banking industry actually recorded technical 
progress. All other banks regressed on average including all the IBO. It must be 
noted that firstly, the measure of central tendency used in Table 6.13 to 
determine the mean technological change scores across all years is the 
geometrical mean. Thus, technological changes within the final 2001-2002 
period had significant bearing on the mean score. Nevertheless, it is apparent 
from Table 6.13 that DCB, FCB and IB made significant tech progress between 
1999-2000 and 2000-2001. Both periods coincided with the 2000 merger 
program and all 3 banking groups were directly affected. Therefore, banks 
seem to have taken preparatory measures in 1999 to (1) ensure smooth 
integration of their operations in anticipation of the merger exercise for the DCB 
and (2) to enhance their capacity to compete in anticipation of a more 
competitive environment for both FCB and IB. As previously mentioned, both 
the DIBS and the FIBS stood to receive the benefits from the investments taken 
by their parent DCB and FCB and thus, both need not spend as much. Table 
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6.13 clearly shows that the DIBS and the FIBS had only started to make 
technical progress between 2000 and 2001 just as the DCB and the FCB were 
streamlining their operations. 
 
This observation testifies to the fact that Islamic banks can no longer expect to 
continue to attract deposits and financing demand from those who particularly 
believe in the unlawfulness of interest-based transactions as reported by Saed 
(1995). This is because  new financial institutions such as the IBS operations 
are now able enter the market while leveraging on the existing competencies of 
their conventional banking operations, and this causes intensified competition 
resulting in falling profit spreads and margins. Consistent with this argument, 
Lewis and Algaoud (2001) have identified that the ability of banks to offer rates 
of return comparable to those received by depositors in conventional banks 
must be complemented with the ability to provide modern banking facilities. 
These need to be supported by the latest technological advancements to 
enhance the processing efficiency of growing transaction volumes in order to 
succeed in this new form of financial intermediation. Many Western 
conventional banks are able to effectively win market share from Islamic banks 
by means of Islamic Windows because they are more able to achieve both 
goals compared to Islamic banks.  
 
7.2: Discussion on Research Question 2 – Comparative Performance 
between DCB and FCB 
Research Question 2:  
What are the Relative Productivity Scores between Domestic Commercial 
Banks and Foreign Commercial Banks? 
 
Summary of Important Findings 
In Tables 6.1 to 6.3, the FCB outperformed the DCB on average TE, PTE and 
SE measures although both did not achieve very efficient scores on all three 
measures. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 shows that most of the TE difference is due to 
the fact that the FCB were more scale efficient than the DCB although both 
banking groups had almost identical average PTE scores. Across all years, the 
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FCB were more inconsistent in PTE measures whilst the DCB had more 
performance variation in SE. Nevertheless Tables 6.4 to 6.6 point out that the 
FCB are more heterogeneous than the DCB on TE, PTE and SE measures. 
 
Discussion on Research Question 2 Important Findings 
Figures 6.1 to 6.3 show that both the DCB and the FCB had highly similar PTE 
and SE trends between 1996-2002. The 1996-2002 study period can be broken 
down into 4 sub-periods in which both the DCB and the FCB exhibited 
distinctive TE, PTE and SE trends. In general, banks were adversely affected 
by the financial crisis between 1996 and 1998. Subsequently the improving 
Malaysian economy and the return of financial system stability saw banks briefly 
recovering from 1999 to 2000. However, the banks grew inefficient once more 
in 2001 following the completion of the industry wide consolidation program 
among the DCB initiated by the Malaysian central bank. Nevertheless, by 2002, 
post-merger bank efficiency levels improved. 
 
Figures 6.1 to 6.3 illustrate that TE levels for both banking groups started to 
decline in 1996 before plunging sharply to reach the highest inefficiency levels 
in 1998. This sustained deterioration in the banks’ technical efficiency was 
mostly caused by growing scale inefficiency although the banks’ managerial 
efficiencies were also falling simultaneously as well but with a lesser magnitude. 
Both the DCB and the FCB were the least SE in 1998. The DCB were more 
scale inefficient during the 1996-1998 period. In fact, the difference in SE 
measures between the DCB and the FCB reached an apex in 1998. 
 
During the subsequent recovery period from 1999-2000; the PTE difference 
widened in favour of the FCB in 1999, although the gap narrowed considerably 
in 2000. At the same time the SE gap reached aminimum in favour of the FCB 
in 1999 but widened thereafter. In 2001, the bank consolidation program 
created high levels of scale inefficiency among the DCB and the FCB. Both 
banks were the least managerially efficient (PTE) in 2001. Nevertheless, the 
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difference in both PTE and SE increased considerably in 2002 with the FCB 
being more efficient. Even when the reintegration process was successfully 
completed at the end of 2001, the DCB only recovered slightly vis a vis the 
FCB. Regardless, the FCB continued to outperform the DCB in 2002. 
 
PTE levels were more stable and fairly similar between the DCB and the FCB 
(except for a period during 1999 when the DCB PTE levels declined even as the 
FCB became slightly more efficient). Both the DCB and the FCB had higher 
PTE than SE.  The DCB were more PTE efficient than SE efficient in 1996, 
1998, 1999 and 2002, whilst the FCB were more PTE efficient from 1997-1999.  
 
Overall, the FCB were more efficient than the DCB and this difference was 
largely due to the FCB being more scale efficient than domestic banks. In fact 
throughout the study period, most DCB were oversized as almost all banking 
institutions operated on DRS. In contrast, a number of the FCB actually 
managed to attain MPSS towards 2002 although most units exhibited DRS. By 
2002, the DCB were the least scale efficient of all. Consequently, the FCB 
dominated the DCB in TFP change, TE change, PTE change and SE change 
measures.  
 
However the DCB on average outperformed the FCB where the technical 
change measure is considered. Both the DCB and the FCB displayed technical 
progress in 1999-2000 and in 2000-2001 and regress in 1998-1999 and 2001-
2002. The DCB however were better innovators in 1998-1999 and 2001-2002 
while the FCB dominated in 1999-2000 and 2000-2001.  
 
7.2.1: Discussion on Research Question 2 Findings: In Relation to 
Relevant Studies 
Research Question 2:  
What are the Relative Productivity Scores between Domestic Commercial 
Banks and Foreign Commercial Banks? 
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Discussion 2 on Research Question 2 
Most studies of banks’ productivity and efficiency seek to compare the banks’ 
performance between the pre and post events or during the financial 
liberalization periods. It is important to note that this study only briefly addresses 
the impact of financial liberalization on the banks’ productivity and efficiency 
because the Malaysian financial system only began to slowly liberalize 
beginning 1999. The policy  was not officially launched by the Central Bank until 
March 2001 when the Financial Sector Master Plan was released. This details 
the phases of financial deregulation to be undertaken in the years leading to 
2010 when the financial system is expected to be fully deregulated. Thus, this 
study is limited to the very early years of financial liberalization. 
 
7.2.1.1: Bank Efficiency Levels 
The results of this study are quite consistent with those reported in 
Bhattacharyya et al (1997) where the study findings suggested that although 
public banks were the most efficient in the Indian banking industry, the public 
banks were on the decline whilst the foreign banks that usually started off as the 
least efficient banks were able to catch up and even match the public banks. In 
this study, it was found that the FCB were consistently more efficient than the 
DCB throughout the study period. In fact, the performance gap continued to 
increase in favor of the FCB from 2000. The results agree with Bhattacharyya et 
al (1997) on the fact that foreign institutions managed to catch up to the efficient 
frontier faster where the FCB had better TE progress. Nevertheless, the results 
show the FCB outperforming the DCB between 1999-2000 and 2001-2002. 
Bhattacharya et al did not report on PTE and SE results.  
 
However Bhattacharyya et al (1997) did report the prevalence of DRS among 
domestic Indian banks while a number of foreign institutions had been able to 
operate on IRS and CRS. The authors attributed the rise of foreign banks to the 
fact that (1) foreign banking institutions were constrained by numerous 
regulations especially on capital adequacy, (2) foreign banks were only 
subjected to modest priority sector lending as opposed to, (3) Indian banks that 
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were required to branch into rural and suburban areas and to make significant 
commitments towards funding priority sectors. Thus foreign banks were able to 
efficiently extend their networks within urban areas only and thus they are 
regarded as more efficient in adapting to an increasingly competitive 
environment.  
 
The third factor holds true to some extent within the Malaysian context as the 
results show that the FCB outperformed the DCB due to their ability to operate 
with better scale size. First and foremost, the FCB in Malaysia were prohibited  
from opening new branches  whilst the usage and acceptance of ATM cards 
issued by foreign banks was restricted unlike domestic banks’ ATM cards where 
transactions are enabled amongst each others’ ATM machines (BNM, 2003). 
Thus the FCB need to compete within their existing physical presence by 
expanding their outreach via other means. Many of the FCB resorted to 
relocating their existing branches and ATM machines to higher-density areas 
and "customer-preferred locations" to gain better access to a larger and more 
focused customer base in urban areas (Yeap, 2001).  
At the same time, the mergers among the DCB also led to a sudden expansion 
of branch and ATM networks amongst the DCB. Here, the results were 
consistent with those of Sathye (1998) who reported that domestic Indian banks 
were expanding and thus, employed higher fixed assets that have yet to 
generate any returns. Similarly, the bank consolidation program led to (1) a 
sudden expansion of scale of operation and (2) huge investment outlays on 
capital items and technology. Both could have left large amounts of idle 
resources and become sources of inefficiencies in the short run before banks 
were able to extract efficiency gains from them through effective and efficient 
use. 
Furthermore, the FCB were mostly concentrated in urban areas except for 4 
main FCB whose outreach may be more spread out but nevertheless, the FCB 
were more focused on certain geographical locations. Thus, the DCB were 
operating at less efficient scale size relative to the FCB. By the completion of 
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the merger exercise in 2000, all the DCB were operating under DRS while some 
FCB were still able to attain IRS and MPSS.  
 
The comparative SE results also correspond well to the findings of Avkiran 
(2000) in which the author found that regional banks with substantially smaller 
bank staff size than the major trading banks tended to operate with IRS whilst 
the major trading banks operated at DRS but sometimes at MPSS as well. The 
FCB in Malaysia certainly had a far smaller bank staff and branch network than 
the DCB and thus were able to operate with IRS and MPSS. This indicates that 
some FCB with IRS are able to enhance their efficiency by expanding their 
operations. Nevertheless, Avkiran (2000) reported that banks had a returns to 
scale cycle during the deregulated period; where banks began with MPSS and 
then deteriorated to DRS. Subsequently, banks experienced IRS and finally 
MPSS once more. Such findings were not evident in the results. Instead this 
study found a increase in IRS and MPSS banks in 2000 but most of the FCB 
reverted to DRS since 2001. 
 
There are however some differences between the banking developments in 
India and in Malaysia. Similar to Indian banks, both the DCB and the FCB were 
also subjected to priority lending directives by the central bank to the SME 
sector. However unlike the case in India, the Malaysian experience has been 
less intrusive and more market-oriented where the central banks  not only 
compelled through moral suasion but also encouraged and assisted banks in 
extending funding to the relatively risky SME sector through various regulatory 
measures. For instance, the Entrepreneur Rehabilitation and Development 
Fund (ERDF) was established on 3rd July 2001 to assist the resolution of 
existing NL and to provide working capital to small SMEs.  It is noted that while 
the DCB are generally cautious in expanding SME lending due to the 
heightened risks, some FCB had already opened branches dedicated to SMEs 
in areas with a heavy concentration of these enterprises.  
In fact, the FCB had been specializing in both consumer and SME lending 
niches  since the pre-crisis period when the DCB were engrossed in serving the 
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corporate sector. When the 1997-1998 financial crisis resulted in high NPL 
levels among corporate loans, the focus of the DCB then  shifted to both 
consumer and SME lending where they had a disadvantage. Thus, the FCB had 
not only generally been able to move faster than the DCB despite the numerous 
regulatory restrictions on their operations, but also had been able to leverage on 
their competencies to emerge and compete effectively and efficiently. This was 
not across all banking markets or  in providing the full range of banking services 
but in a few focused but highly lucrative sectors. 
Research Question 2:  
What are the Relative Productivity Scores between Domestic Commercial 
Banks and Foreign Commercial Banks? 
Discussion 2 on Research Question 2 Findings 
7.2.1.2: Bank Productivity Performance  
In terms of banks’ productivity, the empirical findings of this study run contrary 
to those of Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) who found substantial increases in 
productivity and technical progress growth with the onset of the financial system 
deregulation. In this study, the Malaysian banking system was beginning to 
liberalize with the implementation of the Financial Sector Master Plan in March 
2001. Banks experienced technical progress from 2000-2001 but regressed in 
2001-2002. At the same time, the DCB had PTE regress from 2000 to 2002 
while the FCB only progressed from 2001-2002. Both the DCB and the FCB 
had SE regress from 2000-2001 but progressed from 2001-2002. Thus, the 
results of this study are mixed and inconclusive as to the evidence of improved 
productivity in the wake of financial deregulation in Malaysia as opposed to 
strong and sustained growth in TFP productivity, scale efficiency change and 
technical change reported by Bhattacharyya et al. (1997). Only the FCB 
managed to achieve PTE and SE progress between 2001 and 2002. A very 
likely factor that explains these results is that productivity growth and its 
components for the DCB in 2001 and 2002 were confounded by the effects of 
the 2000 bank consolidation program. For instance, heavy capital investments 
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following the bank merger exercise could have resulted in the technical 
progress of banks between 2000 and 2001. Subsequently, the rationalization 
exercises during 2001 during which branches were closed or relocated and 
banking staff were downsized, could have led to technical regress between 
2001 and 2002. 
Furthermore, the findings disagree with those of Isik (2002) who found that (1) 
foreign banks in Turkey were the sole banking group that experienced technical 
progress on average and (2) domestic private banks were more apt in 
improving PTE change from imitating banking practices of foreign banks as 
opposed to scale efficiency changes. This study’s results show that firstly the 
DCB were the only banks that had technical progress on average in Malaysia. 
The FCB, on the other hand experienced technical regress.  Secondly, SE 
progress was more prevalent than PTE change. Both the DCB and the FCB 
actually incurred PTE regress on average. Again the results reflect the 
structural developments that took place with the DCB following the bank merger 
exercise. Merging DCB entities appeared to have made greater strides in 
improving their technology. Nevertheless, the FCB outperformed the DCB in 
both PTE and SE change in most time periods. As the DCB began to realize 
gains from successful integration of their operations, they began to surpass the 
FCB in SE change during the final 2001-2002 period. However, the DCB had 
more performance variation in SE, indicating the effects of the bank 
consolidation on DCB.  
This study agrees however with Isik (2001) that foreign banks outperformed 
domestic banking institutions in terms of TFP change on average. This is 
attributed to more superior performance in both PTE and SE change.  The 
reasons for these results have been explained earlier.  
 
7.2.3: Trend Analysis relating to Research Question 2: Comparative 
Performance between DCB and FCB 
Research Question 2:  
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What are the Relative Productivity Scores between Domestic Commercial 
Banks and Foreign Commercial Banks? 
Discussion  3 on Research Question 2 
The discussion now proceeds to explain the trend analysis of the comparative 
efficiency and productivity performance between the DCB and the FCB to better 
understand the working mechanisms behind the trends and results from a 
period to period basis. To ease comprehension, the entire study period is 
broken down into 4 sub periods: 1996-1998, 1999-2000, 2001 and 2002 to 
better capture the effects of various but distinctive developments that unfolded 
in each of the sub periods.  
 
7.2.3.1: Between 1996 and 1998: A period of growing bank inefficiencies 
Rising inefficiencies among commercial banks were prevalent between 1996 
and 1998 and were largely attributed to (1) narrowing net interest margins as 
interest expenses increased at a faster rate than the increase in interest income 
and (2) rapid increase in non-interest expense vis a vis growth in non-financing 
income. These trends are illustrated by Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4. Following the 
use of this study’s input and output variables outlined in Section 3, these trends 
intuitively led to deterioration of the DEA efficiency scores as the value of output 
over input ratio declined. 
 
The period between 1996 and 1998 was one of the most challenging for the 
Malaysian banking system. Until 1996, the early 1990s were a period of high 
profitability and easy credit extension that prevailed. However, the onset of the 
financial crisis in mid-1997 following a prolonged period of depreciation followed 
by a devaluation of the Malaysian ringgit and a number of regional currencies 
left the industry in turmoil. Although the banking system was still profitable for 
the financial year 1997, the full effects of the financial crisis were eventually felt 
in 1998 when the industry recorded hefty pre-tax losses for the year. This was 
largely attributed to exceptional losses for the two main DCB owing to the rapid 
rise in interest expense and depressed interest revenues (BNM, 1998). The 
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potential systematic risks posed by the rise of NPL levels and eroding capital 
buffers of several DCB prompted the BNM to take drastic forced stabilization 
measures to prevent a potential break down of the financial intermediation 
process.  
 
Interest expenses rose between mid 1997 to February 1998 when the BNM 
adopted a tight monetary policy to contain inflationary pressures and capital 
flight triggered by the rapidly depreciating ringgit (BNM, 1998). This was further 
compounded by tight liquidity conditions faced by banks as total deposits fell 
when massive sums of external funds were withdrawn from the domestic 
banking system (BNM, 1998). Thus, the DCB became over reliant on short term 
funding to finance asset growth. To add insult to injury, the uneven distribution 
of liquidity among banks during this period also contributed to a rise in short 
term interest rates (BNM, 1998). As a result, banks faced with severe liquidity 
constraints bid up interest rates on deposits to a level that would not justify 
returns on investments for viable business. Rising interest rates however were 
accompanied by increased interest income as lending rates rose but the 
increase was less than proportionate compared to the rising interest expenses. 
This was because in an environment where interest rates were high and while 
economic progress was contractionary, NPLs rose sharply in 1998. This was 
particularly so in the face of the recently revised Guideline on the Suspension of 
Interest on Non-performing Loans and Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Debts 
that shortened the period during which banking institutions were required to 
make loan provisions for doubtful debts and required a 3-month NPL 
classification in place of the usual 6-month classification. As a result, loan loss 
provisions and interest in suspense rose some 208% in 1998 (BNM, 1998).  
 
High NPL levels and loan loss provisions were not the only sources of 
inefficiency in 1998. The worsening financial crisis also bred pessimistic and 
weak business expectations. Banks that were already constrained by tight 
liquidity conditions and capital erosion suddenly became over-cautious and 
reluctant to extend new lending but focused on preserving their balance sheets 
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instead (BNM, 1998). Thus, there was negative loan growth as the amount of 
outstanding loans within the banking system declined more sharply than usual. 
This eventually diminished the primary source of potential interest income. 
Therefore, on a wider scale, high NPL levels, negative loan growth and higher 
loan loss provisions squeezed banks’ interest margins leading to an overall 
deterioration in efficiency.  
 
The easing of monetary policy by the BNM during the later part of 1998 through 
direct lending to banking institutions did little to improve banks’ efficiency levels 
during the year as net interest income continued to decline. This was because 
banking institutions’ average cost of funds generally lagged official policy by an 
average of 3-6 months before falling to new levels (BNM 1998). Thus for the 
financial year 1998, net interest income was at least temporarily made worse 
even as the new liquidity framework was implemented.  
 
Meanwhile, non-interest revenue increased slightly to offset some of the 
increase in interest expense. This favorable development was largely attributed 
to net income from trading securities (BNM, 1998). Non-interest expenses 
however rose as both overheads costs and bank staff costs increased 
significantly. High overheads were incurred during this period as banks actively 
sought to expand their network of branches and ATM’s (BNM, 1998). On the 
other hand, banks were faced with higher bank staff costs because of (1) rising 
bank labor costs as a result of shortage of bank employees that prevailed 
between 1996 and 199728 and (2) banks were largely overstaffed.  
 
Both the DCB and the FCB suffered squeezed interest margins and rising non-
interest expenses, resulting in a sharp deterioration of efficiencies in 1998. The 
FCB however experienced smaller efficiency decline relative to domestic banks 
as there was some migration of deposits from small DCB to FCB easing 
somewhat the upward pressures on the deposit rates offered as the liquidity of 
                                                 
28 In fact, staff cost per employee increased to RM42, 700 per annum in 1998- highest costs recorded in 
the banking industry between 1996 and 1999 (BNM, 1996-2002).  
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foreign institutions improved. Furthermore, although the FCB experienced an 
increased NPL burden, the FCB managed to deal with bad loans more 
effectively and efficiently than the DCB. This was largely because the FCB had 
made appropriate provisions for problem loans on a yearly basis to fulfill more 
stringent reporting requirements that the FCB parent banks face in their home 
countries. In comparison, the DCB had been known to delay the need to make 
provisions for NPLs (Fernandez, 2003). 
 
Conditions however were not very difficult 9for large DCB’s as they received 
some share of the “flight to quality” as well (BNM, 1998). Nevertheless, the 
sharp rise in deposit rates of smaller banks to counter fund outflows resulted in 
high inefficiencies not only for smaller banks but also for all DCB (as they are 
aggregated together in a common banking group) on an average basis. During 
the 1996-1998 period however, most of the inefficiencies were sourced from the 
increase in scale inefficiency. This was due to (1) high bank staff costs and (2) 
the large increase in overheads expenses incurred from the banks’ large 
network of branches and ATM’s. Thus, banks were both “oversized” and 
“overstaffed”. This condition was made apparent because as the narrowing 
margins indicated that both increases in interest income and interest expenses 
generally offset one another leaving non-interest expenses as the primary 
source of inefficiency and hence the dominance of SE inefficiency.  
 
Investments in technology were significantly dampened during 1997-1998 as 
banks scathed by the financial crisis adopted overcautious attitudes by avoiding 
any investment decisions that would spread their resources too thin as some 
domestic banks ran short of much needed liquidity. Furthermore, the banks 
were more focused on preserving their balance sheets and controlling loan loss 
expenses and levels rather than on expansionary plans. Indeed, during the 
crisis period, asset growth was severely restricted by high NPL levels and a 
shortage of capital, banks actually needed capital injections to sustain their 
operations.  
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 7.2.3.2: 1999-2000: Recovery and Rising Efficiencies 
The 1999 financial year witnessed a sharp reversal of commercial banks’ 
performance. Figure 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 show that the banks experienced 
significant improvements in scale efficiency that resulted in a strong rebound in 
overall technical efficiency levels from 1999 to 2000 although domestic banks 
became slightly less PTE efficient in 1999. The recovery was sourced from (1) 
the larger decrease in interest expenses relative to the decline in interest 
income and (2) the pickup in non-interest income. Efficiency improvement was 
however greater for the FCB owing to a wider net interest margin. 
 
The banking industry recovered strongly in 1999 following a sharp improvement 
in economic activity following a series of structural correction measures taken 
by the BNM  earlier in March 1998 to address the key vulnerabilities of the 
banking system. The financial restructuring program not only aimed at 
stabilizing the banking system in the immediate term but also at enhancing 
banks’ resilience to economic shocks over the medium and longer term. The 
near-term adjustment programs saw (1) the establishment of Danaharta, an 
asset management company to remove NPLs from banks’ balance sheets to 
restore lending and capital investment activities, (2) the setting up of 
Danamodal, a bank recapitalization agency, to recapitalize banks where 
shareholders were simply unable to raise additional capital to finance expansion 
and (3) the establishment of the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee 
(CDRC) to provide a viable bridge between banks and corporations to work out 
feasible debt workout solutions (BNM, 1999). 
 
Following the financial restructuring program, the banks’ profitability and 
efficiencies for 1999 improved significantly as interest margins widened 
although the levels were still considerably lower than pre-crisis level. However it 
must be noted that such profits made during 1999 were only possible with large 
sums of NPL being removed from banks’ balance sheets to Danaharta and 
public confidence being restored by the recapitalization of the distressed DCB’s 
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by Danamodal. In 1999 alone, the book value of the loans removed from the 
banking system amounted to some RM 34 million and the NPL levels in banks 
decreased to 6.6% from a maximum of 9% (BNM, 1999).  
 
Interest revenues however declined on a net basis in 1999 as banks recorded 
negative growth in outstanding loans as a result of (1) the low interest rate 
environment as the BNM implemented an easy monetary policy to revive 
domestic demand, (2) the removal of problem loans from banks’ books, (3) the 
damage inflicted to the banking system during the crisis had made banks 
somehow still hesitant to extend credit to less credit-worthy borrowers. 
Nevertheless, given that the economy was barely recovering, higher credit-
worthy borrowers were hard to come by, and (4) households and businesses 
were reluctant to take up additional credit given the largely pessimistic 
sentiments that still prevailed during that year, and (5) the preference of 
borrowers to secure Islamic banking to finance purchases of residential 
properties due to the fixed-rate nature of Islamic finance (BNM, 1999). In fact 
throughout 1999, domestic commercial banks had a vast number of unused and 
unutilized credit facilities. Loan activities were mostly restored to finance the 
manufacturing sector and residential property investments. Interest expenses 
also declined at the same time however. This was largely attributed to the drop 
in deposit rates as banks were flushed with excess liquidity as a result of new 
capital injected by Danamodal and the new liquidity framework to increase the 
amounts of loanable funds alongside an easy monetary stance by the BNM 
(BNM, 1999). 
 
Meanwhile non-interest revenue increased significantly, buoyed by the sales of 
investment securities following an encouragingly good performance of the stock 
market and the corporate sector (BNM, 1999). The improved profitability of 
banks was also aided by the fall of non-interest expenses attributed to some 
4.4% reduction in banking staff as well as some 8.2% decrease in overhead 
expenses (BNM, 1999). 
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The differences/variations in efficiency levels among the DCB and between the 
DCB and the FCB were marked in 1999 as the financial crisis disrupted the 
industry. Exceptionally large losses were recorded by one domestic banking 
group and 2 commercial banks because of provisions for losses and high NPL 
levels (BNM, 1999). These losses lead to a few isolated cases of low TE scores 
for DCB’s; the efficiency gap between the DCB and the FCB was thus attributed 
to a difference in managerial efficiency rather than scale efficiency. 
 
The year 1999 also marked the beginning of an industry wide regulatory 
consolidation process when the BNM directed two commercial bank mergers 
following large losses that were incurred as a result of substantial provisions 
arising from high NPLs. It was the BNM’s belief that the 1998-1997 financial 
crisis exposed many vulnerabilities of the banking system that was not well 
capitalized and thus only a strong, efficient and stable banking system can build 
resilience in the functioning of the intermediation process. Following this, a 
comprehensive bank consolidation program involving all domestic commercial 
banks and finance companies was implemented to push the domestic banks to 
attain the critical mass level to (1) meet the changing demands of the domestic 
economy, (2) withstand future shocks to the financial system and (3) to meet 
competitive challenges arising from globalization and liberalization (BNM, 
1999). During the year, the BNM approved the formation of just 10 anchor 
banking groups that would greatly reduce the number of operating banking 
institutions from 54 to just 29. Each banking group must have at least RM 2 
billion in shareholders’ funds and RM 25 billion asset base (BNM, 1999). To 
further ensure that the merger exercise would be an eventual success, BNM 
had targeted the end of December 2000 as the completion date for the bank 
consolidation program and all the DCB were required to conform with this. 
Although the merger exercise was not market-oriented, the DCB were given the 
flexibility to form their own merger groups and banking group leaders (BNM, 
1999).  
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Technology advancement in 1999 was thus not only geared towards resilience 
building and enhancing cost efficiencies but also as a preparatory measure to 
integrate future operations in anticipation of the exercise. Following the BNM’s 
announcement of the impending merger exercise emphasis was given to new 
sources of growth, non-interest activities, new distribution technology as well as 
developing human capital, some of the technological investments made were of 
a competitive strategy in nature.  
 
The momentum of the financial system restructuring initiated and implemented 
in 1999 to consolidate the sector continued to gather in 2000. The program had 
succeeded in fully restoring the stability and credibility of the financial system. 
With this in hand, the BNM shifted its focus towards enhancing the productivity 
and competitive abilities of domestic banks. One important decision made by 
BNM during the year was the permission given to banking institutions to 
outsource to third parties the management of non-core functions to reduce the 
burden to and expenses for banks (BNM, 2000).  
 
During 2000, the banks earned higher interest revenues. Non-interest revenues 
meanwhile rose 10.6% in 2000 due to a 17.8% increase in fee-based activities 
(BNM, 2000). This is also an indication that banks were beginning to focus on 
fee-based operations as interest margins continued to narrow. At the same time 
banks incurred lower non-interest expenses as labor productivity increased and 
loan loss provisions were reduced (BNM, 2000).  
 
7.2.3.3: 2001: Bank Consolidation and Initial Deterioration of Bank Efficiency 
The year 2001 brought new dynamics into the Malaysian banking industry. With 
the bank merger exercise concluded in 2000 with minimal disruption, the 
attention was then focused on the process of business integration and 
rationalization. Although banking groups now enjoyed enhanced size and 
managerial capacity, size alone does not guarantee success. Instead, this 
phase is perhaps the most critical one in determining the eventual long-term 
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success of the merger exercise as new entities within the 10 banking groups 
must strive to reap the potential benefits of merger activity arising from scale 
economies, scope economies, synergies, asset rationalization and 
product/service cross-selling. All banking groups succeeded in doing so 
throughout 2001 with a total of 187 branches being closed down with 55 
branches being reallocated as well as a 4,240 banking staff layoff (BNM, 2001). 
Although disruptions had been minimal, the rationalization process resulted in 
huge overhead costs and higher loan loss provisions and NPL’s as anchor 
banks realigned their internal policies on loan loss provisions towards more 
stringent standards as loan portfolios were integrated (BNM, 2001). Thus, non-
interest expenses rose significantly.  
 
At the same time, net interest income continued to be depressed due to 
declining general interest rate levels that resulted in the reduction of interest 
income compared to interest expense (BNM, 2001). The low interest rate 
environment also prompted the DCB to liquidate low-yielding investment 
securities in their books to extend their loan portfolios (BNM, 2001). Collectively, 
this action led to intense competition in the retail and mortgage businesses 
leading to a further decline in lending rates (BNM, 2001). The reduction of net 
interest income was however offset to a large degree by lower deposit rates. On 
the other hand, the non-interest revenues of the DCB were boosted when banks 
reaped extraordinary gains from liquidating their holdings of dividend-based 
investments to focus on fee-based revenues which by the end of 2001, 
amounted to some 26.3% of total non-interest income (BNM, 2001). These 
developments led to declines in PTE and SE in 2001 for the DCB and the IB 
although banks experienced considerable technological progress. 
Technological investments however tended towards those that assisted in the 
integration and rationalization process. 
 
The 2001 period marks a new phase of competition between the DCB and the 
FCB. The 2000 banking consolidation process resulted in massive scale 
inefficiency within the DCB. While the DCB were busy integrating their 
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operations and managerial systems, the FCB seized this opportunity to expand 
their loan assets. Between 2001 and 2002, loan growth among most of the DCB 
actually slowed while the main FCB (Citibank, HSBC, OCBC and UOB) 
managed to maintain and even grow their loan assets during the same period 
(Fernandez, 2003). The FCB were able to do so because the FCB have always 
been restricted to smaller bases that prevented them from branching out and 
expanding their ATM services and thus not only did they operate at more 
efficient scale sizes (SE), but they had also evolved over time to move faster 
than the DCB in order to compete leading to higher PTE.  
 
7.2.3.4: 2002: Bank Consolidation and Subsequent Improvement in Banks’ 
Efficiency 
The focus of the financial restructuring/deregulation process in 2002 shifted 
towards enhancing domestic capacity of the newly merged domestic banking 
groups. With the completion of the integration and rationalization of banking 
operations, banks were geared towards building suitable and competitive 
delivery platforms and human capital. Central to these were the financial re-
engineering of operations to reap gradual improvements in productivity and 
produce enhanced high-quality product/service diversity, reconfiguration of 
business profit and asset-risk management models and heavy investment in 
technologies that assist banks in gaining competitive market shares. The year 
2002 also saw a more streamlined FCB presence with the merger of United 
Overseas Bank Malaysia and Overseas Union Bank Malaysia following the 
merger of the parent banks in Singapore (BNM, 2002).  
 
With a more liberalized environment, efforts were directed towards  promoting 
efficiency, productivity and innovation measurement and comparability. The 
bank performance benchmarking which was initiated by BNM back in 2000 had 
never became more relevant as within the same year the BNM had committed 
itself towards instilling active and sophisticated consumerism among the 
banking public. Following these efforts, BNM had begun to gather performance 
indicators on the financial performance and customer service quality of 
domestic banks vis-a-vis their peers, be they domestic or foreign institutions. 
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Initiatives were also taken to accelerate strategic alliances especially between 
insurance companies and domestic banks to further enhance banking capacity 
(BNM, 2002). 
 
Against this new backdrop, interest margins continued to narrow owing to 
increased competition (especially in the household sectors), ample liquidity 
conditions attributed to large trade surpluses and foreign investment inflows and 
low general interest rate environment. For the DCB, interest margins were 
preserved by higher lending activities to households and the strategic SME 
sector in compliance with BNM directives. Thus of significance during the year 
was a shift in loan composition towards small loans. Although the business and 
corporate sectors had been revived, the largely low-interest environment since 
the end of the financial crisis had prompted corporations to tap alternative direct 
financing, especially through the bond markets, to finance projects with longer 
terms (BNM, 2002). These developments led to somewhat higher interest 
revenues to the DCB than their FCB counterparts that tended to have less 
expertise in the SME niche. Meanwhile, low interest rates also resulted in low 
deposit rates.  
 
The year 2002 also saw a significant increase in non-interest revenues earned 
by the DCB as higher income was generated by fee-based activities. Strong 
growth was evident in corporate advisory, underwriting and portfolio 
management activities. This trend reflected the changing structure of the 
Malaysian economy as disintermediation  became more common and the 
merged banks were able to restrategize their operations and enlarge their 
revenue scope. The DCB also managed to tap into the potential presented by 
high-worth customer segment wealth management services registered a 244% 
increase during that year alone (BNM, 2002). The favorable economic 
environment and successful debt restructuring exercise meanwhile brought loan 
loss provisions down.  
 
Thus, as the newly merged DCB became fully integrated, SE began to improve 
although only marginally. Nevertheless, the loss of market share for loans to the 
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FCB during 2001 continued to confound the DCB (Fernandez, 2003). In fact by 
2002, the DCB can generally be described as overcapitalized. After 1999, the 
new areas of growth in the Malaysian banking industry had been consumer 
lending, wealth management and fee-based off balance sheet activities. These 
new business segments required not only an intense finance re-engineering 
process and greater access to capital markets, but also effective innovations in 
marketing and distribution that extended far beyond maintaining physical 
branches and ATM’s as well as experience in conducting treasury operations- 
areas in which  the main FCB specialized. Standard Chartered Bank for 
example organized the largest number of syndicated loans in Malaysia in 2002 
(Fernandez, 2003). The same article also highlights the fact that the FCB’s had 
more expertise in linking Malaysian firms with foreign firms elsewhere, providing 
more potential for trade financing. Thus, by 2002, the FCB experienced a sharp 
increase in PTE while the DCB continued to experience decline. 
 
7.3: Discussion on Research Question 3: Dynamic Analysis on Pre- and 
Post- Bank Merger Efficiencies 
Research Question 3:  
What is the Evidence relating to whether Mergers Lead to Productivity Gains? 
 
Summary of Important Findings:  
Dynamic Analysis on Pre- and Post- Bank Merger Efficiencies 
 
Discussion on Research Question 3 Findings 
In regards to the second research question, this study has found that: 
 
1. Out of 9 merger cases that were investigated, 6 cases showed that the 
acquiring banks were more efficient than the target banks in terms of TE, 
one year prior to their respective mergers. In the remaining 3 cases, the 
target banks were only slightly more efficient than the acquiring banks. 
2. In 8 of the 9 merger cases analyzed, the acquiring banks had higher PTE 
levels than the target banks one year prior to their respective mergers. 
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Hence, almost all acquiring banks had more competent managerial 
efficiency.  
3. This study found that in 7 cases, the acquiring banks were less scale 
efficient than the target banks. 
4. In 8 bank merger cases out of 9 cases, TE performance improved right 
after merger. Nevertheless in 6 cases out of 8 cases that permit 
observation during the first post merger year, efficiency deteriorated. 
Only 2 cases saw efficiency improvement. Beyond the first post merger 
year, there is no consistent efficiency performance among banks as 
some banks improved while others grew more inefficient. 
5. For most banks, the improved efficiencies for the merged entities during 
the merger year was attributed to increased scale efficiency. Scale 
efficiency nevertheless declined for a majority of the cases scrutinized. In 
cases that involved observations into the second and third post-merger 
years, SE either stabilized or continued to decline at slower rates. In 
terms of PTE, almost all cases saw PTE deterioration. During the second 
and third post merger years, some banks were more scale efficient while 
others were more PTE efficient. 
6. For a majority of the bank merger cases, the post-merger TE, PTE and 
SE levels did not recover to match those attained during the pre-merger 
period. 
 
In this study, it is found that acquiring banks were more efficient than the target 
banks and that this efficiency advantage was almost all attributed to better 
managerial competence (PTE). In contrast, acquiring banks were less scale 
efficient than target banks. Thus, the results agree with Avkiran (1999), Houston 
and Ryngaert (1994), Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Wheelock and Wilson 
(1998) that acquiring banks were relatively more efficient than the target banks. 
It needs to be re-iterated that the Malaysian in-market bank mergers experience 
was essentially guided by the Malaysian central bank and not market-force 
oriented as had been the cases studied in the existing literature (although banks 
were allowed to choose their own merger partners and bank group leader). 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence gathered is consistent with the findings of 
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Wheelock and Wilson (1995) that relative efficiency can serve as a fairly good 
indicator of becoming a takeover target. Thus, as Avkiran (1999) pointed out, 
banks that are consistently under-performing are likely to become takeover 
targets if potential acquiring banks can identify synergies that can lead to 
increased savings and efficiencies.  
 
This finding would perhaps be more relevant and very vital to both Malaysian 
policymakers and bank managers alike in the years ahead where the possibility 
exists of the second round of in-market bank mergers to reduce the existing 10 
domestic banking groups to say 6. This is because unlike the previous merger 
exercise, the coming merger program would be likely guided by market 
mechanisms.  
 
Although banks generally grew more efficient during the merger year, almost all 
banks experienced efficiency decline during the first post-merger year. Both 
PTE and SE deteriorated at the same time, but in 3 bank merger cases, there 
had been a sharp decline in SE. The sudden enlargement of operating sizes 
could often result in problems and difficulties in consolidating branches, 
computer operations and transaction processing during the first few post-
merger years (Berger et al, 1999). Furthermore, banks are likely to experience 
PTE decline as banks are swamped by managerial difficulties in monitoring 
larger organizations, conflicts in corporate culture and system integration 
problems. However as Table 6.15 and 6.16 suggest, growing scale 
inefficiencies were more prevalent among banks and dominated declines in 
PTE. A possible explanation is pointed out by Yahya et al. (2001) whose study 
showed that Malaysian domestic banks tended to expand their branch and ATM 
networks beyond the levels that were deemed necessary and thus created an 
oversupply in inputs. Furthermore, as explained earlier within the discussion 
section, domestic banks were somehow “overstaffed” just prior to the merger 
exercise at the time when the cost of labor was rising. 
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Nevertheless, the results show inconsistent evidence about increased efficiency 
levels during the post-merger periods. Banks were split between those that 
recovered beyond the first post-merger year and those that continued to 
experience efficiency declines. At the same time, banks were also split between 
those that were more PTE efficient and those that were more scale efficient. 
Thus, the results were consistent with a majority of studies of bank mergers in 
the US, Europe and Australia that found very modest or no efficiency gains 
resulting from bank mergers (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Rhoades, 1993; 
DeYoung, 1997 ;Peristani, 1997;  Vennet, 1996; Focarelli at al. 1998 and 
Avkiran, 1999).  
 
Contrary to the potential for increased scale economies identified by Berger and 
Mester (1997), Berger and Humphrey (1997), Allen and Rai (1996), this study 
found no concrete measures of scale efficiency gains. Similarly, the results are 
inconsistent with (1) Berger and Humphrey (1997) who  showed because the 
banking industry exhibits substantial X-inefficiencies ranging from 20-25% of 
total costs, mergers may substantially improve cost efficiency when relatively 
efficient banks acquire relatively inefficient banks, (2) Haynes and Thompson 
(1999) explain that if a bank merger results in transferring assets to better 
quality managers, X-efficiency gains are likely to result: where potential 
acquirers are usually more efficient than target banks and (3) Resti (1998) 
suggests  increased efficiency levels tend to occur when banks have 
considerable market overlaps. This is because by the end of the study period, 
we found only one bank that managed to attain TE, PTE and SE levels that 
matched or surpassed the levels recorded during the pre-merger years.  
 
On the other hand, this study is consistent with Avkiran (1999) whose results 
assert that acquiring banks may be more efficient than the target banks but they 
do not necessarily maintain their pre-merger efficiency levels following bank 
mergers. This study is also consistent with the findings of Berger and Humphrey 
(1992), Srinivasan and Wall (1992) and Rhoades (1993) whose findings 
maintained that there is no efficiency gain from in-market mergers where the 
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acquiring bank is more efficient. Thus, this study shows that even bank mergers 
in a developing economy do not necessarily lead to efficiency gains as 
promoted by many academics and policy makers. Following this, decision 
makers need to be more cautious in promoting bank mergers as a means to 
attain higher efficiency.  
 
It is very likely that banks became inefficient in the post-merger period relative 
to the pre-merger period because bank managers need time to address the 
coordination difficulties arising as a result of bank mergers. Nevertheless, in this 
study, the Malaysian central bank had reported that all merged banks had 
successfully integrated their operations within their own groups by 2001. Thus, 
efficiency gains should be evident by 2002 at the latest. The results show 
inconclusive evidence of such gains. But perhaps it is also possible that banks 
need more time to adjust their operations accordingly despite the central bank’s 
claims. This is because the existing literature more or less arrived at a 
concensus that newly merged entities may take between 2 to 4 years before 
cost savings and revenue enhancements can be realized Berger et al. (1998),  
Calomiris and Karceski (2000), Rhoades (1998) and Houston et al. (2001). For 
6 of the 9 merger cases studied, the fourth post-merger year would coincide 
with 2004. Only in 1 of the other 3 bank merger cases had the merged entities 
been through the 3rd post-merger year by 2002. That particular banking group 
experienced efficiency growth in the 1st and 2nd post merger years but recorded 
efficiency decline during the 3rd post merger year. The case however presents a 
rather different result from the other 8 cases. This is largely because when 2 
banks merged into a single entity in 1998, a full fledged Islamic bank was 
created out of the operations of both merging banks. The Islamic bank operated 
as a separate and distinct legal entity from the merged commercial banks. 
Thus, the results from this case cannot be interpreted with confidence as they 
are confounded by the effects of the event.  
 
A point raised by Haynes and Thompson (1999) is that if a bank merger results 
in transferring assets to better quality managers, X-efficiency gains are likely to 
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result: where potential acquirers are usually more efficient than target banks. 
Furthermore, the findings are also consistent with Resti (1998) who suggests 
that increased efficiency levels tend to occur when banks have considerable 
market overlaps. 
 
7.4: Discussion on Research Question 4: Evidence on the Transmission of 
Post-Merger Gains to the Public 
Research Question 4:  
What is the Evidence of Public Benefits of Bank Mergers? 
Summary of Important Findings: Evidence on the Transmission of Post-Merger 
Gains to the Public. 
Discussion on Research Question 4: 
In 7.3, it was shown that the findings are inconclusive in regards to past merger 
efficiency gains among merged bank entities although banks generally 
recovered from efficiency declines that occurred during the first post-merger 
year in the second post-merger year. Nevertheless, the results from 7.3 show: 
 
1. For 8 out of 9 bank merger cases, banks experienced increases in the 
market share of deposits during the first post-merger year. However, in 
only 1 case had the increase in deposit market share been accompanied 
by an increase in TE. Thus, as far as the first post-merger year is 
concerned, there is only one case in which the transmission of post-
merger gains to the public is evident. 
2. In the second post-merger year, there were 3 cases where there had 
been increases of market share of deposits following increases in TE. 
One of the other 6 cases experienced declines in both (but still preserves 
the proposed causality between post-merger efficiency gains and the 
transfer of such gains to the public. In this case, post-merger efficiency 
losses translate into less favourable rates, pricing and even quality to the 
public). The remaining 5 cases exhibited inconsistent results. 
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3. In the only cases where observations for the third post-merger year is 
possible, both bank groups experienced decline in TE and market share 
of deposits after showing increases in both during the second post-
merger year. Thus, the post-merger efficiency gains and the transmission 
of such gains to the public appear to be non-sustainable. Nevertheless, 
these two cases were insufficient to render firm conclusions on the 
Malaysian bank merger experience as a whole. 
 
Thus, there is inconsistent and inconclusive evidence about the extent to which 
benefits of post-merger bank efficiency gains are passed on to the public. Only 
a few cases support the proposition and the causality that changes in market 
share and changes in overall operating technical efficiency are positively 
correlated. And even these few cases proved to be unsustainable where the 
causality appears to have diminished by the third post-merger year.  
 
The same inconclusive results were also inferred by Avkiran (1999). The 
author attributed the inconsistent results to the possible fact that a change in the 
market share of deposits is not a very good proxy for measuring the extent of 
post-merger efficiency gains to be passed on to the public. The author in fact 
explains that the direction of causality reasoning can be reversed to the effect 
that the increase in efficiencies does not guarantee decreases in prices and 
increases in the quality of banking products and services.  Furthermore the 
study expounds the possibility that increased market penetration creates 
monopoly power due to fewer competitors and as such, merged entities are less 
inclined to improve service at better prices. However this latter argument forms 
the basis for providing a rather poor and counterintuitive explanation of the 
Malaysian financial environment as no single intermediary possesses a 
substantial market share that threatens Malaysia’s competitive financial 
environment29.      
 
                                                 
29 An observance of the results in Table F provides justification for this stand, as the local bank with the 
highest market share of deposits as at the end of 2002, merely controls 12.93% of total deposit. This 
provides a clear indication of the absence of a strong monopoly within the Malaysian financial system.  
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Nevertheless, it is important to note that both this study and that by Avkiran 
(1999) only examine both change in market share of deposits and change in 
post-merger TE variables over a time period of less than 4 years. Focarelli and 
Paneta (2002) highlighted that improvements in efficiency may emerge after 
some time resulting in more favorable future pricing for consumers. Empirical 
evidence has shown considerable lags are likely between the completion of a 
merger and the realization of the public gains due to the difficulties faced by the 
merged bank entities in  integrating their operations and systems, rationalizing 
common assets and harmonizing management styles. The same study actually 
looked into interest rates for different categories of deposits of Italian banks 
over 9 years to detect favorable pricing effects due to post-merger efficiency 
gains. A longer time frame, if applied to this study would reveal any noticeable 
trends.  
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Figure 7.1: Banks Inputs and Outputs (Foreign Islamic Banking Services) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Banks Inputs and Outputs (Domestic Commercial Banks) 
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Figure 7.3: Banks Inputs and Outputs (Foreign Commercial Banks) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Banks Inputs and Outputs (Singaporean Commercial Banks) 
 
 
Inputs and outputs of Figure 7.1 to 7.4 refer to variables on Table 5.1 
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 Conventional Banking Variable Islamic Banking Comparable 
Variable 
Interest Expense Income attributable to depositors Inputs 
Non-Interest Expense Expenses not related to income 
attributable to shareholders 
Interest Income Income from financing Outputs 
Non-Interest Income Non-financing income  
 
Table 5.1: The List of Comparable Variables for Conventional and Islamic 
Banking following the Intermediation Approach of Modeling Bank Behavior.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 280
CHAPTER  8: 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The role of financial intermediation is to channel pooled funds from surplus units 
to deficit units to enable the latter to undertake the use of the funds for either 
consumption or investment purposes. In return, the deficit units or borrowers 
compensate both the bank and the saver in the form of interest. This contractual 
design forms the basis of conventional banking that has a record of almost 300 
years of history. The interest-based debt contracts have been able to effectively 
solve problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in the bank-borrower 
relationship but at times they fall short. This happens in terms of the depositor-
bank relationship as depositors often rely on bank shareholders to monitor 
banks for them when they delegate both agency problems and costs to the 
banks that act as their agents (Lewis and Algaourd, 2001). This form of financial 
intermediation nevertheless, has been able to generate acceptable risk and 
returns to all parties.  
 
The forces of financial deregulation, consolidation, technological advances and 
financial innovation however, are rapidly transforming the role of financial 
intermediaries including banks by intensifying competition among them. 
Financial intermediaries often respond to these forces of change by engaging in 
financial innovation, a process where new financial solutions that provide better 
investment opportunities, returns and risk management, thus helping to 
maintain their competitive positions. As a result, new financial instruments or 
even new financial systems are being introduced at increasing rates to serve 
the role of financial intermediation as financial innovation is assisted by 
advancements in technology, finance theory and the liberalization of financial 
regulations.  
 
Islamic banking represents a new form of financial intermediation that is fast 
gaining popularity worldwide. Unlike conventional banking, Islamic banking 
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prohibits the charging and receipt of interest and the practice of amassing 
wealth through speculative economic transactions that entail excessive risk. 
Instead, Islamic banking strives for economic justice and emphasizes societal 
and community welfare development above the earning of economic profits. In 
short, the essence of Islamic banking is a dual partnership between the Islamic 
bank and its depositors and between the Islamic bank and its investment clients 
to manage the depositors’ financial resources towards productive uses. Rather 
than earning returns in the form of interest, both the Islamic bank and 
depositors instead share in the profits or loss in a particular project with the 
investors. Profit and loss sharing (PLS) arrangements in investment financing 
therefore form the key theoretical framework for Islamic banking. 
 
Islamic banking was initially conceived during the first centuries of Islam to 
enable Muslims to conduct financial transactions. It had rarely however 
developed into a formal financial intermediation framework capable of 
mobilizing massive financial resources from the deficit to the surplus units. 
Islamic banking is governed by the holy precepts contained in Islamic holy 
scriptures and therefore it is both a duty and an obligation of Muslims to 
transact in accordance with Islamic banking principles. Thus, Islamic banking 
holds tremendous potential especially in Muslim countries where the revival of 
Islamic banking is fast taking place as conventional banking slowly gives way 
after becoming the principal financial intermediary since the colonial period. 
Furthermore, there has been much support and interest shown by non-Muslim 
depositors, investors and organizations. In fact, collective evidence has shown 
that multinational banks and organizations have been more adept in operating 
Islamic banking than full-fledged Islamic banks from Muslim countries. As a 
result, Islamic banking has experienced astounding growth rates over the past 
two decades compared to the relatively paler performance of conventional 
banking. 
 
Nevertheless, the rejection of interest-based mechanisms exposes Islamic 
banking to heightened risks arising from (1) the nature of equity-like funding, (2) 
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moral hazards, (3) adverse selection and (4) the lack of risk hedging and 
liquidity instruments that are based on PLS arrangements. As a result, Islamic 
banks tend to experience imbalance between funding and financing sides of 
their balance sheets where funding often exceeds financing because either (1) 
banks’ precautionary stands of expanding investments or/and (2) the lack of 
suitable investment avenues with more desirable risk-return profiles. To 
aggravate problems further, the fundamental differences inherent in Islamic 
banking could potentially result in friction and misunderstanding with regulatory 
bodies and other external agencies that Islamic banks need to deal with as they 
often treat banks as authorized interest-based depository financial institutions: 
the regulations of many central banks to protect depositors in non-Muslim 
countries are in contradiction with the concept of PLS deposits of Islamic banks. 
Furthermore, conventional accounting standards are often inadequate for the 
provision of accurate disclosures of financial reporting to stakeholders.  
 
The distinctive nature and challenges presented by Islamic banking calls into  
question the sustainability of growth of the sector and its ability to compete 
against conventional banking as an alternative banking mode despite its 
impressive record so far. After all, the growth rates of Islamic banking are rather 
crude measures to gauge the competitiveness of Islamic banking vis a vis 
conventional banking. This is compounded by the fact that a cross-system 
performance assessment and analysis between Islamic banking and 
conventional banking has never been widely researched before.  Nevertheless, 
a credible cross-system bank performance would yield valuable insights to all 
participants in the financial intermediation process (including regulators) whose 
decisions would have significant bearing over the eventual success or demise 
of Islamic banking as a viable alternative financial system to conventional 
banking. 
 
This study shows that despite the fact that many aspects within Islamic banking 
deviate significantly from those of conventional banks, Islamic banking is 
nevertheless performing the same role of financial intermediation function as 
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conventional banking. This argument then forms the basis for a comparative 
bank performance assessment methodology between Islamic banking and 
conventional banking. Subsequently, 2 input and 2 output variables of Islamic 
banking that are comparable to the input-output variables of conventional 
commercial banks have been derived. In Islamic banking, (1) financing and (2) 
non-financing income are shown to be close counterparts of (1) interest revenue 
and (2) non-interest revenue of conventional banks. Furthermore both (1) 
income attributable to shareholders and (2) income not related to income 
attributable to shareholders in Islamic banking are synonymous to (1) interest 
expense and (2) non-interest expense in conventional banking.  
 
With  credible models of both conventional and Islamic banking to hand, the 
study proceeds to perform a comparative bank performance assessment. Bank 
performance assessment is then defined in terms of bank total factor 
productivity that includes (1) technical efficiency, (2) scale efficiency and (3) 
technical change. Both of the first two terms are absolute measures at a specific 
point of time while the third term is a relative measure between two time periods 
to capture the shift of the efficient frontiers. Bank technical and scale efficiency 
measures are computed using the Data Envelopment Analysis approach to 
generate relative efficiency scores while the final term is computed using the 
Malmquist Productivity Index or the MPI approach that employs and compares 
relative efficiency scores ratios between two time periods. 
 
The methodology is applied to the Malaysian dual banking system case. The 
dual banking system enables one to make a bank productivity performance 
comparison between conventional and Islamic banks more effectively and 
accurately than in a full-fledged Islamic financial system and a mixed financial 
system. This is because in a dual banking environment, both conventional and 
Islamic banks enjoy identical regulatory control, supervision and incentives that 
are often lacking in the other two financial systems. Thus, it is only within a dual 
banking system that both conventional and Islamic banks compete on a level 
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playing field and this therefore enables a cross system bank productivity 
comparison to be done. 
 
The choice of the Malaysian dual banking system as the case study for this 
study is justified on the grounds that the Malaysian case represents the only 
developed and sophisticated dual banking system in the world that is complete 
with (1) effective regulation of Islamic banking, (2) Islamic money and capital 
markets and (3) a broad spectrum of Islamic financial instruments that include 
short term government liquidity instruments. These have essentially enabled 
Islamic banking to effectively compete with conventional banking. 
 
The research questions that were addressed are in brief as follows: (1) what is 
the comparative productivity performance between conventional and Islamic 
banks within a dual banking system?, (2) what is the comparative productivity 
performance between domestic and foreign banking institutions, (3) has there 
been any post-merger efficiency gains for banks?, (4) if there have been gains, 
has there been transmission of post-merger efficiency gains to the public.  
 
What follows are summaries of the results and discussions of this study. To 
ease readability, the following abbreviations should be noted (1) CBS: 
commercial banking system, (2) IBO: Islamic banking operations, (3) IBS: 
Islamic banking schemes, (4) DCB: domestic commercial banks, (5) FCB: 
foreign commercial banks, (5) IB: Islamic banks, (6) DIBS: domestic IBS and (7) 
FIBS: foreign IBS.  
 
In reference to Research Question 1 on the comparative productivity and 
efficiency performance between CBS and IBO, the principal findings of this 
study indicate that on average, the IBO tended to be more efficient and 
productive than the CBS within the Malaysian dual banking system. Specifically, 
the IBO began to improve their efficiency with the onset of the 1997-1998 
financial crisis. This was largely caused by a sudden migration of funds from 
CBS to IBO as depositors received better investment deposit rates or returns in 
Islamic banking compared to the lower interest rates offered by conventional 
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commercial banks. This was whilst the central bank pursued an easy monetary 
policy to revive the economy following the crisis. The results thus show that the 
acceptance of Islamic banking was largely attributed to motives aimed at 
earning higher economic returns rather than its salient ethical features. The IBO 
continued to grow beyond 1998 as the central bank introduced a number of 
financial restructuring measures geared towards developing the IBO as a viable 
financial intermediary system capable of mobilizing financial resources on a 
grand scale that would be comparable to CBS. Thus, the IBO experienced 
relatively higher progress in terms of PTE and SE change relative to the CBS 
between 1998 and 2002. The initiatives of the central bank in developing the 
Islamic banking system in Malaysia alongside the lifting of a number of 
restrictions on IBS operations saw both the FIBS and the DIBS beginning to 
increase their efficiency and hence their productivity at a faster rate than the  IB 
beyond 2000.  
 
Nevertheless, there had been imbalance between the financing and funding 
sides for the IBO. The unfamiliarity of the greater risks inherent in Islamic 
banking caused the savers to deposit their surplus funds in short-maturity 
savings accounts rather than investment accounts that have a longer maturity. 
Although rates of return are not guaranteed in savings accounts, IBO banks in 
general had been willing to compensate depositors for their funds. The rates of 
return were nevertheless not determined by the amount of risk assumed by 
depositors in PLS investments but rather by the demand and supply of loanable 
funds. Thus, Islamic banking in Malaysia has only been able to outperform CBS 
by being willing to compensate depositors much like paying interest rates to 
savers. IBO banks also experienced excess liquidity due considerable 
difficulties in channelling funds to finance the PLS investment projects that have 
suitable risk-return profiles. The heightened risk in PLS arrangements generally 
made banks more cautious in expanding their assets. The financing decisions 
and directions of the DIBS and the IB were also subject to some degree of 
political pressures in directing credit towards priority sectors. 
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The FIBS on the other hand, were becoming more reliant on non-financing 
income from fee-based activities to generate profit returns due to their greater 
access and participation in the international money markets as a result of their 
wide network of international presence and the existing supporting frameworks 
afforded by their conventional banking operations. The FIBS thus began to 
surpass the DIBS and the IB in PTE change since 1999.  
 
At the same time, the DCB bank merger exercise initiated in 2000 and 
completed in 2001 had significant spillover effects on the DIBS operations since 
the DCB are often the parent bank of the DIBS operations. The sudden 
enlargement of size following the bank mergers in 2000 eventually resulted in 
increased scale inefficiency among the DIBS. The FIBS on the other hand were 
operated by FCB that were restricted by regulations in terms of enlarging their 
branches and ATM network. By being able to rely on their marketing and 
service quality expertise in marketing themselves to the public, the FIBS 
registered higher SE change compared to the DIBS and the IB towards 2002 as 
the FIBS began to become more efficient in SE in 2000.  
 
Fully fledged Islamic banks (IB) meanwhile had more similarities in terms of 
their operations with conventional commercial banks. This is because, unlike 
the DIBS and the FIBS that are able to leverage upon existing risk management 
competencies, distribution network, technologies and other shared assets with 
their parent CBS operations, the IB had to provide and build these necessities 
on their own. Furthermore, the IB operations were more constrained by political 
pressures to undertake government priorities due to (1) the assistance 
extended by governments in the Islamization of the financial system and (2) the 
large fund contributions by the government in the form of longer maturity 
investment accounts.  
 
Throughout the study period, all the IBO appear to have experienced technical 
regress on average compared to technical progress made by the DCB. This 
may be due to the fact that technological investments made by the DCB 
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benefited their subsidiary the  DIBS and the FIBS operations as they often 
shared the same assets, resources and distribution networks.  
 
With  regards to the comparative productivity performance between the DCB 
and the FCB in Research Question 2, the results showed that the FCB 
outperformed the DCB on average TE, PTE and SE measures. Nevertheless, 
despite the differences both DCB and FCB did not achieve very efficient scores 
on all three measures. Most of the TE efficiency difference was attributed to 
higher SE scores for the FCB compared to the DCB although both banking 
groups had almost identical PTE scores on average. Subsequently, the FCB 
dominated the DCB in TFP change, TE change, PTE change and SE change 
measures.  
 
Overall, the FCB were more efficient than the DCB and this difference was 
largely due to the FCB being more scale efficient than domestic banks 
particularly during 1998 during the heights of the financial crisis and in 2001 
following the industry-wide bank merger exercise implemented in 2000 by the 
central bank. In 1998, many DCB that were already experiencing sharp 
tightening of interest margins were further burdened by excessive overheads 
and bank staff costs resulting from the banks’ actions in over expanding their 
branch and ATM networks after prolonged periods of profitability growth during 
the pre-crisis years. The FCB meanwhile experienced less deterioration in SE 
because they were not allowed by the regulators to expand their branch and 
ATM networks. On the other hand, the sudden expansion of assets following 
the bank merger program in 2000 also resulted in many DCB operating beyond 
the most efficient scale size (MPSS) and all exhibited DRS in 2001. In fact 
throughout the study period, most DCB were oversized as almost all banking 
institutions operated on DRS. In contrast, a number of the FCB actually 
managed to attain MPSS towards 2002 although most units exhibited DRS. 
 
Both efficiency and productivity trends for both the DCB and the FCB  had a 
positive correlation with one another. In general, banks were adversely affected 
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by the financial crisis between 1996 and 1998 and in 2001 by the bank merger 
program while banks had efficiency growth in 1999, 2000 and 2002. The DCB 
however tended to experience lower TE, PTE and SE scores than the FCB 
throughout, even during 1998 and 2001 when banks had efficiency troughs. 
This was largely due to better NPL provisioning in foreign banks. However the 
DCB on average outperformed the FCB where the technical change measure is 
considered.   This is mostly attributed to the bank merger exercise where 
domestic banks had to change in response to mergers. 
 
In relation to Research Question 3 on the majority of bank merger cases 
involving the DCB; the acquiring banks were found to be more efficient in TE 
and PTE than the target banks. In contrast, in almost all merger cases, the 
acquiring banks were less scale efficient than the target banks. Following a 
bank merger, the newly formed bank entities exhibited efficiency increases 
during the merger year but efficiency subsequently declined during the second 
post merger year due to higher declines in SE. The evidence gathered from the 
Malaysian dual banking system showed that there was no conclusive evidence 
as to post-merger efficiency trends beyond the first post-merger year as some 
banks experienced efficiency gains while some suffered deterioration. 
Nevertheless, for a majority of the bank merger cases, the post-merger TE, PTE 
and SE levels did not recover to match those attained during the pre-merger 
period. Our results were consistent with a majority of prior studies of bank 
mergers in the US, Europe and Australia that found very modest or no efficiency 
gains resulting from bank mergers 
 
As to Research Question 4 on the transmission of post-merger efficiency gains 
to the public, the results were too inconsistent to make a general inference that 
(1)  there had been sustained post-merger efficiency gains made by banks and 
(2) the gains were passed on to the public and thus resulted in higher deposit 
market shares. The inconsistent results may be due to the possible fact that 
change in the market share of deposits is not a very good proxy for measuring 
the extent of post-merger efficiency gains to be passed on to the public.  
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Summary 
The empirical evidence obtained shows that Islamic banking operations (IBO) 
were more productive than conventional banking schemes (CBS) since 1997 
due to the migration of funds that resulted from: (1) the Islamic banks’ ability 
and willingness to offer higher rates of return compared to the relatively lower 
deposit rates available in conventional banks and (2) the growing scale 
inefficiencies among conventional banks that followed the financial crisis. IBO 
tend to operate at more efficient scale sizes than do conventional banks. 
Nevertheless, the IBO experienced technical regress on average compared to 
CBS as the majority of the IBO were Islamic banking schemes operated by 
conventional banks that were able to leverage on the technological investments 
and other competencies of their parent banks. Consistent with these findings, 
the study shows that full-fledged Islamic banks were the least productive banks 
and they exhibited strong performance similarities with conventional banks. 
Nevertheless, the findings suggest a prevalence of asset-liability imbalance 
among the IBO due to a unique and heightened risk profile of the IBO. 
Subsequently, Islamic banking schemes operated by foreign banks were found 
to be more productive due to the greater contributions from their off-balance 
sheet activities that partially offset the problems of asset-liability mix problems.  
This study also concludes that foreign commercial banks had outperformed 
domestic commercial banks despite the restrictive regulation on branch and 
Automated Teller Machines (ATM) network expansion that was  imposed on the 
former. Overall, the foreign conventional banks (FCB) were more efficient than 
the domestic conventional banks (DCB) and this difference was largely due to 
the FCB being more scale efficient than domestic banks following the onset of 
the financial crisis and the bank merger exercise that involve all DCB. The 
empirical findings also show inconclusive evidence as to the presence of post-
merger gains among merged bank entities and the transmission of these gains 
to the public.  
Limitations of  study 
The results obtained in this study may be confounded by the fact that the post-
merger periods for most merged bank entities were simply too short to allow for 
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suitable gestation period before operation and system integration among the 
merged entities began to result in efficiency gains for the banks and thus the 
subsequent transmission of such gains as benefits to the public. Hence, a 
longer time frame if applied to our study would better reveal any noticeable 
trends.   The  results are to be interpreted with the understanding of the context 
of the study.   The application of the intermediation approach  indicates that the 
banking operations were rated based on the function of mobilizing funds only.    
Further research 
The Malaysia dual banking system allows the study to venture further to gather 
additional empirical insights to the pertinent issues of post-bank merger 
efficiency gains and the transmission of such gains to the public. The empirical 
findings of this study could further add discussion to the already heated debates 
on the existence of post-merger efficiency gains for banks that are often 
forwarded as the motives for the bank mergers. The Malaysian experience 
could also add a further dimension to the banking literature by presenting not 
only a cross-system bank productivity analysis in a dual banking system alone, 
but also in a developing country’s financial system. Specifically, this study could 
further address the pertinent issue of comparative performance between 
domestic banks and foreign banks as they compete on both conventional and 
Islamic banking fronts. Finally, the inclusion of Singaporean banks enhances 
the ability of the DEA models to discriminate between efficient/productive banks 
from those that are not.   This could open frontiers to further research of 
benchmarking in bank productivity within the relatively regulated developing 
financial systems.      
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GLOSSARY 
 
AAOIFI  Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions  
AP  Average Product 
ASEAN  Association of South East Asian Nations 
ATM  Automated Teller Machines 
BIMB  Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
BNM  Bank Negara Malaysia (Malaysia's Central Bank) 
CBS  Conventional Banking Schemes 
CDRC  Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee 
CEPA  Center for Productivity and Efficiency Analysis 
CRS  Constant Returns to Scale 
CV  Coefficient of Variation 
DCB  Domestic Commercial Banks 
DEA  Data Envelopment Analysis 
DEAP  Data Envelopment Analysis Programming 
DFA  Distribution Free Approach 
DIBS  Domestic Islamic Banking Schemes 
DMU  Decision Making Unit 
DRS  Decreasing Returns to Scale 
EE  Economic Efficiency 
EKS  Econometrics Software 
ERDF  Entrepreneur Rehabilitation and Development Fund 
ESH  Efficient Structure Hypothesis 
FCB  Foreign Commercial Banks 
FDH  Free Disposal Hull 
FIBS  Foreign Islamic Banking Schemes 
FMSP  Financial Sector Master Plan 
GATS  General Agreement In Trade and Services 
IAIB  International Association of Islamic Banks 
IASC  International Accounting Standards Committee 
IB  Islamic Banks 
IBCA  Intervest Bancshares Corporation 
IBO  Islamic Banking Operations 
IBS  Islamic Banking Schemes 
ICT  Information Communication Technology 
IDEAS  Econometrics Software 
IFBS  Interest Free Banking Scheme 
IFRS  International Financial Reporting Standards 
IFSB  Islamic Financial Services Board 
IIMM  Islamic Interbank Money Market 
IRS  Increasing Returns to Scale 
LP  Linear Programming 
M&A  Merger and Acquisitions 
MAS  Monetary Authority of Singapore 
MM  Modogliani and Miller 
MPH  Market Power Hypothesis 
MPI  Malmquist Productivity Index 
MPSS  Most Productive Scale Size 
NIRS  Non-Increasing Returns to Scale 
NPL  Non-Performing Loans 
OBS  Off Balance Sheet 
PEFCH  Pure Technical Efficiency Change 
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PLS  Profit and Loss Sharing  
PPC  Production Possibility Curve 
PTE  Pure Technical Efficiency 
R&D  Research and Development 
RAM  Rating Agency Malaysia 
SAS  Statistical Software 
SCB  Singapore Commercial Banks 
SCHTCH  Scale Change of Technology 
SE  Scale Efficiency 
SECH  Scale Efficiency Change 
SFA  Stochastic Frontier Approach 
SHAZAM  Econometrics Software 
SME  Small and Medium Enterprise 
TE  Technical Efficiency 
TECHCH  Technical Change 
TFA  Thick Frontier Approach 
TFP  Total Factor Productivity 
VRS  Variable Returns to Scale 
WDEA  Econometrics Software 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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